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Chapter 1
Introduction
It is a widely accepted view in economic research and policy practice that research
and development activities (R&D) and innovation constitute an important driver
of economic competitiveness and sustainable economic growth (see e.g. Schumpeter
1934, Solow 1957, Griliches 1979, 1992, Hall 1996). Moreover, R&D has been rec-
ognized as important input factor to industrial production at the firm level. As has
been illustrated by numerous studies, the impact of R&D on firms’ productivity is
positive on average. This effect stems from the implementation of newly generated
knowledge and technological discoveries into new products, improvement of existing
products and production processes or cost reductions of producing existing prod-
ucts or services (see e.g. Stiglitz 1969, Griliches 1980, Schankerman 1981, Griliches
and Mairesse 1984, 1990, and Hall and Mairesse 1995). However, while the social
returns to innovation can be substantial, it is not evident that at the project level
the private returns to innovation investment are always positive. Furthermore, pri-
vate returns to investment in R&D, i.e. returns to the company or organization
undertaking the investment, may be significantly lower than social returns due to
knowledge spillover effects. Such spillovers arise because of the imperfect appropri-
ability of the knowledge embedded in innovations. In particular, (basic) research
projects create knowledge that becomes, at least in part, available to third parties
1
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who do not compensate the firm which is conducting and financing these activities
(Griliches 1979). Thus, firms cannot appropriate the full benefits from their R&D
while they have to bear the entire costs (Nelson 1959, Arrow 1962, Usher 1964).
Incentives for investing in R&D may therefore be reduced and the level of private
investment in R&D may be lower than socially desirable. The awareness of the lack
of appropriability of returns to R&D investments has triggered the establishment
of institutional and legal frameworks aimed at protecting intellectual property and
hence, make appropriability of returns more feasible. Yet, even if full appropriability
of returns could be achieved by such policy measures, a second source of potential
under-investment, that is, access to financing for such investment, remains of great
importance.
Not only the uncertainty about private returns to innovation investment faced by
both the investing firm and potential investors, but also information asymmetries
affect conditions for raising funds and hence the incentives of firms to invest in
innovation projects.
This doctoral dissertation focuses on this second type of market failure. Since
the work of Arrow (1962) and Nelson (1959) numerous articles have elaborated on
concepts illustrating why the source of financing does matter and in particular mat-
ters for investments in R&D. These considerations boil down to the cognition that,
if capital markets are imperfect and information asymmetries influence lending and
investment decisions, the cost of different kinds of capital vary by type of invest-
ment (Meyer and Kuh 1957, Leland and Pyle 1977, Myers and Majluf 1984). Firms
fund their R&D projects either from internal sources, from external sources or from
both. In most European countries, raising equity for financing investment projects
generally appears to be not a preferred option. Only a few firms of the entire popu-
lation are listed on the stock exchange. Particularly small (family owned) firms view
issuing of new equity as not particularly desiring. Debt, usually in the form of bank
loans, is therefore a common channel for firms to raise money to finance their invest-
3ment projects. Unlike for capital investment, however, access to external financing
for R&D investment may be restricted due to several reasons. As R&D projects
usually involve costs that consist of wages and rather firm specific investment costs
that provide low collateral value, establishing an R&D program involves significant
sunk costs that unlike capital investment cannot be capitalized in the balance sheet
(Alderson and Betker 1996). Debt-holders such as banks, however, prefer physical
and re-deployable assets as security for their loans, since those can be liquidated in
case of project failure or bankruptcy. Moreover, serving debt requires a stable cash
flow and reduces internal funds for future investments (Hall 1990, Hall 2002). Yet,
most R&D projects do not lead to results that can be commercialized immediately
especially those involving basic research. In many cases it can take years of invest-
ing before the first return is realized. This may also impede financing conditions
for R&D by external sources. Information asymmetries between investors and man-
agers additionally create uncertainty that affects financing conditions. Complexity
and specificity of innovation projects make it difficult for outsiders to judge their
potential value. Firms may also be reluctant to reveal details of the projects to
potential investors for competition reasons (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, Greenwald et
al. 1984, Bhattacharya and Ritter 1983, Anton and Yao 2002). Raising funds for
innovation may therefore be characterized by a higher degree of asymmetric informa-
tion between the parties involved compared to other types of investments. Previous
research further suggested that raising new equity in order to finance R&D may be
even more costly (Himmelberg and Peterson 1994, Carpenter and Petersen 2002).
Myers and Majluf (1984), for example argue that firms will have to take into account
a ”Lemons Premium” when raising new equity, should it be possible to raise it at
all. If no pursuant rate of return can be appropriated, investors may ration their
investment or even refrain from investing at all (Stiglitz 1985).
There is a whole branch of theoretical and empirical literature illustrating that
firms indeed first and foremost use internal funds to finance innovation projects (as
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compared to debt) suggesting a gap in the cost of capital (Leland and Pyle 1977,
Bhattacharya and Ritter 1983, Hall 1990, Hall 1992, Himmelberg and Peterson 1994,
Bougheas et al. 2003). Consequently, the extent to which financial constraints are
binding depends on the firms’ accumulation of internal funds and their ability to
raise financing externally under the conditions of imperfect capital markets.
1.1 Identifying financial constraints
Measuring financial constraints and identifying firms that are affected represents a
challenge in empirical research. Existing literature stresses the role of asymmetric
information, moral hazard in borrower-lender relationships, intra-firm organizational
structures and other institutional factors that may increase the risk of firms to face
financing constraints. This dissertation contributes to previous empirical research
on financing constraints for innovation. The contribution is basically twofold. First,
this thesis adds to previous research in this field by taking into account the role of
the heterogeneity of R&D investments for financing constraints that has received
little attention so far (chapters 3 and 4). Second, it contributes to earlier research
in terms of methodology. In particular, it is attempted to overcome limitations
of previous measuring approaches by introducing direct measures of credit market
access (chapters 2 and 3) and even a direct measures for the financial constraint
itself (chapter 5).
1.1.1 Heterogeneity of R&D
Previous empirical, as well as theoretical, literature has paid surprisingly little at-
tention to the fact that R&D projects can differ substantially in terms of uncertainty
of returns, resource requirements, risk of failure, involvement of basic research and
the importance of secrecy. These properties may, however, be crucial factors that
affect financing conditions. Hence, raising funds for R&D may not only differ from
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financing of capital investment as is shown as a starting point in Chapter 2, but also
intrinsically.
The analysis presented in chapter 3 explicitly distinguishes between firms that are
doing routine R&D to strengthen their established product lines and firms investing
in cutting-edge R&D projects aiming at more radical innovations. Chapter 3 empiri-
cally investigates the presence of financial constraints by studying R&D investments
of product innovators where the type of R&D is considered as being decisive for fi-
nancial constraints. According to this distinction, the former defensive R&D firms
are expected to be less likely to face financial constraints on their activities than the
latter that pursue a more offensive R&D strategy. Since fundamental innovations
usually involve basic research, require significantly more resources, are much riskier
in terms of default and expected returns, and are more prone to secrecy issues, the
acquisition of external capital may be more likely to be curtailed for firms aiming
at such innovations. If this applies empirically it has important implications for
innovation policy. As cutting-edge innovations are typically regarded as the driv-
ing force of technological progress and long-term growth, it is questionable whether
current policy practice aimed at alleviating financial constraints indeed addresses
cutting-edge type R&D.
Whereas in chapter 3 it is distinguished between routine and cutting edge R&D
at the firms’ R&D strategy level, the analysis presented in chapter 4 focuses on
the firms’ R&D activity itself. In particular, the analysis distinguishes the com-
ponents ’R’ and ’D’ of the firms’ R&D investments. As pointed out by Griliches
(1986) (basic) research is a main driver for productivity at the firm level. He showed
that expenditures for basic research significantly contribute to productivity growth
of U.S. manufacturing firms in the 1970s (see also Mansfield 1980). Moreover, the
socially beneficial effects from industrial research projects may be substantial. How-
ever, research projects are often characterized by being ”far from the market” and
the likelihood of profitability may reduced through higher externalities. In addi-
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tion, development usually takes place at a later stage of the R&D process building
on previously generated knowledge. Information asymmetries may be particularly
severe in the case of research activities and firms may be particularly reluctant to
reveal details of the projects to potential investors. Further, the intangibility of the
asset that is being created by the investment may make raising funds externally
more costly for ’R’ projects than for other types of investments. Yet, most pre-
vious research does not explicitly distinguish between the different components of
R&D, although several authors have already stressed that research activities are not
only often separated from development activities organizationally (Karlsson 2004,
Mansfield et al. 1971, Seiler 1965), but also important factors like time, originality,
organization, and knowledge depth differ substantially between ’R’ and ’D’ projects
(Karlsson 2004). The empirical study presented in chapter 4 investigates whether
’R’ investment is more sensitive to the firms’ operating liquidity compared to ’D’.
Such effects would indicate that firms have to rely even more on internal funds for
financing their research than for their development activities. Moreover, it is tested
whether (basic) research subsidy recipients invest more into ’R’ than other firms,
and if they are less affected by financial constraints. If so, the implications for inno-
vation policy are straight forward. Firms willing to pursue ’R’- projects should be
given the opportunity to raise funds at alternative institutions or be supported in
collaborations for ’R’- projects, for example with universities, that reduce financial
resource intensity of such projects. Further, it may be worthwhile to scrutinize ex-
isting subsidy policies in terms of the attention that is devoted to industrial research
projects.
1.1.2 Measures of financial constraints
Since the seminal work of Fazzari et al. (1988) econometric studies have tried
to detect financial constraints by analyzing investments’ sensitivities to changes in
available financial resources. This methodology has subsequently been applied to
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investments in R&D as such activities constitute an important share of total inno-
vation investments. The conjecture for investment in R&D was derived accordingly:
the more sensitive firms’ R&D investment to cash flow the more binding are financial
constraints. Excess sensitivities were regarded as indirectly reflecting firms’ (lack of
access) to the credit market.
The analyzes presented in chapters 2 and 3 aim to improve previous measuring ap-
proaches by employing standardized credit ratings as a more direct measure of credit
market access. This indicator represents an index that is indeed used by banks as
well as by trade partners. Thus, it is in fact the actual rating that potential lenders
would use to assess the creditworthiness of the firms they are dealing with. The
great advantage of the credit rating as indicator for financial constraints compared
to the previously commonly used investment-cash-flow sensitivities is that it rep-
resents a direct measure of access to external capital. Unlike investment-cashflow
sensitivities, it is thus not vulnerable to the shortcomings discussed by Kaplan and
Zingales (1997, 2000). In previous studies it was not clear how the observed ’access
sensitivities’ of investment to changes in cashflow actually can be interpreted and
whether they really reflect credit constraints. The rating index also has an impor-
tant advantage compared to credit requests that have recently been used to study
access to financing (see for example Piga and Atzeni 2007). The main concern using
credit requests relates to a selectivity problem as the most constrained firms which
do not expect to get external funding might not even ask for it. Hence, as the rating
is available for all firms independently of size, legal form or whether they requested
a loan this concern does not apply.
The implementation of the rating index, however, is not without some limitations.
For instance, the rating contains all kinds of information that describe the over-
all situation of the company such as profit, managerial competencies and market
prospects. These factors, however, may be interdependent with the R&D strategy
of the firm. That could for instance imply that successful R&D performers score
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better in some of the rating categories than non-R&D-performers. Moreover, compa-
nies in R&D-intensive industries may also have better market development forecasts.
Hence, even if R&D is no official factor in the construction of the index it may well
affect the evaluation. This should therefore be kept in mind in the interpretation of
the results presented in this dissertation.
In addition to the rating scores, a measure for the firms’ internal liquidity is derived
from the firms’ empirical price-cost margin and employed in the analyzes presented
in chapters 2 and 3. While this measure is not used to identify credit market con-
straints as done in earlier studies, it still serves as control for the availability of
internal financial resources. Thus, the econometric models account for both avail-
able internal funds as well as access to external funds.
Finally, chapter 5 of this thesis presents an entirely different approach to the identi-
fication of financing constraints. In particular, a survey-based measure of financing
constraints is derived. Recently, the use of survey-based constraint indicators has
become of increased popularity. The growing availability of comprehensive, interna-
tionally harmonized survey data on innovation activities at the firm level has enabled
researchers to adopt more direct approaches towards the identification of potentially
financially constrained firms (see e.g. Canepa and Stoneman 2002, Savignac 2008,
Tiwari et al. 2007). These studies generally define firms as constrained if the firms
indicated in a survey that their innovation projects were hampered by the lack of fi-
nance. Yet, the essential problem that these studies face is the potential endogeneity
of the survey indicator. Firms may be more likely to indicate some lack of finance,
the more innovation projects they already conduct. The challenge is to find a valid
instrumental variable which is not influenced by the R&D investment decision of
the company, but does influence the survey variable ”lack of finance”. The measure
for financial constraints that is presented in chapter 5 does not suffer from these
shortcomings. This constraints indicator is based on a test that comes closer to the
’ideal experiment’ for identifying financing constraints as suggested by Hall (2008).
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Firms were asked to imagine that they receive additional cash exogenously and to
indicate how they would spend it. Thus, it is directly observed whether firms choose
to invest either all or part of the cash in innovation projects. Second, it is accounted
for the firm’s choice between alternative uses of the money. Such an approach is
crucial as investing in innovation projects competes with other purposes of firms’
available funds. The consistency of this novel constraint measure has been tested
within the methodological framework presented in chapter 3. The results can be
found in the supplemental material.
1.2 Chapter overview
Chapter 2 of this dissertation1 presents two empirical models. While the main in-
terest is on financial constraints on R&D, the results are also compared to those of a
capital investment model. A positive sensitivity of investment to internal resources
is interpreted as an indication of a restriction due to lack of liquidity in the firm.
Furthermore, a reaction of investment to changes in the firms’ credit rating index
serves as an indicator for credit market restrictions. Moreover, the models allow to
distinguish between differences in investment due to heterogeneity in firm size and
age.
The presented analysis advances on previous studies in the following dimensions.
First, the analysis employs standardized credit ratings as these are a more direct
measure of access to external financing than previously commonly used cash-flow
measures. A sensitivity of investment to the rating index should represent a more
reliable indicator of financing constraints. In addition, an internal liquidity measure
from the firms’ empirical price-cost-margin is employed. Moreover, most previous
studies focus on R&D performers and thus neglect that a large share of smaller firms
1A previous version of this chapter has been published as: Czarnitzki, D. and H. Hottenrott
(2009), R&D investment and financing constraints of small and medium-sized firms, Small Business
Economics.
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do not conduct any R&D activities in the observed periods, possibly due to the lack
of financial resources. For example Bond et al. (2006) attribute the weak results
of many existing studies to the fact that ’financial constraints may manifest them-
selves more in the decision to set up R&D facilities, rather than in decisions about
the year-to-year levels of spending in existing research programs’. Consequently,
non-R&D performing firms and the endogeneity of their decision to invest in R&D
are explicitly taken into account in this chapter’s analysis. While most previous
studies analyze samples of rather large, often stock market listed firms which leads
to results that cannot be generalized smaller or to non-listed firms, the analysis in
this chapter avoids a bias towards large firms by using a sample of firms that is more
representative of the economy.
The empirical models are set up to investigate two main research questions. First,
differences between R&D and capital investment with respect to financing restric-
tions will be analyzed. Second, the role of firm characteristics such as the firms’ sizes
and the firms’ business experiences for the occurrence of financial constraints is at
the center of interest. For instance, larger firms may either be able to fund most
of their projects internally at full scale or may face a lower gap between internal
and external cost of capital. The latter argument is supported by the fact that the
largest firms may offer sufficient collateral for external financing due to their overall
asset value. Moreover, younger firms may be restricted in their R&D investment due
to asymmetric information that is less severe for older firms that have established a
long and stable relationship with their bank. Young firms on the other hand have
not yet built such a relationship (Petersen and Rajan 1995, Berger and Udell 2002).
Besides that, established firms can innovate by building on their previous innova-
tions, e.g. by product differentiation or improvement, while younger firms need to
conduct more fundamental R&D which requires more resources and is much more
uncertain. Further, banks may be reluctant to finance innovation projects of young
firms because of the ’initial-stage nature’ of such projects and the overall higher
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default risk. This may aggravate financing constraints since they cannot yet rely
on internal funds resulting from cash in flow of former products. However, small
and young entrepreneurial firms contribute significantly to the introduction of major
innovations most European countries. Such firms tend to innovate more radically,
create new technologies, products, and markets and often lay ground for further
innovations and spur innovation by other firms. Financing constraints that hamper
those firms’ innovative efforts may thus be particularly harmful for the development
of economic competitiveness and for sustainable economic growth.
Chapters 3 and 4 present econometric studies that explicitly take the hetero-
geneity of R&D investments into account. Sofar empirical as well as theoretical
literature had paid little attention to the fact that R&D projects can differ sub-
stantially in terms of uncertainty of returns, resource requirements, risk of failure,
involvement of basic research, the importance of secrecy and how these properties
may affect financing conditions. Additionally, most articles, surveys, evaluations
and reports concerning allocation of resources to R&D do not explicitly distinguish
between the different components of R&D, namely research- versus development-
oriented projects. However, characteristics usually attributed to R&D activities in
general, such as intangibility and outcome uncertainty are very likely to be more
applicable for ’R’ than ’D’. Research projects are also usually characterized by being
”far from the market” and may induce higher externalities that decrease the likeli-
hood of profitability. Moreover, development generally takes place at a later stage
of the R&D process and builds on previously generated knowledge.
Chapter 3 of this book2 hypothesizes that firms pursuing cutting-edge R&D strate-
gies are subject to financial constraints in the credit market. R&D spending is
expected to be curtailed for cutting-edge R&D while it is not to the same extent for
routine R&D investment. Thus, even if firms are able to credibly convey all infor-
2A previous version of this chapter will be published as: Czarnitzki, D. and H. Hottenrott
(2010), Financial Constraints: Routine versus Cutting Edge R&D, Journal of Economics and
Management Strategy.
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mation relevant to the R&D project to banks, the risky nature of cutting-edge R&D
may still prevent these firms from raising sufficient capital. If such investments are
indeed subject to binding credit market constraints, it would have important impli-
cations for innovation policy. Cutting-edge innovations are one of the driving force
behind technological progress and may also yield higher social returns than routine
R&D projects in the long run. This may call for special policy measures towards
cutting-edge R&D projects and it may also be questionable whether current policies
address these investments effectively.
The analysis presented in Chapter 4 explicitly takes into account differences in
the characteristics of the two components of R&D. By compartmentalizing indus-
trial R&D activity into its components, it is argued that financing development ’D’
externally should be less critical than it is for industrial research ’R’. Moreover,
it is tested whether (basic) research subsidy recipients invest more into ’R’ than
other firms, and whether their investment is also less sensitive to internal liquidity.
Such findings would likewise have interesting consequences for policy. As industrial
research projects yield high social returns and are usually a prerequisite for radi-
cal innovations, financing constraints for such projects may call for policy measures
towards the support of such projects. Research-oriented projects may require dis-
tinct attention implying that a uniform R&D policy may not be able to alleviate
constraints to a sufficient extent.
Chapter 5 of this dissertation takes an entirely different approach to the iden-
tification of financial constraints compared to chapters 2 to 4. Financial constraints
are measured by a survey-based measure. This indicator is derived from a test that
is close to the ’ideal experiment’ for identifying financing constraints as suggested by
Hall (2008). In particular, firms were asked to imagine that they receive additional
funds exogenously and to indicate how they would spend it. This approach takes the
firm’s choice between alternative uses of available funds into account as investing in
innovation projects competes with other purposes of use for these funds.
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Chapter 5 furthermore introduces the concept of innovation capability into the con-
text of financing constraints. This concept is based on the employees’ skill struc-
ture, firms’ efforts to train their employees and innovation experience. This concept
extends previous definitions such as the concept of New Technology Based Firms
(NTBFs) that comprises small and medium sized firms in high-tech sectors (see
e.g. Storey and Thether 1998). Compared to growth rates of start-ups in general,
NTBFs were found to grow faster in terms of employment indicating the potential
for job-creation embedded in these firms. The slightly different concept of Young In-
novative Companies (YICs) takes into account that in addition to the disadvantages
of being small and young, these firms exhibit a high R&D-intensity in the sense that
funds need for investment in R&D are large compared to the funds that the firms
generate from their business activities (see e.g. Schneider and Veugelers 2010). The
concept of innovation capability can be applied to broader range of firms than the
YICs-concept as it does not exclude firms that are not yet active in R&D and in-
novation. Using this more general concept, the analysis in this chapter investigates
whether financial constraints do not depend on the availability of internal funds,
size, or age per se, but are also affected by innovation capacity. On the one hand, it
can be argued that as innovation capabilities are necessary to do innovation, firms
with high capabilities should be able to attract funds easier because of the higher
expected success of their projects. On the other hand, investors - although they
might be aware of the fact that skill is an important success factor of R&D - might
not value such skills sufficiently. That is, banks and investors may still value ’tangi-
ble collateral capital’ more than something intangible as skills. That is, firms with
higher innovation capability are more likely to have unexploited innovation projects.
Additionally, it may be that other firms benefit most from the surplus created by
firms with high innovation capabilities through subsequent innovations that build
on the knowledge created by the latter. Hence, these firms may bear a high share
of the risk of subsequent innovators. Firms with high innovation capability but low
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financial resources may therefore be most likely to be constrained. Such empirical
findings would suggest an innovation policy that focuses on those factors that form
the innovation capability of firms such as the accumulation of human capital. Ac-
cordingly designed policies may be able to account for the distinctive characteristics
of NTBFs and YICs, but would also address firms that are not yet at a stage where
very high R&D-intensities can be observed and also those firms that are not very
innovative yet probably due to financing constraints.
Chapter 6 summarizes the results and key insights from the preceding chapters
and provides overall conclusions. Limitations of the presented work are pointed out
and directions for further research are suggested.
Chapter 2
R&D Investment and Financing
Constraints of Small and
Medium-Sized Firms
Innovations typically result from investment in research and development (R&D).
From that perspective, R&D activities of firms can be seen as private investments
in the creation of knowledge. This basic fact makes investment in R&D projects
different from other types of investment.
Like any investment, however, R&D investment projects require financial resources.
R&D investment in particular, is characterized by high, and usually firm specific
investment costs, on the one hand, and low collateral value, on the other hand.
Moreover, establishing an R&D program involves significant sunk cost and adjusting
the level of R&D spending is costly, because a major part of R&D spending consists
of the wages of R&D employees. As these employees are usually high-skilled work-
ers, hiring and training them is very expensive and leads to low volatility in R&D
spending over time (see Hall 2002 for a survey).
Information asymmetries between investors and managers additionally create uncer-
tainty that affects financing conditions and hence may impede investment in R&D.
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This restriction, however, is not necessarily the same for all firms. Its extent may
substantially depend on firm characteristics.
While a large part of private R&D investments is spent by large and established
companies, the role of either young or small and medium-sized companies increas-
ingly attracts scholars’ and policy makers’ attention. The contribution of these firms
to technological progress through R&D and innovation has been found to be cru-
cial (Acs and Audretsch 1990, Audretsch 2006). However, given the characteristics
of R&D investment, financing of such investment by external sources is expensive.
Consequently, firms rely on internal sources of financing for their R&D projects to
a great extent. This fact may constrain financing of R&D projects especially for
firms whose internal financial sources are limited. Generally a firm is considered to
be financially unconstrained if it can carry out all its R&D projects at optimal scale
and constrained if it cannot due to insufficient financing.
Since the study of Fazzari et al. (1988), econometric studies have tried to detect
financial constraints by comparing different groups of firms. On the one hand, sup-
posedly unconstrained firms were identified and were expected to be able to raise
funds for any investment. For those firms R&D spending should not be sensitive to
the availability of internal funds which are usually measured by different kinds of
cash flow indicators. On the other hand, the group of potentially constrained firms
was expected to show a positive relationship between investment and the availabil-
ity of financial resources, and thus be sensitive to the availability of internal funds.
Classifications for grouping firms with respect to their investment sensitivity that
are frequently used in the literature are firm size, financial market regimes and
governance structures. However, there has been strong criticism in the literature
whether the relationship between cash flow and investment is a sufficient indication
of overall financial constraints (see Kaplan and Zingales 1997, 2000, and the response
by Fazzari et al. 2000). Moreover, the results concerning the existence of financial
constraints are often ambiguous in these studies (see e.g. Harhoff 1998 and Bond et
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Because this discussion casts doubt on the cash flow approach, the study presented
in this chapter follows a different strategy of identifying financial constraints. A
credit-rating index is employed to reflect financing opportunities of the rated firms
more directly. As standardized credit ratings incorporate much more information
about the firm than pure cash-flow measures, a sensitivity of investment to the
rating index should represent a more reliable indicator of financing constraints. In
addition, an internal liquidity measure from the firms’ empirical price-cost-margin
is derived.
Moreover, most previous studies focus on R&D performers and thus neglect that a
large share of smaller firms do not conduct R&D activities in the observed periods,
possibly because of the lack of financial resources. Bond et al. (2006) attribute the
weak results of many studies to the fact that ’financial constraints may manifest
themselves more in the decision to set up R&D facilities, rather than in decisions
about the year-to-year levels of spending in existing research programs’. Conse-
quently, non-R&D performing firms and the endogeneity of their decision to invest
in R&D are explicitly taken into account in this study.
This chapter presents two empirical models. While the main interest is on financial
constraints on R&D, the results are also compared to those of a capital investment
model. A positive sensitivity of investment to internal resources is interpreted as
an indication of a restriction due to lack of liquidity in the firm. Furthermore, a
reaction of investment to changes in the firms’ credit rating index serves as an in-
dicator for credit market restrictions. Moreover, the models allow to distinguish
between differences in investment due to heterogeneity in firm size and age. The
results show that the R&D investment indeed differs from capital investment with
respect to financing constraints and the importance of internal and external sources.
First, the availability of internal funds is more decisive for R&D investments than
for capital investment. Second, smaller firms suffer more from external constraints
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on R&D investment than larger firms.
For capital investment, no such effect cab be found. This may be due to the lower
impact of internal liquidity for capital investment. As capital investment provides
more collateral than R&D investment, cost of external financing for capital invest-
ment may be lower than for R&D investment for all size classes. Further, inter-group
financing of R&D is identified as an alternative important source of funds, as the
effects are considerably stronger for R&D than for capital investment.
When looking at age differences, however, no monotonic relationship between level
of constriction and R&D-investment can be identified. Section 2.1 gives an overview
of insights in the literature on financial constraints on R&D investment. Section 2.2
presents the conceptual framework of this study and section 2.3 describes the data
used for the analysis. In sections 2.4 and 2.5 the econometric models and the results
are described and section 2.6 provides robustness checks for the findings. Section
2.7 presents the main conclusions that can be drawn from this chapter.
2.1 Financing R&D
Firms fund their R&D projects either from internal sources, from external sources
or from both. Unlike for capital investment, however, access to external financing
for R&D investment may be more restrictive due to several reasons aggravating im-
perfections in capital markets.1 Information asymmetries about the value of the in-
vestment on the one hand, and the intangibility of the assets that are being created
on the other hand, affect financing conditions for R&D investment. Debtholders
such as banks prefer physical and redeployable assets as security for their loans,
since those can, at least partly, be liquidated in case the project fails or when the
firms go bankrupt. Most R&D investments, however, are sunk and cannot be rede-
1Stein (2003) provides an overview on the body of literature on how asymmetric information
and other agency problems influence corporate investment in general. While there is a large body
of research on investment in physical assets, the special case of R&D investment is less thoroughly
investigated.
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ployed (Alderson and Betker 1996). Moreover, serving debt requires a stable cash
flow. That may impede financing conditions for R&D through external sources,
since most R&D projects do not immediately lead to results that can be commer-
cialized (especially those involving basic research). In many cases it can take years
of investing before the first return is realized (Hall 2002).
Studies also illustrate that raising new equity in order to finance R&D may be
costly. For example Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that firms will also have to take
into account a ”Lemons Premium” when raising new equity, should it be possible
to raise it at all. Mller and Zimmermann (2008) analyze the importance of equity
finance for the R&D activity of small and medium-sized enterprises. They find
that equity indeed may be a constraining factor for young companies which have
to rely on the original equity investment of their owners. These firms have not yet
accumulated retained earnings and can, moreover, relay less on outside financing.
Moreover, empirical studies find a negative relationship between a firm’s debt ratio
and its R&D intensity. This may reflect the fact that those firms pursue less R&D
activities, because they have no access to new external funds and at the same time
have to serve existing debt (Chung and Wright 1998, Czarnitzki and Kraft 2004).
Consequently, internal financing generally turns out to be the preferred option (or
the only available option) for funding R&D investment. Internal funds may be less
costly, but also limited. The potential problem for firms to finance R&D activities
internally was first pointed out by Schumpeter (1934, 1939, 1942). He emphasized
the necessity of temporary monopoly profit for financing of future R&D. Thereby
arguing that (perfect) competition would not leave enough financial resources for
R&D activities of firms in the long run. Thus, as pointed out by both, Hall (1992)
and Himmelberg and Petersen (1994), a positive cash flow may be more important
for R&D than for other types of investment.
Based on the conclusion that firms mainly rely on internal funds as a consequence
of imperfect capital markets, the empirical literature focused on detecting financing
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constraints due to lacking internal financing opportunities. This has been done by
testing whether cash flow affects investment. The test is based on the idea that
R&D expenditures will be determined by available cash flow if borrowing is con-
strained. Otherwise investment should not be sensitive to cash flow. Empirical
studies, however, do not always provide unambiguous results. Hall (1992), Himmel-
berg and Petersen (1994) and Harhoff (1998) find a positive relationship between
R&D activity and cash flow for U.S. and German firms. Mulkey, Hall and Mairesse
(2001) show that cash flow appears to be more important in the U.S. than in France
for any type of investment. Bond et al. (2006) find for UK firms that cash flow
determines whether a firm does R&D but not how much. They argue that this may
indicate that R&D performing firms are a self-selected group of firms that are not
constrained. However, they do not find such a relationship for Germany. Baghat
and Welsh (1995) find a negative relationship between debt and R&D activity for
U.S., but not for Japanese firms. For US and UK firms they observe a positive
relationship between stock return and R&D activity two years later. Yet, they do
not observe any relationship between cash flow and R&D. Bougheas et al. (2003)
find similar results for Ireland. Financing conditions for both internal and external
sources may strongly depend on firms’ characteristics. Small firms can benefit from
advantages in implementing R&D projects, because their managers often know more
about technology and exhibit entrepreneurial spirit and a positive attitude towards
risk taking. In addition, R&D personnel in small firms may have more influence on
decisions, and the number of owners is limited leading to more flexibility (Acs and
Audretsch 1990, Czarnitzki and Kraft 2004).
While these aspects may positively impact financing opportunities for those firms,
there are arguments illustrating that financing constraints due to asymmetric infor-
mation between borrowers and lenders may be particularly binding for smaller firms.
Small firms may have disadvantages because they cannot exploit scale economies and
have less overall physical assets that could serve as collateral compared to large cap-
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ital intensive companies. Similarly, young firms may face different conditions than
more established firms. First, young firms may be more financially constrained, be-
cause they cannot use earlier profit accumulations for financing their R&D projects.
Older companies may not face that restriction. Moreover, older firms could benefit
from their established bank contacts as banks use relationship lending to reduce
problems of asymmetric information. Newly founded firms may not have built such
relationships yet (Petersen and Rajan 1995, Martinelli 1997, Berger and Udell 2002).
In addition, bank financing may be limited for R&D projects of young firms because
of the higher default risk of young companies (Fritsch et al. 2006). This problem
may become even more severe as the ”Basle II Capital Accord” requires banks to
conduct detailed risk assessment based on standardized rating systems. Czarnitzki
and Kraft (2007) suggest that a rating in the third worst category (out of six) al-
ready results in three times higher interest rates than in the best category. Assuming
that especially young firms without a track record and with uncertain prospects are
rated rather low, bank loans would become too expensive for those firms. Since
young companies can not rely on internal funds resulting from cash inflow from for-
mer product sales either, financing constraints may be more binding for such firms
(Gompers and Lerner 1999, Ritter 1991).
Recent literature indeed provides evidence for the fact that young or small firms face
financial constraints (Petersen and Rajan 1995, Berger and Udell 2002, Carpenter
and Petersen 2002, Czarnitzki 2006). For older or larger companies evidence for
constraints is harder to find. Moreover, established firms can innovate by building
on their previous inventions, e.g. product variation or improvement, while younger
firms may need to conduct more fundamental R&D which requires more resources
and is much more uncertain. In summary, the literature suggests that R&D invest-
ment may be subject to binding financial constraints. This may especially apply to
small or young firms that may face higher cost of capital than larger or older firms.
An empirical analysis to test for financial constraints in firm investment is presented
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in the following sections.
2.2 Conceptual framework
This study advances previous work by taking into account several additional as-
pects and combining them. A credit-rating index is employed to reflect financing
opportunities of the rated firms more directly. This should help to overcome the
inaccuracies, arising from the measuring approaches in many earlier studies using
cash flow as indicator for financial constraints.
Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) argue that cash-flow sensitivity is not an ap-
propriate measure for financial constraints as high cash flow sensitivities to R&D
investment of firms cannot be interpreted as evidence for those firms being more
financially constraint than firms with smaller sensitivities. They illustrate that with
the example of Microsoft, which has a high sensitivity to investment and a very high
overall liquidity at the same time, making severe constraints very unlikely. Thus,
they criticize that the cash flow- investment sensitivity approach cannot distinguish
between a) firms with more cash holding because they are highly profitable, b) firms
with high cash flow because they follow for example a non-dividend strategy, c) firms
with a low cash flow in order to reduce managerial cash disposal or d) firms with a
low cash flow because they are simply less profitable. Thus, a high sensitivity cannot
be interpreted as financial constraint because it could also be the case that firms use
their high liquidity to invest. Thus, sensitivity could even be stronger for especially
solvent firms und lower for firms with low cash flow levels. Further, firms with free
cash flow under a certain threshold may even exhibit the lowest sensitivities as they
do not start to invest even if cash flow increases.
Fazzari et al. (2000) defend their approach and point out limitations of the argumen-
tation of Kaplan and Zingales (1997), but the usefulness of the cash flow approach
remains highly controversial. When criticizing cash-flow measures, Kaplan and Zin-
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gales adopt the methodology of a case by case manual (credit) rating of firms, which
provides a more sophisticated indicator for long term liquidity.
The advantage of the credit rating indicator used in this article is that it is a stan-
dardized measure provided by Creditreform, Germany’s largest credit rating agency.
Thus, it is in fact the actual rating that potential lenders would use to assess the
creditworthiness of the firms in the sample.2
In addition to the rating scores, an internal liquidity measure is derived from the
firms’ empirical price-cost margin. While this measure is not used to identify credit
market constraints as done in earlier studies, it still serves as control for the availabil-
ity of internal resources. The fact that the sample also includes non-R&D-performers
allows taking the endogeneity of their decision to invest in R&D explicitly into ac-
count.
Further, R&D is compared to capital investment for the same sample of firms. Pre-
vious studies such as Audretsch and Elston (2002) analyze the impact of liquidity
constraints in capital investment on a sample of German firms. Their study is moti-
vated by the idea that the special nature of the banking dominated financial system
in Germany may alleviate or even avoid financial constraints. Their results show
that this may not be the case for all firms. Firms in the smallest group in their
sample seem to benefit from the institutional structure. For medium-sized firms,
however, the most severe liquidity constraints can be found, while for the largest
firms in the sample no evidence of binding financial constraints on capital investment
can be located. Thus, their results suggest a non-monotonic relationship between
firm size and liquidity constraints for capital investment. However, it should be
noted that Audretsch and Elston analyze a sample of rather large, stock market
listed firms and therefore cannot generalize their findings to non-listed firms.
As the gap in financing due to imperfect capital markets may be especially severe
when it comes to financing of R&D, it is particularly interesting to analyze and
2See section 3.1 for more details on the construction and interpretation of the credit rating
index.
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compare both, financial constraints on capital investment and on R&D investment.
Further, the analysis in this chapter aims to avoid a bias towards large firms by using
a sample of firms that is more representative of the economy. Finally, the models
presented in the following allow distinguishing between differences in investment due
to heterogeneity in firm size and age.
2.3 Data
The data used for the analysis stems from the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP)
that provides us with firm-level survey data on the German business sector. The sur-
vey is conducted annually by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW),
Mannheim. The survey identifies process and product innovators as well as non-
innovative firms in manufacturing and service industries. Table A1 in the Appendix
shows the industry classifications and description used in this study. This study
uses the survey from the manufacturing sector and the sample covers the years 1992
to 2002.3 The survey data is supplemented with the credit rating variable from the
’Creditreform’- database. The sample on which this analysis is based is more repre-
sentative of the economy than those used in several earlier studies, where scholars
had to restrict their analysis to large firms or R&D-performing due to limitations in
data availability. The advantage of having such a representative database does not
come without cost. For a large share of the firms in the sample does not contain ac-
count data, because they are not obliged to publish this information. This analysis
has thus to rely on data collected within the survey.
Due to a large fraction of small firms (median size = 140 employees; a quarter of
firms is smaller than 44 employees), firms may not conduct R&D in every year. This
censoring of the dependent variable is taken into account by estimating censored
3The questionnaire changes every year, and unfortunately the years 1999 and 2000 cannot be
used in this study as relevant variables were not part of the survey in these years.
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regression models (Tobit). Taking the skewness of the distribution into account,
logarithms, ln(1+R&D), are emloyed as dependent variable in the R&D investment
model.4 As differences in patterns for constraints between capital investment and
R&D investment are of key interest in this chapter, the models are also estimated for
capital investment (INV). As the distribution of capital investment is also skewed,
logarithms, that is ln(1+INV), are used here as well.
Liquidity indicators
The most important right-hand side variable is the credit rating reflecting access to
external capital. This standardized credit rating index was obtained from CRED-
ITREFORM - the largest German credit rating agency. This rating index serves
as basis for loan decisions of banks as well as for other firms such as suppliers who
want to inform themselves about other firms before they engage in business rela-
tions. CREDITREFORM holds and maintains a data base that comprises company
information for about 2.5 million companies located in Germany. The company in-
formation is collected through a network of about 140 local subsidiaries that gather
information about companies in their respective district.
The index is built on hard facts as well as soft facts, so-called risk-factors. The
hard and soft facts can be categorized into four main groups. First, structural firm
characteristics, such as a classification of the companies’ legal form and ownership
structure, are obtained from the official trade registers. Second, income and liquid-
ity characteristics such as capital structure, shareholders’ equity, capital turnover,
and firms’ past payment practice, are composed from balance sheet and accounting
data. Third, information in turnover and development of the company, on order
situation, as well as on demand and market prospects is collected based on facts as
well as from the companies’ own assessment. Finally, factors such as volume of past
credit requests, liable capital, encashment and debt collection track-record as well
4R&D expenditure and capital investment are measured in million ”Deutsche Mark” (1 DM
0.51 EUR).
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as the companies’ expected demand for loans are gathered from different sources.5
The calculation of the index depends on company type and market situation. Gener-
ally speaking, the companies’ payment practice accounts for between 20% and 24%
of the rating. Financial information accounts for about 25% and structural charac-
teristics accounts for 10% to 15%. Factors such as turnover and turnover prospects,
expected market development account for up to 10% to 15%. It is important to note
that the remaining 25% to 30% of the final rating index is based the individual eval-
uation of company factors by employees of CREDITREFORM. These can be based
on the overall impression of the firm and business conduct. Even rather subjective
impressions about individual persons at the company, not only managers, but also
board members or administrative officers can influence this indicator.
Advantages and disadvantages of the credit index
The great advantage of the credit rating as indicator for financial constraint is that
it is a direct measure of access to external capital. Unlike investment-cashflow
sensitivities it is thus not vulnerable to the shortcoming of an approximation. In
previous studies it was not clear how the observed ’access sensitivities’ of investment
to changes in cashflow actually can be interpreted and whether they really reflect
credit constraints. The rating is indeed used in the real world as it is employed in
this study. Yet, using the rating index is also not without some disadvantages. Fist,
the rating contains all kinds of information that describe the overall situation of the
company such as profit, managerial competencies and market prospects. However,
these issues may be interdependent with the R&D strategy of the firm. That could
for instance imply that successful R&D performers score better in some of the rat-
5Information sources of CREDITREFORM comprise the German Trade Register, the Coop-
erative Register, the Register of Corporate Associations, the Debtor Register, bankruptcy an-
nouncements, insolvency and settlement proceedings, regular newspapers, balance sheet data, an-
nual reports and other financial statements, suppliers and subcontractor queries at the so-called
’Wirtschaftsauskunftsteien’, that are information pools from companies for companies that was
founded for the purpose of information sharing in business networks.
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ing categorize than non-R&D-performers. Moreover, companies in R&D-intensive
industries for example may also have better market development forecasts. Hence,
even if R&D is no official factor in the construction of the index it may well affect the
evaluation. This should therefore be kept in my in the interpretation of the results,
even if econometrically no evidence of endogeneity can be found in the following
models (see section 3.4 for a formal test).
In the following analysis, the level of constriction is thus observed directly through
the credit rating, which is a continuous measure (RATING). The credit rating is an
index between 1 and 6, whereby an index of 6 represents the best rating.6
Moreover, additional variables that allow to model heterogeneous effects of the
rating index for firms of different size classes are constructed. For this purpose,
RATING is interacted with 4 dummy variables (0 = does not belong to this size
class, 1 = belongs to this size class) that attribute each firm to one of 4 size classes.
Thereby, each of the four size classes contains 25% of the firms in the sample. This
leads to 4 interaction-terms:
RATINGi,t−1 × SIZE CLASS X (2.1)
with X = 1,...,4
Because, not only differences between firms of different size are of interest here, but
also in differences between firms of different age, interaction terms for equally sized
AGE-classes are constructed analogous:
RATINGi,t−1 × AGE CLASS X (2.2)
6It should be noted that an inverted version of the original rating index is used for easier
interpretation of the estimated effects. The original index ranges from 100 to 600, where 600
represents the worst rating. It is simply switch around so that higher values of the regressor stand
for an improved rating. Further, the rating is divided by 100 in the regression models.
28
CHAPTER 2. R&D INVESTMENT AND FINANCING CONSTRAINTS OF SMALL AND
MEDIUM-SIZED FIRMS
with X = 1,...,4
Kaplan and Zingales (2000) argue that the practice of splitting the sample according
to a measure of financial constraints and then comparing the sensitivities across
groups only justifies if investment sensitivities increase monotonically in the degree
of financial constraints. Adding the 4 interaction terms to the models, allows to test
whether such a monotonic relationship can indeed be found. Although constraints
are not identified through investment-cash flow relationships solely, it is control
for the availability of internal funds. For the measurement of internal resources,
scholars typically use cash-flow. As the data is based on a survey and is not limited
to large firms which are obliged to publish balance sheet information, cash- flow
is not observed for the sample. Instead, an approximation for the availability of
internal funds, the empirical price-cost margin (PCM) is calculated as
PCMi,t =
Salesi,t − Staff Costi,t −Material Costi,t + δ ·R&Di,t
Salesi,t
(2.3)
This approach has been widely used in the literature (see Collins and Preston 1969,
Ravenscraft 1983 for the seminal papers). Since R&D is an expense, the decision
to invest in R&D will decrease PCM in the corresponding period. As internally
available funds during the year are supposed to be measured irrespective of the
actual investment decision, it is common to add the R&D expenses back into PCM
(cf. Harhoff 1998). As PCM does not account for capital cost, only staff and material
cost shares of R&D are added back. These amount to 93% ( = 0.93) according to
the Wissenschaftsstatistik (1999) which is the official German R&D statistic.7
In order to test for monotonicity for the internal liquidity measure PCM
PCMi,t−1 × SIZE CLASS X (2.4)
7All regressions were run without adding R&D back to PCM. The results were basically identical
to the ones reported below.
2.3. DATA 29
with X = 1,...,4
are constructed as well. Further control variables are firm size measured by the value
of fixed assets ln(SIZE) and its squared value ln(SIZE)2. This capital-related size
measure is included, instead of using the total number of employees, as capital may
serve as collateral in credit negotiations with potential lenders, facilitating access to
external sources of financing. Also firms’ age ln(AGE) is used to control for age-
related effects. For instance, younger firms may conduct more R&D ceteris paribus
than older firms, since they could have more established products in the market.
As intra-group flows of resources are considered as important option for funding
investment projects, a dummy variable (GROUP) is introduced that is equal to one,
if a firm is part of a group, and takes the value of zero otherwise. Business cycle
effects are taken into account by including a set of 8 time dummies (t) and variation
of R&D intensity across sectors is accounted for by adding 10 industry dummies
(IND) to the models. In order to avoid direct simultaneity between investment and
the explanatory variables, lagged values of all time variant variables (except AGE)
are used.
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2.1. Average R&D expenditure (R&D)
over all firms and years in the full sample is about 8 million DM (4.1 million ).
Average capital investment (INV) is about 11 million DM and average firm size
(SIZE) measured in fixed assets amounts 47 thousand DM. On average firms’ are
active in business (AGE) for about 49 years. The average credit rating is 4.98 out
of a range from 1 to 6.
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Table 2.1: Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics (5,003 obs.)
Variable Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
dependent variables:
R&Di,t R&D expenditure
in million DM
8.156 74.577 0 2,031
INVi,t Investment in
million DM
11.169 100.864 0 3,965
INNOEXPi,t∗ Innovation expend.
in million DM
12.037 115.943 0 3,719
main control variables:
SIZEi,t−1 Fixed assets in
thousand DM
46.855 236.925 0 5,255
AGEi,t Years elapsed since
founding
48.582 40.950 1 198
PCMi,t−1 Empirical price
cost margin
0.272 0.152 -0.470 0.825
RATINGi,t−1/100 Credit rating
index; 1 = worst
rating
4.982 0.543 1 6
GROUP Dummy for firms
that are part of a
group
0.357 0.479 0 1
Notes: time and industry dummies omitted. *Used as an alternative limited dependent
variable in the robustness checks. The number of observation for this variable is
limited to 4,514.
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2.4 Econometric models
Two different econometric models are estimated. First, a pooled cross-sectional
approach is followed and second, a random effects estimator is applied to the panel
data. The investment models to be estimated can be written as
Ii,t = max(0, x
′
i,tβ + ci + ui,t), i = 1, 2, ..., N t = 1, 2, ..., T (2.5)
ui,t | xi, ci ∼ N(0, σ2u) (2.6)
where Ii,t is the dependent variable (both denoted as I being the natural logarithm
of INV and R&D, respectively), xi,t denotes the set of regressors, β the parameters
to be estimated, and ci the unobserved firm-specific effect, and ui,t is the error term.
Two versions of this model will be estimated. First, it is assumed that ci = 0.
Hence, the model can be estimated as a simple pooled cross-sectional model, where
the standard errors are adjusted for firm clusters to account for the panel structure
of the data. Thus, the error terms are allowed to be correlated within firm obser-
vations. The pooled model has the advantage that it is not necessary to maintain
the strict exogeneity assumption. While ui,t certainly has to be independent of xi,t,
the relationship between ui, t and xi,s, t 6= s, is not specified (see Wooldridge, 2002:
538). Hence, the model allows for feedback of R&D in period t to the regressors in
future periods, for instance. In the second version of the model, a random-effects
Tobit panel estimator is applied so that ci 6= 0. However, this requires the strict ex-
ogeneity assumption. In addition, the random-effects Tobit requires the assumption
that ci is uncorrelated with xi,t.
After estimating the baseline models, the effects of the rating are allowed to vary
with firm size. Therefore four separate slope coefficients of the rating variable for
each size class are estimated through the interaction terms of the rating with firm
size. The subsequent procedure with the age interactions follows accordingly. I is
of key interest here to test for a monotonic relationship between the rating and the
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size or age class, so that the investment constraints become more binding for either
smaller or younger firms.
The basic model is specified as:
I∗i,t = β0 + β1RATINGi,t−1 + β2PCMi,t−1
+ β3lnSIZE + β4(lnSIZE)
2
i,t−1 + β5lnAGEi,t + β6GROUPi,t
+
17∑
k=7
βkINDi,k +
26∑
s=18
βsts + ci + uit (2.7)
and
Ii,t =
I
∗ if
∑26
j=0 xj,i,tβj + ci + ui,t > 0
0 otherwise.
(2.8)
2.5 Estimation results
The results of both, the baseline models and the extended specifications including
the interaction terms of RATING with firm size classes, are presented in Table 2.2
The first two columns present the results from the pooled cross-sectional model. For
both, R&D investment and capital investment, SIZE and its squared term are highly
significant. As both coefficients are positive, it can be learned that the estimated
coefficients describe a u-shaped curve, where the data, however, only cover the right
branch of the parable. Thus the investment level is monotonically increasing with
firm size. Being part of a group also turns out to positively impact both types of
investment in line with, for example, Stulz (1990). He argues that large internal
capital markets reduce the problem of underinvestment. Interestingly, this effect
is considerably higher for R&D investment. This may lead to the conclusion that
firms that are associated with a group have access to additional capital through their
parent companies. This seems to be important for R&D, as firms may well be con-
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strained by their own internal resources and their access to the credit market. This
is in line with previous results on corporate investment in general. Yet, there may
also be an alternative explanation as the GROUP dummy may roughly approxi-
mate manager-led firms in the sample. The high positive impact of GROUP on
both types of investment indicates that there maybe higher investment if managers
lead the firm instead of owners (or family members). This may be related to the
well-known principal-agent-theory-based phenomenon of ’empire-building’ through
overinvestment by the managers (see, for example, Jensen 1986, 1993). In a recent
paper, Czarnitzki and Kraft (2008) consider different corporate governance struc-
tures and innovation for a sample of large German corporations. They indeed find
that managerial firms invest more into R&D than owner-led firms. However, they
also point out that the difference in investment between manager and owner-led
firms declines with the degree of control exerted on the manager by the owners.
AGE has also a significant, positive effect on R&D-investment in all regressions.
For capital investment the coefficient is also positive, but it is significant only in the
random effects panel model. Note that it was also experimented with non-linear age
effects, but unlike the case of firm size, these never turned out to be significant.
The measures for availability of financing (PCM, RATING) are highly positively
significant for both types of investment, naturally indicating that both, a higher
price-cost margin and a better rating, support higher firm investments. Yet, the
results show differences between R&D and capital investment. The coefficient of
PCM, reflecting the importance of internal sources of financing, is much higher for
R&D investment than it is for capital investments. Accordingly, the impact of the
indicator of availability of external funds is smaller for R&D investment compared
to general investment. However, the cross-equation difference is not significant for
RATING.
The estimated coefficients describe the marginal effects of the regressors on the
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investment propensity I∗, such as (see e.g. Greene, 2000: 908-910)
∂E[I∗i |x′i]
∂xi,k
= βk. (2.9)
Since the dependent variable is specified in logarithms, a unit change in the main
variables of interest, i.e. PCM and RATING, can be interpreted as a percentage
change in investment. For instance, if the price-cost margin changes from 10% to
20%, R&D investment (in terms of the latent index I*) changes by 10%, all else
constant, and capital investment only changes by about 3%. If the rating changes
by 1 unit in the regression R&D would change by 17% and capital investment by
20%.
Note that one could also compute the marginal effect on I instead of I* as
∂E[I∗i |x′i]
∂xi,k
= βk · Φ(x
′
iβ
σ
). (2.10)
In this case, R&D would change by 5% in response to a 10% change in PCM and by
7% if the rating changes by 1 unit, on average. Capital investment would increase
by 3% in response to a 10% increase of PCM, and by 14% for a unit change in the
rating. The more interesting conclusion with respect to firm size, however, can be
drawn from the regressions with interaction terms. First, the estimated coefficients
are not only significantly different from zero, but that they also differ from each
other (see chi-squared tests at bottom of Table 2.2). In terms of marginal impact
on I*, a unit change in the rating causes the smallest firms to adjust R&D by about
22%. However, the effect monotonically decreases with increasing firm size from 22%
to 20%, 15% and 11% (last coefficient only significant at the 10% level), respectively
in the pooled cross-sectional model. In the panel model, the marginal effects are
somewhat smaller but still monotonically decreasing and significantly different from
zero as well as significantly different from each other. Again, the marginal effects
on the capital investment propensity are larger than those for R&D.
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The relatively higher importance of PCM for R&D investment is confirmed by a
test on the equality of coefficients across the two equations. Concerning the rating,
it cannot be confirmed that the coefficients differ significantly from the first model.
In the regression with size interactions, the rating has higher impacts in the R&D
equation (coefficients differ significantly at the 10% level across equations). As it is
observed from the first models that firms have to rely more on internal financing for
R&D than for capital investment, I am also interested in testing for monotonicity in
the relationship between investment and the interaction of firm size and PCM. This
resembles, to a certain extent, the earlier studies on investment-cash flow relation-
ships, where scholars tried to identify financial constraints purely by investment-cash
flow sensitivities. There, financial constraints were interpreted as being present if a
group of firms did not show any sensitivity (insignificant coefficient), but another
group (e.g. smaller firms) did. This chapter’s analysis, however, supplement this
approach by the credit rating, and thus, one should not expect to find a monotonic
relationship (see also the Kaplan-Zingales critique mentioned earlier).
Table 2.3 presents the results from the extended models. The estimates on the firm
level controls remain similar to the previous specification. While the effects for the
RATING ∗ SIZE interactions also remain robust (compare to Table 2), the coef-
ficients of the PCM ∗ SIZE interaction terms are not monotonically decreasing.
Furthermore, the test on differences between the PCM coefficients reveals that they
are not significantly different from each other. Thus, all models collapse to the ones
shown in Table 2.
Age effects
While it was already controlled for firm age in the previous models, it is still of
great interest if firms’ age and size have comparable effects on the access to external
funding. For this,
PCMi,t−1 × AGE CLASS X
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interactions are included rather than interactions with size classes. Interestingly,
age seems to have a less clear effect on credit availability. Neither a robust mono-
tonic relationship for R&D nor for capital investment can be found. Therefore, I
believe that access to external funding is more related to size arguments, especially
such as collateral for additional loans, rather than to age argumentations, such as
missing track histories or lending relationships with banks or suppliers. The detailed
regression results are relegated to the appendix (see Table A.2).
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Table 2.3: Tobit regressions with PCM*SIZE CLASS interactions (5,003 obs.)
Pooled Cross Section
Model
Random-Effects Panel
Model
Variable ln(R&D) ln(INV) ln(R&D) ln(INV)
ln(SIZEi,t−1) 0.273 *** 0.285 *** 0.180 *** 0.248 ***
(0.028) (0.017) (0.020) (0.013)
ln(SIZEi,t−1)2 0.053 *** 0.051 *** 0.033 *** 0.043 ***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
ln(AGE)it 0.078 ** 0.010 0.121 *** 0.065 ***
(0.033) (0.017) (0.028) (0.018)
GROUPit 0.347 *** 0.196 *** 0.160 *** 0.118 ***
(0.057) (0.035) (0.036) (0.026)
RATINGi,t−1 ∗ S C 1 0.903 *** 0.237 ** 0.071 0.111
(0.266) (0.103) (0.206) (0.026)
RATINGi,t−1 ∗ S C 2 1.181 *** 0.383 ** 0.515 *** 0.280 **
(0.250) (0.168) (0.179) (0.121)
RATINGi,t−1 ∗ S C 3 1.186 *** 0.450 ** 0.459 *** 0.193
(0.308) (0.190) (0.176) (0.132)
RATINGi,t−1 ∗ S C 4 0.796 *** 0.320 0.296 ** 0.027
(0.305) (0.220) (0.151) (0.122)
PCMi,t−1 ∗ S C 1 0.227 *** 0.251 *** 0.170 *** 0.217 ***
(0.072) (0.038) (0.037) (0.025)
PCMi,t−1 ∗ S C 2 0.189 *** 0.201 *** 0.136 *** 0.162 ***
(0.068) (0.037) (0.036) (0.025)
PCMi,t−1 ∗ S C 3 0.142 ** 0.173 *** 0.108 *** 0.141 ***
(0.066) (0.037) (0.035) (0.025)
PCMi,t−1 ∗ S C 4 0.125 * 0.178 *** 0.105 *** 0.124 ***
(0.068) (0.039) (0.035) (0.025)
Joint sign. ind. dum. χ2(10) 307.45∗∗∗ 14.95 360.74∗∗∗ 29.57
Joint sign. time dum. χ2(8) 87.36∗∗∗ 28.45∗∗∗ 88.97∗∗∗ 24.40∗∗∗
Diff. PCM χ2(3) 1.61 1.25 3.40 2.52
Diff. RATING χ2(3) 8.31∗∗ 21.44∗∗∗ 9.77∗∗ 37.15∗∗∗
Log-likelihood -5,010.14 -5,355.29 -4,019.35 -4,765.83
ρ - - 0.724 0.523
# censored obs. 2,382 305 2,382 305
∗ Notes: All models include an intercept and industry dummies (not presented). Standard
errors in parentheses (clustered in pooled cross-sectional models). *** (**, *) indicate a
significance level of 1% (5, 10%). ρ indicates the share of the total variance which is due to
the cross-sectional variation.
2.6 Robustness tests
As a robustness test of the previous results, three different checks are provided
in this section. First, the same model specifications as described in section 2.4
are estimated for a sub-sample of firms that have been innovators at least once in
the overall sample period. The Oslo-Manual (OECD/EUROSTAT 1997) provides
guidelines for the collection and interpretation of innovation data at the firm level.
According to these guidelines, ”technological product and process (TPP) innovations
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comprise implemented technologically new products and processes and significant
technological improvements in products and processes. A TPP innovation has been
implemented if it has been introduced on the market (product innovation) or used
within a production process (process innovation). TPP innovations involve a series
of scientific, technological, organizational, financial and commercial activities. The
TPP innovating firm is one that has implemented technologically new or significantly
technologically improved products or processes during the period under review. The
minimum entry is that the product or process should be new (or significantly im-
proved) to the firm (it does not have to be new to the world)” (OECD/Eurostat,
1997: 31). This first robustness check tests whether differences between the capital
investment model and the R&D investment model are due to the fact that there are
firms in the sample that never performed any innovation activity. Table 2.4 pro-
vides summary statistics for the subsamples of innovating and non-innovating firms
(compare to Table 2.1 for the full sample), and t-tests on mean differences between
the two groups. While it is not surprising that innovators spend significantly more
on R&D and innovation, the summary statistics and the t-tests also reveal that the
two groups differ in all covariates considered. Thus, it seems to be an appropriate
robustness check to repeat all estimations excluding non-innovators.
As can be seen in Table 2.5, all previous results obtained with the full sample are
confirmed. This also applies to the rating-size interactions. Again, the regressions
for the age effects are relegated to the appendix (see Table A.3), as the results do
not improve for the subsample of innovating firms.
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As a second robustness check, it is tested how sensitive the results are to changes
in the definition of investments for innovation. Since R&D is only one component
of successfully introducing new processes or new products to the market, it is inter-
esting to check whether the results persist when one considers a broader measure of
innovation activity. The database offers the opportunity to look at total innovation
expenditure rather than R&D only. In addition to pure internal R&D, innovation
expenditure comprises outsourcing of R&D, the acquisition of new (lab) equipment
that is linked to an innovation project, the purchase of other intellectual property
(e.g. patents or licenses), education expenditure which become necessary for train-
ing employees when implementing new technologies, market introduction cost that
arise due to a product innovation, as well as design and prototyping and related
activities.
The results are presented in Table 2.6. Note that the sample is slightly smaller than
for the R&D regressions due to some missing values in the total innovation expen-
diture. Thus, also the capital investment regressions for this sample are reproduced
in order to have an accurate comparison. As argued in the literature, adjusting
R&D is more costly than capital investment, which implies that the firms try to
smooth R&D spending over time. Thus, the observed reaction of R&D to financial
constraints, as reported in Table 2.2, is lower than for capital investment. When
looking at total innovation expenditure, I expect the effects to become more similar
to capital investments, because total innovation expenditure comprises some types
of investment that show lower outcome uncertainty or that has more collateral value
(e.g. buying a patent or license). The results in Table 2.6 are similar to the find-
ings with R&D. However, the marginal impact of the RATING*SIZE interactions
changes somewhat. A monotonic relationship can still be found, but no differences
in the coefficients between the R&D and the investment equation can be observed.
This confirms the hypothesis that differences with respect to external financing are
larger between R&D investment and capital investment than between innovation
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investment in total (of which on average about 60% in the sample are R&D expen-
ditures) and capital investment.
For completeness, also the results from the age interaction variables are presented
in the appendix (see Table A.4). However, the results remain inconclusive and are
thus not discussed in more detail.
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As third robustness check, an interaction term of PCM and RATING has been
added to the model. The results are presented in Table 2.7. It turns out that PCM
is neither significant in the R&D nor in the capital investment equation. RATING
is significant in both. The interaction term is not significant in the investment
equation, but it is significant at the 12% level for R&D. However, the sign of the
coefficient is positive. This is not straight forward to interpret. One could have
expected that for firms with a bad rating the effect of PCM is larger than for firms
with a good rating. This would imply a negative coefficient. This did not turn out
to be the case in the model specification presented.
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2.7 Conclusion and discussion
Financing R&D activities externally may be costly due to outcome uncertainty,
asymmetric information and incomplete appropriability of returns. Thus, firms may
prefer to exploit internally available funds to finance their R&D investment as much
as possible. However, internal funds may be limited as well. Especially small and
young firms may face financing constraints for their R&D projects as they have not
yet accumulated profits or a steady cash inflow from a broad and established product
portfolio. Financially constrained firms may have to conduct their R&D activities
at a sub-optimal level, abandon certain projects or not be able to conduct R&D at
all.
From the empirical models presented in this chapter, the following main conclu-
sions can be drawn. The results show that R&D investment differs from capital
investment with respect to financing constraints and the importance of internal and
external resources. First, the availability of internal funds is more decisive for R&D
investments than for capital investment. It can be observed that an increase in the
availability of internal funds, measured by increases in the firms’ price-cost-margin,
has a larger impact on R&D investment than on capital investment. Second, smaller
firms suffer more from external constraints for R&D investment than larger firms.
That is, smaller firms’ levels of R&D investment increases as conditions for access
to external funds improve, while larger firms’ R&D investment is not as sensitive.
Thus, financial constraints are more binding for smaller firms. Further, it turns out
that the level of constriction decreases monotonically with firm size. Thus, the larger
the firms, the fewer R&D investment projects are discarded. Larger firms may either
be able to fund most of their projects internally at full scale or may face a lower gap
between internal and external cost of capital. The latter argument is supported by
the fact that the largest firms may offer sufficient collateral for external financing
due to their overall asset value. When looking at age differences, however, it is
not possible to draw analogous conclusions. No monotonic relationships between
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financial constraints and age can be observed. In addition, intra-group financing of
R&D, being a supplemental measure of internal liquidity, turns out to be another
important source of funds, as the effects are considerably stronger for R&D than for
capital investment.
Finally, the results are robust to a number of additional tests. All results persist
in both, pooled cross-sectional regressions and panel data regressions that allow
controlling for firm-specific unobserved effects in the level of investment. Also ro-
bustness checks on total innovation expenditure rather than pure R&D show similar
result patterns as discussed above. As investment in new knowledge is a crucial fac-
tor in the creation of wealth, potential underinvestment is regarded as justification
for government intervention to promote R&D investment from a society’s point of
view. This study is aimed at contributing to the identification of firms that are
potentially not able to pursue their R&D projects at the optimal level. The iden-
tification of potentially constrained firms aims at supporting the design of policy
schemes avoiding underinvestment.
European policy makers attribute the relative gap in R&D spending compared to
the US to the relatively lower number of small, young, highly innovative firms in Eu-
rope. One crucial difference between the US and continental Europe is the access to
financing for such firms. Countries with well developed markets for Venture Capital
and equity are likely to achieve a comparative advantage in R&D for high-tech or
other knowledge intensive goods and services (Chiao 2002, Carpenter and Petersen
2002) as small firms appear to be more concerned with financing constraints than
larger firms.
This suggests the need for innovation policies directly addressing financing R&D of
small businesses. Although growing attention of policy makers already has gener-
ated numerous initiatives to improve access to finance, it seems that these schemes
are not targeted enough, and thus not yet very effective in improving conditions for
firms that really face financial constraints for their R&D activities (see also Licht
2.7. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 49
and Nerlinger 1998).
Despite the efforts presented in this chapter to detect and interpret the effects of
the limited financial resources for R&D investment, this study has some important
limitations. It has been attempted to overcome the Kaplan-Zingales critique that
previous studies have identified financial constraints only indirectly, which is im-
plemented by supplementing common regressions with a credit rating index that
directly measures credit access. However, the panel structure of the data used here
is not rich enough to estimate investment models that are well grounded in economic
theory, such as Euler equations, accelerator models or error-correction models that
all revolve around the firms’ challenge to achieve an ”optimal” capital stock through
their investment. It would be desirable to extend the common investment models
to direct measures for external constraints in the future. Moreover, there are some
limitations due to the characteristics of the data that have been used. In particular,
the implications of using a survey data such as the CIS. The CIS is designed such
that it is representative of the population of firms with 5 or more employees. That
implies that young start-up firms may be underrepresented due to this criterion.
Moreover, independent of the size of the firm, it may take a couple of years un-
til young firms make it into the repertory from which the sample is drawn as this
repertory is not refreshed each year. Thus, the insignificant results for AGE should
not be overinterpreted. It is definitely not valid to conclude that constraints are
size related only. With respect to the results of chapter 2, there might actually be
two issues play a role. First, start-up firms and firms in their first couple of years of
business activity may just not be in the final sample. This may not only be caused
by the sampling, but also by panel structure of the data: the final data only includes
firms that were observed at least twice during the panel period. This means that
they must have existed for a couple of years. The number of firms younger than
5 years can also be explained by for example a new incorporation of a previously
existing company, by a change of legal form or by a merger. A second issue is that
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SIZE and AGE are correlated (with a correlation coefficient of about 0.073). That
means that some age related effects may be captured by SIZE. Nevertheless, it can
be argued from the results obtained that collateral value is crucial as constraints
are found to be less binding if firms are larger in terms of assets. Thus, what can
actually be concluded is that for firms that have reached a certain AGE-threshold
SIZE matters. Yet, I cannot derive a conclusion for start-up or very young firms.
For such an analysis a different data source must be considered.
Furthermore, smaller firms might undertake major investments in stages, that is,
they first accumulate funds and then invest. It would thus be interesting to model
some form of cumulative availability of internal funds, for example, by accumulating
the financial performance over several years.
Chapter 3
Financial Constraints: Routine
versus Cutting Edge R&D
Investment in research and development (R&D) is usually considered to be subject
to financing constraints due to outcome uncertainty and asymmetric information
between borrowers and lenders (Arrow 1962, Nelson 1959, Bhattacharya and Ritter
1983, Myers and Majluf 1984, Anton and Yao 2002). Moreover, R&D investment
typically has a low inside collateral value as it is sunk once expensed (Alderson and
Betker 1996). These arguments on market failures are often used to justify govern-
mental intervention in the market for R&D through subsidy grants and tax credits
(Mansfield 1986). While the empirical literature - essentially testing hypotheses de-
rived from economic theory - on financing constraints for R&D investments is vast,
results are often ambiguous. For example, Chiao (2002) finds a negative influence
of debt on R&D spending in science-based industries, but a positive one in non-
science based industries indicating that risk is significantly lower in the latter. Hall
(1992), Himmelberg and Petersen (1994), Harhoff (1998) find a positive relationship
between R&D and cash flow for the U.S. Bond et al. (2006) find that cash flow
predicts whether a firm does R&D or not in the UK, but not the level of R&D
indicating that UK firms that do R&D are a self-selected group that face fewer
51
52 CHAPTER 3. FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS: ROUTINE VERSUS CUTTING EDGE R&D
constraints. Yet, they find no such effects for Germany. Mulkay et al. (2001) find
that cash flow has a stronger impact in the U.S. than in France both for R&D and
ordinary investment. Baghat and Welch (1995) found similar results for the US and
UK as well as Bougheas et al. (2003) for Ireland (see Hall 2002 for a survey).
These studies, however, deliver inconclusive results potentially due to the concep-
tual set-up of empirical studies, sample selection and limitations in data availability.
Several of these studies look at rather large stock market listed firms as conditions
for data availability as they are usually better than for unlisted firms (for example
Mansfield 1964, Mller 1967, Scherer 1965, Bhagat and Welch 1995, Carpenter and
Petersen 2002, Bond et al. 2006).
Yet, this chapter argues that the inconclusiveness may also be due to the hetero-
geneity of R&D investments. Previous empirical, as well as theoretical, literature
has paid little attention to the fact that R&D projects can differ substantially in
terms of uncertainty of returns, resource requirements, risk of failure, involvement
of basic research, the importance of secrecy and that these properties may affect
financing conditions.
An exception is Kamien and Schwartz (1978) who, in a theoretical model, distin-
guish firms who are doing routine R&D to strengthen their established product lines
and firms investing in more fundamental R&D projects aiming at more radical mar-
ket innovations. According to this distinction, the former -defensive R&D- firms are
less likely to face financial constraints on their activities than the latter -offensive
R&D- firms. Since fundamental innovations usually involve basic research, require
significantly more resources, are much riskier in terms of default and expected re-
turns, and are more prone to secrecy issues, the acquisition of external capital may
be curtailed. If this applies empirically it has implications for innovation policy.
As cutting-edge innovations are typically seen as the driving force of technological
progress and long-term growth, it is questionable whether current policy practice
aimed at alleviating financial constraints indeed addresses cutting-edge type R&D.
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This chapter presents the implementation of this test on financial constraints em-
pirically by investigating R&D investments of product innovators where the type of
R&D, with respect to the degree of innovativeness, is considered as being decisive
for financial constraints. Firms pursuing cutting-edge R&D are defined as those that
aim at introducing market novelties. The control group of routine R&D performers
consists of firms that mainly aim at improving existing products or pure imitation.
In the following it is argued that cutting-edge R&D performers may well follow more
risky investment strategies than others. Therefore, this analysis can be regarded as
an empirical approximation of the notion of risky investment behavior as indicated
in the theoretical model by Kamien and Schwartz (1978).
Furthermore, this study accounts for a widely discussed methodological critique
formulated by Kaplan and Zingales (1997). Due to the specific characteristics of
R&D, investment scholars argued that firms have to rely to a great extent on in-
ternal sources of financing for their R&D projects. Thus, firms regarded as un-
constrained or less constrained are those with relatively high liquidity. In a seminal
paper, Fazzari et al. (1988) suggest to investigate financial constraints by estimating
investment-cash flow relationships. For this, they grouped their sample of firms into
potentially unconstrained and constrained firms according to dividend pay-outs. If
the investment of the potentially constrained group is more sensitive to internal fi-
nancial resources than that of the other one would conclude that the credit market
would curtail investments of these firms. This methodology has been adopted by
many subsequent studies (see the survey by Hall 2002).
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) heavily criticized this methodological approach, though.
Using the potentially constrained firms of the study by Fazzari et al. (1988), they
show that the investment-cash-flow relationship may not be appropriate to judge
financial constraints. Kaplan and Zingales split the sample into different groups
of firms ranging from definitely constrained to not constrained firms. Rather than
using an ad-hoc grouping, they created ratings by carefully combining annual re-
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port data with qualitative evidence from management reports on liquidity and other
sources. They show that the investment-cash flow sensitivity is not monotonically
increasing with the level of constriction. Hence, this study places high doubts on
earlier research and, consequently, calls for further research where financial con-
straints are not identified indirectly through investment-cash flow sensitivities, but
observed more directly. ”The final implication of our paper is a methodological one.
Our research design and results point out what we think is a weakness in existing
research as well as an opportunity for future research. A great deal can be learned
trough more direct observation.” (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997: p. 212).
The contribution of this chapter follows the advice of Kaplan and Zingales (1997)
by making use of a credit rating index which constitutes a direct observation of
expected credit market constraints.1 The credit rating index is generated by Ger-
many’s largest rating agency and serves thereby as an indicator of firms’ ability to
raise external funds for their R&D investment.2
The German capital market is strongly banking-dominated. Firms rely to a greater
extent on bank loans for external financing of investment, instead of bonds and is-
suing of new equity, compared to firms in the U.S. (see for example Mayer 1988,
Bebenroth et al. 2009). First, the analysis presented here establishes multivari-
ate correlations between R&D and credit ratings by estimating an equation such
as R&D = f(Credit Rating, Controls) for firms conducting cutting-edge R&D and
those firms performing more routine R&D. The level of constriction is observed di-
rectly through the credit rating, which is a continuous measure (an index from 100
to 600). If only the question if and to what extent credit market restriction curtail
firm level investment was of interest here, it would not be necessary to split the
1Only recently Whited and Wu (2006) estimate of a more sophisticated final constraints risk
measure for US firms. However, the advantage of the credit rating used in this study is that it is
in fact used by lenders (banks and suppliers) in Germany.
2See Czarnitzki and Kraft (2007) for an analysis of the usefulness of credit rating informa-
tion. Czarnitzki (2006) provides evidence on the relationship between R&D policy (subsidies) and
financial constraints in small and medium enterprises using credit rating information.
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sample but one could simply run regressions in the total sample. The effect of credit
constraints would be identified through the variation in the rating variable and its
estimated coefficient. However, as this analysis follows Kamien and Schwartz who
argue that potential credit market restrictions are less binding for routine R&D in-
vestments than for cutting-edge R&D investments, the sample is split in two groups
to account for the heterogeneous nature of R&D investments. In a second step, the
analysis goes beyond the multivariate correlation analysis to investigate causality
between firms’ credit ratings and their R&D activities more thoroughly. Although,
lagged credit ratings were already used in the first step to avoid direct simultane-
ity between firms’ R&D and the ratings, the results of an instrumental variable
approach that controls for further endogeneity concerns are presented as well. As
will be discussed at the end of the empirical section, however, not all kinds of en-
dogeneity can be ruled out with the instruments at hand. It will be shown that
firms pursuing cutting-edge R&D strategies are subject to financial constraints in
the credit market. The credit rating index, turns out to curtail R&D spending for
cutting-edge R&D while it does not for routine R&D investment. Moreover, this
study complements the finding of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) that the investment
cash-flow sensitivity is not monotonically increasing with the level of constriction by
identifying such a monotonic relationship between the credit rating index and R&D
investment.
Section 3.1 presents the database and variables; section 3.2 shows the econometric
set-up and section 3.3 describes the results of the empirical analysis. Section 3.4
presents some robustness checks and section 3.5 discusses the conclusions that can
be drawn from this chapter.
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3.1 Conceptual framework and data
The data used for the following analysis stems from the Mannheim Innovation Panel
(MIP) which is an annual survey in the German business sector conducted by the
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Mannheim. The MIP started in
1992 as the German part of the European-wide Community Innovation Survey with
the aim to provide key innovation data for policy and research purposes.3
All underlying definitions and concepts of measurement are based on the guidelines
of the OECD and Eurostat (OSLO-Manual 1997, 2nd edition) and clear definition
and examples are given to the responding firm to ensure that firms understand the
questions as intended. The key innovation indicators used in the present study are
based on concepts formulated in Chapter 3 of the Oslo Manual.4 The survey identi-
fies process and product innovators as well as non-innovative firms in manufacturing
and service industries. This study uses the survey from the manufacturing sector.
According to these definitions the concept of a product innovation is clearly set:
”a technologically new product is a product whose technological char-
acteristics or intended uses differ significantly from those of previously
produced products. Such innovations can involve radically new technolo-
gies, can be based on combining existing technologies in new uses, or can
be derived from the use of new knowledge” (OSLO-Manual 1997).
3The full sample comprises about 30,000 firms and is drawn as a stratified random sample.
Stratification criteria are sectors, firm-size and region (eastern/western Germany) and the sample
is drawn from the population of firms listed in the CREDITREFORM database. The sample of
firms is refreshed by a random sample of newly founded firms to replace firms that have exited the
market every two years.
4The Manual defines: ”Technological product and process (TPP) innovations comprise imple-
mented technologically new products and processes and significant technological improvements in
products and processes. A TPP innovation has been implemented if it has been introduced on
the market (product innovation) or used within a production process (process innovation). TPP
innovations involve a series of scientific, technological, organizational, financial and commercial ac-
tivities. The TPP innovating firm is one that has implemented technologically new or significantly
technologically improved products or processes during the period under review. The minimum
entry is that the product or process should be new (or significantly improved) to the firm (it does
not have to be new to the world)”.
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The subsample of product innovators allows us to implement the theory-derived dis-
tinction of defensive versus offensive R&D. Product innovative firms can be divided
into original innovators and imitators. Imitators are those firms that introduce new
products that are only new to the firms’ product portfolio but not new to the mar-
ket. Original inventors, on the contrary, introduce market novelties. In order to
distinguish ’cutting-edge R&D performers’ from ’routine R&D performers’ this in-
formation on the originality of firms’ innovations is exploited.
In particular, the concept of radical innovators and routine innovators is based on
information about the firms’ share of sales due to technologically innovative prod-
ucts introduced on the market within the last three year (Oslo-Manual, pp. 53 ff).
The corresponding question in the survey differentiated between the percentages of
shares of sales due to:
1. technologically new products (as defined in Chapter 3, Section 2.1, Oslo-
Manual) commercialized during the last three years that can be further broken
down by:
(a) sales due to products that are new or technologically improved for the
operating market of the firm
(b) sales due to products that are new or technologically improved only for
the firm
2. technologically improved products (as defined in Chapter 3, Section 2.1, Oslo-
Manual) commercialized during the last three years
3. products that are technologically unchanged, or subject only to product differ-
entiation, produced with changed production methods (see Chapter 3, Section
2.2, Oslo-Manual) during the last three years.
The sample is split according to the distribution of the sales share achieved with
market novelties (1a) at the firm level averages in the period under review (NOVEL).
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38% of product innovators are pure imitators, i.e. their sales with market novelties
are always zero. The median of NOVEL amounts to 2.5%, and the 75% quantile of
the distribution is at a novelty sales share of 7.5%. Several versions of these models
are going to be estimated. The subsequently presented results are based on a 1/3
versus 2/3 sample split: a product innovator is defined as ’cutting-edge R&D per-
former’ if NOVEL is larger than 5% of total sales on average during the observed
time period. The other group is denoted as ’routine R&D group’. Note, however,
that other definitions, such as sample split at 2.5% (at the median) or 7.5% (at the
3rd quartile) will be tested as well and allow the same conclusions (see appendix).
The sample covers the period between 1993 and 2002. It represents an unbal-
anced panel of 1,238 firm-year observations (352 different firms) on firms following
cutting-edge R&D investment strategies (NOVEL > 5%) and are thus more prone
to financial constraints than the control group. The latter consists of 2,568 firm-year
observations (719 different firms) on firms devoting most of their innovation effort
to imitation. The panel is unbalanced. While the data cover a time period of 10
years, 40% of firms are observed only two or three times in the panel, another 40%
are observed between four and six times, and the final 20% more frequently (up to
nine times). Note that a sample which is more representative of the economy than
those used in several earlier studies is used here, where scholars had to restrict their
analysis to large R&D-performing firms due to limitations in data availability. Due
to a large fraction of small firms (median size = 180 employees; a quarter of firms is
smaller than 55 employees), firms may not conduct R&D every year. This censoring
of the dependent variable is taken into account by estimating censored regression
models (Tobit). Due to the skewness of the distribution R&D expenditure measured
as ln(1+R&D) is used as dependent variable in all regressions.5
5R&D expenditure is measured in million ”Deutsche Mark” (1 DM ≈ 0.51 e).
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The credit rating index
The most important right-hand side variable is the credit rating reflecting access
to external capital. The credit rating (RATING) is an index between 100 and 600,
where the value of 100 indicates an expected excellent creditworthiness and the value
of 600 represents the worst rating. The construction of the index and the advantages
and disadvantages of its use have been discussed in detail in section 2.3.
Internal liquidity
While this analysis does not rely on the identification of constraints through investment-
cash flow relationships, it should still be controled for the availability of internal
funds. The most commonly used measure of internal financial resources is cash
flow. As this sample, however, is not limited to large firms which are obliged to
publish accounting data, there is no cash flow information available. Instead, the
empirical price-cost margin is calculated as
PCMi,t =
Salesi,t − Staff Costi,t −Material Costi,t + δ ·R&Di,t
Salesi,t
(3.1)
which has been used widely in the literature (e.g. Collins and Preston 1969, Raven-
scraft 1983). Since R&D is an expense, the decision to invest in R&D will decrease
PCM in the corresponding period. As internally available funds during the year
should be measured irrespective of the actual decision on investment, it is common
to add the R&D expenses back into PCM (cf. Harhoff 1998). As PCM does not
account for capital cost, only staff and material cost shares of R&D are added back.
These amount to 93% (δ = 0.93) according to the Wissenschaftsstatistik (1999)
which is the official German R&D statistic.
Firm and market characteristics
Further control variables are firm size measured by the number of employees (EMP)
and the capital intensity (KAPINT = tangible assets / EMP). Capital may serve as
collateral in credit negotiations with potential lenders, facilitating access to external
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sources of financing. Firms’ age (AGE) is employed to control for age-related effects,
e.g. younger firms may conduct more R&D ceteris paribus than older firms, since
they could have more established products in the market. Additionally, the firms’
competitive environment may impact the firms’ R&D activities. To take these effects
into account a Herfindahl-index (HHI) of industry sales concentration is introduced.
The data is taken from the annual reports of the German Monopolies Commission.
Finally, a set of 8 time dummies controls for business cycle effects and 10 industry
dummies (only included in pooled cross-sectional regressions) control for variation
of R&D intensity across sectors. Lagged values of all time variant variables (except
age) are used to avoid direct simultaneity between R&D and explanatory variables.
Descriptive statistics for both groups are presented in Table 1. The firms in the
’routine R&D’ group are on average 52 years old, while the cutting-edge-R&D firms
are slightly younger (about 50 years). However, the firms in the latter group are
bigger in terms of average employment, e.g. 1,166 compared to 575 in the routine-
R&D-group. Firms in both groups show similar capital intensities. Furthermore,
one can see that those firms following a - according to this definition - more risky
R&D strategy indeed spend considerably more on R&D than the control group.
Moreover, Table 1 shows these firms have a slightly higher price-cost-margin and
better credit rating than the firms in the routine R&D performing control group.6
6The relatively large difference of average R&D spending between groups is to a large extent
due to a few huge firms that spent more than 100 million Deutsche Mark, on average. Taking
those out of the sample does not alternate any of the findings.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
Routine R&D (2,568 obs.) Cutting-edge R&D (1,238 obs.)
Variable Mean Std.
Dev.
Min. Max. Mean Std.
Dev.
Min. Max.
R&Dit 5.05 37.24 0 866.74 29.17 176.94 0 2,525
EMPi,t−1 575.85 2,166 2 36,000 1,167 5,248 3 67,157
KAPINTi,t−1 0.09 0.10 0.01 0.79 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.73
PCMi,t−1 0.27 0.15 -0.38 0.81 0.30 0.16 -0.34 0.83
AGEi,t 52.58 42.03 2 202 49.77 42.69 1 186
HHIi,t−1 44.09 69.57 3.15 1,000 52.91 68.66 3.15 432.04
RATINGi,t−1/100 2.01 0.59 1 6 1.95 0.43 1 6
Note: Note: time and industry dummies omitted.
3.2 Econometric models
Three different models are applied to the panel data: a pooled cross-sectional ap-
proach, a random effects estimator and a modification of the latter by Wooldridge
(2002). The model can be written as
yi,t = max(0, xi,tβ + ci + ui,t), i = 1, 2, ..., N t = 1, 2, ..., T (3.2)
ui,t | xi, ci ∼ N(0, σ2u) (3.3)
where yi,t is the dependent variable, xi,t denotes the set of regressors, β the param-
eters to be estimated, and ci the unobserved firm-specific effect, and uit is the error
term. Three versions of this model are going to be estimated. First, it is assumed
that ci = 0, and thus the model can be estimated as a simple pooled cross-sectional
model, where the standard errors are adjusted for firm clusters to account for the
panel structure of the data. Thus, the error terms are allowed to be correlated
within firm observations. The pooled model has the advantage that it is not nec-
essary to maintain the strict exogeneity assumption. While ui,t certainly has to be
independent of xi,t, the relationship between ui,t and xi,s, t 6= s, is not specified
(see Wooldridge, 2002: 538). Hence, the model allows, for instance, for feedback of
R&D in period t to the regressors in future periods. In the second version of the
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model, a random-effects Tobit panel estimator is applied so that ci 6= 0. However,
this requires the strict exogeneity assumption. In addition, the random-effects Tobit
requires the assumption that ci is uncorrelated with xi,t. The latter is relaxed in the
third version of the model that follows Wooldridge who presented a modification
of the random effects Tobit in spirit of the Chamberlain (1982, 1984) method that
allows correlation between ui,t and ci. It is assumed
ci | xi ∼ N(Ψ + x¯iξ, σ2a), (3.4)
ci = Ψ + xiξ + ai (3.5)
so that a random-effects Tobit model in following modified version will be estimated
yi,t = max(0,Ψ + xi,tβ + xiξ + ai + ui,t) (3.6)
It can be tested if ξ = 0, and the model would reduce to the traditional random-
effects model, where the firm-specific effects are not correlated with the error term.
Table 3.2 presents the regression results for both firm groups respectively. The
first two columns are pooled cross-sectional estimates, the third and fourth are
random-effects Tobits that account for unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity in
investment behavior under the assumption that the regressors are not correlated
with the firm-specific effects. The Wooldridge estimator in columns 5 and 6 relaxes
this assumption.
3.3 Estimation results
In the pooled cross-sectional model it can be seen that both groups’ investment be-
havior is affected by the availability of internal funds measured through PCM. The
sensitivity of R&D to changes in PCM is larger for cutting-edge R&D compared
to routine R&D indicating the relatively higher importance of internal liquidity for
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this type of R&D investment. However, the access to the credit market as measured
by the credit rating only restricts the investment of firms with more risky or offen-
sive R&D. Recall that a larger value of RATING indicates a worse rating, and thus
the negative sign of the coefficient describes a reduction in R&D with increasing
values of the rating. In the random-effects panel models it is observed that - as pre-
dicted by Kamien and Schwartz (1978) - routine R&D performers are not subject to
binding credit market constraints. Hence, financial constraints constitute binding
restrictions for this type of R&D investment. This model also indicates that there
is unobserved heterogeneity in the panel. The Wooldridge model shows that the
assumption of uncorrelatedness between the firm-specific effect and the regressors
is rejected: several of the variables’ ”within” means are individually significant and
they are jointly significant altogether. Thus the Wooldridge model is preferable
over the standard random effects model. Again, the previous results are confirmed.
While credit market restrictions apply to firms conducting cutting-edge R&D, they
are not binding for routine R&D performers. Table 3.2 presents the result of Tobit
regression models under a different specification of the rating index. Here rating
classes are defined, where this indicator is split into four categories defined by the
quartiles of the rating distribution, so that each group contains 25% of the observa-
tions. In the regressions the three dummy variables, B, C and D, are included where
D indicates the worst rating. The group with the best ratings, A, serves as reference
group. This is related to the tests Kaplan and Zingales (1997) employed when they
rejected the usefulness of investment-cash flow relationships as they did not find a
monotonic relationship between cash flow sensitivity and level of constriction. The
results from this specification confirm earlier results and the models reveal that there
is a strict monotonic relationship between the indicator (RATING B, RATING C,
RATING D) and R&D investment. Consider the random effects model: the coeffi-
cient of rating B amounts to -0.057 indicating that the B group conducts slightly less
R&D than the reference group. The coefficient of the C group is -0.118 and the one
64 CHAPTER 3. FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS: ROUTINE VERSUS CUTTING EDGE R&D
of the D group equals -0.233. Thus R&D is found to be monotonically decreasing
with the level of constriction. The same applies to the pooled cross-sectional esti-
mates. The coefficients of the rating classes are jointly significant for cutting-edge
R&D in all specifications. These results illustrate that it is important to distinguish
the heterogeneity of investments in the spirit of Kamien and Schwartz, though. In
the ’routine R&D’ group the ratings’ coefficients are all insignificant and they do
not show a monotonic relationship. Note that the Wooldridge model collapses with
this specification as there is too much multicollinearity between the rating classes
and their within firm means.
While KAPINT always has the expected positive sign in the regressions using rou-
tine R&D performers, it is only significant in the panel estimations that account for
a firm-specific effect. For the cutting-edge group, KAPINT is always insignificant
and thus does not seem to have any effect on the firms’ investment. Furthermore,
firms’ age has no significant effect in except in the Wooldridge model for routine
R&D performers. Firm size, however, is always highly relevant for R&D invest-
ment. The non-linear specification detects a U-shaped relationship. However, the
extreme value of the curve is around 3 employees in the group of routine R&D
performers and around 17 employees in the cutting-edge group. As there are only
few observations that are smaller than these thresholds, it is basically found an up-
ward sloping (non-linear) relationship between R&D investment and firm size. A
Herfindahl-market-concentration index has been included to control for effects from
market structure on R&D investment. A positive effect of market concentration on
routine R&D, but not on cutting-edge R&D is observed.7
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate the negative relationship between R&D and the rat-
ing. To visualize the relationship a regression line has been added to the graph. The
line is the expected value of a univariate Tobit regression of the dependent variable
7Also non-linear specifications of the concentration measure habe been testes (as suggested for
example by Scherer 1984, Levin et al. 1985). These results showed that the relationship is basically
linear in this case.
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ln(R&D) on the credit rating. Even in this simple correlation, it becomes clear
that the rating has a larger effect (steeper slope) on the cutting-edge performer’s
R&D than on the routine R&D group. Also note that the slope of the curve is not
affected by the observations with very bad ratings at the right end of the distri-
bution (RATING ≥ 4). Omitting these observations leads essentially to the same
regression line.
 
0
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4 
6 
8
1 2 3 4 5 6
R&D E(R&D | RATING)
cutting-edge R&D group
Figure 3.1: Cutting-edge R&D and the credit rating
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Figure 3.2: Routine R&D and the credit rating
Finally, it is noteworthy that regressions using a pooled total sample without
the distinction of routine and cutting-edge performers do not detect any financial
constraints (results not presented in detail). The ratings are always insignificant
in the regressions with the total sample. Neither monotonic relationships between
rating classes and investment can be found. Thus, one would not find convincing
results with respect to financial constraints if one had used the full sample without
making explicitly a distinction with respect to the heterogeneity of R&D invest-
ments, cutting-edge versus routine project. Consequently it can be concluded that
the distinction with respect to the nature of the R&D investment is important in
analyzing financial constraints, as it was argued by Kamien and Schwartz (1978).
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Table 3.3: Tobit regressions on ln(1+R&D), for ’routine R&D’ (2,568 obs.) and
’cutting edge R&D’ (1,238 obs.) with RATING classes
Pooled Cross Section
Model
Random-Effects Panel
Model
Variable routine
cutting
edge
routine
cutting
edge
ln(EMPi,t−1) -0.353 *** -0.692 *** -0.195 ** -0.659 ***
(0.105) (0.101) (0.087) (0.090)
ln(EMPi,t−1)2 0.089 *** 0.120 *** 0.070 *** 0.113 ***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
ln(AGE)i,t 0.024 -0.021 0.049 -0.006
(0.038) (0.037) (0.033) (0.037)
KAPINTi,t−1 0.512 -0.101 0.702 *** -0.141
(0.361) (0.289) (0.228) (0.290)
PCMi,t−1 0.569 *** 0.763 *** 0.206 0.487 ***
(0.175) (0.198) (0.134) (0.138)
ln(HHIi,t−1) 0.056 * -0.022 0.064 ** 0.005
(0.033) (0.033) (0.027) (0.030)
RATINGi,t−1/100B 0.044 -0.078 0.087 -0.057
(0.086) (0.088) (0.058) (0.065)
RATINGi,t−1/100C 0.040 -0.187 ** 0.079 -0.118 *
(0.092) (0.092) (0.066) (0.075)
RATINGi,t−1/100D -0.036 -0.269 *** 0.002 -0.233 ***
(0.086) (0.095) (0.063) (0.071)
Joint sign. ind. dummies
χ2(10)
126.17∗∗∗ 104.17∗∗∗ 140.57∗∗∗ 97.37∗∗
Joint sign. time dummies
χ2(9)
52.16∗∗∗ 41.13∗∗∗ 50.08∗∗∗ 44.05∗∗∗
Joint sign. RATING
χ2(3)
1.37 9.01∗∗ 3.67 11.97∗∗∗
Log-likelihood -2,396.151 -1,330.163 -2,089.686 -1,190.370
ρ - - 0.546 0.491
∗ Notes: All models include an intercept and industry dummies (not presented). Standard
errors in parentheses (clustered in pooled cross-sectional models). *** (**, *) indicate a
significance level of 1% (5, 10%). ρ indicates the share of the total variance which is due to
the cross-sectional variation.
3.4 Robustness tests
a) Routine vs cutting-edge definition
The following section presents robustness checks with alternative ’cutting-edge’ def-
initions. The results presented above were obtained by splitting the sample at the
value of 5% of sales with market novelties over the whole time period at the firm
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level. This roughly resulted in 33% of firms being defined as cutting-edge R&D
performer. Other definitions, such as sample splits at 2.5% (at the median) or 7.5%
(at the 3rd quartile), result in the same conclusions (see Tables A.7 to A.10 in the
appendix).
In addition to these robustness checks, another cutting-edge definition is considered
that takes into account that the type of R&D may be very heterogeneous across
industries. While the former sample grouping was solely done on the basis of firm-
level information, it is now adjusted to innovation outcome relative to the industry.
This motivation for this test can be seen in Table A5 where the distributions of
routine and cutting-edge R&D performers across industries are shown. Since the
relative distributions differ, an an alternative grouping of firms is considered. Again
the average sales of market novelties across all time periods is calculated at the firm
level, but then divided by the average sales of market novelties at the industry level.
A cutting-edge R&D performer is now defined as a firm that is located in the upper
third of the sales distribution with market novelties relative to its industry. Thus,
cutting-edge performers are defined relative to their ’peer companies. This allows
to test the robustness of previous results to the relative distribution of industries to
the ’routine’ and cutting-edge R&D performing group.
The results are shown in Tables A.11 and A.12 and again all previous results are
confirmed. The R&D investment of cutting-edge performers is curtailed only by
the credit market which is again in line with the argumentation by Kamien and
Schwartz (1978).
b) Potential endogeneity of the credit rating
If firms jointly decide about capital structure, equity issuance and dividend pay-
ment, R&D and other investment in a way to maximize profits, the credit rating
evaluating this performance of the firms may be influenced by the R&D decision.
Moreover, firms that engage in risky investment projects may have a higher likeli-
hood to fail, which may lead to both an adjustment in R&D investment and to a bad
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credit rating. This suggests that there might be some endogeneity in the relationship
between financial constraint and R&D investment. To address this concern, two in-
strumental variables (IV) were collected and a test for endogeneity was performed.8
The instrumental variables must be exogenous and relevant. To be exogenous, these
variables are required to be uncorrelated with any unobserved firm-specific omitted
variable affecting current R&D. To be relevant, the IVs are required to be strongly
partially correlated with the uncertainty proxy in a first stage regression.
After examining a number of IV candidates, two instrumental variables were found
that are related to the firm’s credit rating, but are exogenous to the individual R&D
decisions of the companies.
The first IV is the lagged average credit rating in the three-digit NACE industry in
which the sample firms operate in the respective year.9 The second IV is the lagged
average of firms’ credit ratings in the firms’ region, more precisely at state level.
The latter is motivated by the organization of the rating agency Creditreform. It
is organized regionally, i.e. each German region has a branch of the rating agency
which is responsible for the evaluation of its local firms.
Column 1 and 2 of Table 3.4 show the first stage results from regressing RATING on
all covariates and the instruments. In case of weak instruments, the coefficient esti-
mates in IV regressions can be seriously biased. To avoid this problem, Staiger and
Stock (2007) suggest the partial F statistic for the IVs must exceed a value of 10. In
this case, the value of this statistic is for the cutting-edge group is F (2, 351) = 51.27
and F (2, 718) = 23.93 for the routine group. This clearly rejects a weak instrument
concern.
Second, it was tested whether RATING is endogenous in the structural equation us-
8The IV results presented here are based on pooled cross-sectional models as IV methods for
Tobit panel estimators do not exist to date. As no major differences concerning the main hypotheses
between the pooled cross-sectional models and panel Tobits as presented in Table 3.2 could be
found, one can conclude that this is no major concern for this analysis.
9At the three-digit NACE level, 88 different industry classes are considered (as compared to 11
different classes used as industry dummies in the models).
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ing the Smith and Blundell (1986) method for Tobit models which is similar to the
Rivers-Vuong procedure in the Probit case. It requires computing the residuals from
the first stage reduced form regression and subsequently plugging these residuals into
the Tobit estimation of the R&D equation. The usual t-statistic on the coefficient
of the first stage residuals provides a test of the null hypothesis that RATING is ex-
ogenous. If the coefficient estimate is significantly different from zero, meaning the
exogeneity of RATING would be rejected, the second stage Tobit standard errors
would not be asymptotically valid. In addition to this test, a full information maxi-
mum likelihood (FIML) IV Tobit as proposed by Newey (1990) has been estimated.
As can be seen in columns 3 and 4 of table 3.4, the 1st stage residuals are not
significant in the R&D equation which leads to the conclusion that the exogeneity
of RATING is not rejected in the R&D equation. The results for Newey’s FIML
IV Tobit model can be seen in columns 5 and 6 of Table 3.4. Consistent with the
fact that the exogeneity of RATING cannot be rejected, the results are virtually the
same as those of the Smith-Blundell procedure. There is no evidence that RATING
is endogenous.
Finally, it has been tested for the validity of the instruments, i.e. the instruments are
uncorrelated with the error term of the R&D equations. Note, however, that there is
no standard over-identification test for Tobit models like there is for linear models.
Therefore, one can only perform a test by ignoring the left censoring of the R&D
variable. A standard Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) model was estimated and
Hansen’s J test (the heteroscedasticity-robust version of the Sargan test) had been
computed. The Hansen J statistic is χ2(1) = 0.352 (p = 0.553) for the cutting-edge
group and χ2(1) = 0.153 (p = 0.696) for the routine group. This indicates that the
IVs satisfy the exogeneity requirement. Although the instruments pass all tests and
the previous findings are confirmed, some remaining concerns about actual causality
cannot be ruled out. For instance, the instruments address within-industry endo-
geneity, while cross-industry endogeneity is not captured. Another concern could
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be the following: suppose there are identical firms in an industry and all engage in
R&D, but only some of those succeed. These will introduce new products and also
have better credit ratings. This problem may not be solved by the industry-level in-
strument. The instrument at the regional level, however, may address some of these
concerns as it provides variations across industries. Finally, the industry heterogene-
ity may be such that one industry has both growth and research opportunities while
others do not. Then, firms in this industry may also produce more new products by
investing more into R&D and have high credit ratings. Although the regional level
instrument is not subject to industry-specific effects, heterogeneity of opportunities
at the firm-level cannot be fully ruled out. To some extent the firm-specific effect
in the panel models may capture such firm heterogeneity, though. In conclusion,
however, one should be somewhat careful in interpreting these results as causal.
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3.5 Conclusion and discussion
This chapter revisited the discussion on financial constraints for R&D investment.
As studies on investment-cash flow relationships have been criticized by Kaplan
and Zingales (1997), this chapter suggests to overcome these limitations by using a
credit rating index that directly measures the expected level of constriction. Fur-
thermore, the presented analysis accounts for the heterogeneity of R&D investments
by grouping the sample into potentially constrained and unconstrained firms based
on Kamien and Schwartz (1978). They suggest that R&D of a more risky nature
will be difficult to finance by external resources where less risky R&D may not be
subject to binding financial constraints. This has been implemented empirically by
grouping the sample into routine versus cutting-edge R&D performers. Using panel
data, it has been shown that firms pursuing cutting-edge R&D strategies are sub-
ject to financial constraints in the credit market. The credit rating index turns out
to curtail R&D spending for cutting-edge R&D while it does not for routine R&D
investment. This finding has important implications for innovation policy. It can be
assumed that cutting-edge innovations are one of the driving force of technological
progress and thus their innovations yield higher social returns than routine R&D
projects in the long run. The results, however, show that such investments are sub-
ject to binding credit market constraints. Thus, even if firms are able to credibly
convey all information relevant to the R&D project to banks, the risky nature of
cutting-edge R&D may still prevent these firms from raising sufficient capital. This
may call for policy measures towards cutting-edge R&D projects. It would be in-
teresting for further research to investigate whether current policies address these
investments and how effective and efficient R&D policies are. In Germany there
have been so-called ’thematic R&D programs’ in place since the early 1980’s that
aim at supporting radical R&D in new technologies that can still be far from mar-
ketable applications. However, public R&D support for the industrial sector has
been declining in the period from the mid-80s until the year 2003. In 1997 govern-
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mental R&D subsidies for such programs were at an all time low accounting to 0.74
billion Euro representing only 27% of all public R&D spending in the private sector
(Rammer and Binz, 2006). Even if financial support has been declining for all types
of R&D, the decline in the ’thematic R&D programs’ may have most severe long-run
detrimental effects. At European Union level so-called Young Innovative Compa-
nies (YICs) have recently attracted policy initiatives’ attention. These firms, even if
they are small in number, contribute to a large share of radical innovations creating
new markets and stimulating follow-on innovations by other companies (Schneider
and Veugelers 2008). However, such policy measures may be too focused on one
particular group of firms. Future research will have to show effectiveness of these
policy measures. Finally it should be noted that this study is not without limita-
tions. Although long time-series data was available for many firms in this sample,
it was not possible to calculate an R&D stock. This would be necessary to estimate
Euler equations or error correction models which are theoretically founded models
of investment behavior that map the inter-temporal optimization problem between
the size of investments and the level of R&D stocks. While those models have been
applied in many studies this analysis can only use their ingredients but have to de-
part with the specification from the theory-grounded choice due to data restrictions.
Although this analysis made an effort to establish a causal link between the credit
rating and R&D investment, the instrumental variables - despite passing common
relevance and validity tests - cannot rule out some remaining concerns about en-
dogeneity, for instance, cross-industry endogeneity. Longer time series data and a
more balanced panel would possibly allow exploiting some specific shocks, e.g. pol-
icy changes or technological shocks, to establish a quasi-experimental setting that
could help to re-assure these findings.
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Chapter 4
Industrial Research versus
Development Investment: The
Implications of Financial
Constraints
R&D activities and resulting innovation constitute an important driver of economic
competitiveness and hence sustainable economic growth. As has been illustrated
by numerous studies, the impact of R&D on productivity at the firm level stems
from the implementation of newly generated knowledge and technological discover-
ies into new products, improvement of existing products and production processes
or cost reductions of producing existing products or services (see e.g. Stiglitz 1969,
Griliches 1980, Schankerman 1981, Griliches and Mairesse 1984, 1990, and Hall and
Mairesse 1995). Consequently, R&D has been recognized as important input factor
to industrial production.
However, Griliches (1986) points out that basic research is a main driver for produc-
tivity at the firm level. He shows that expenditures for basic research significantly
contribute to productivity growth of U.S. manufacturing firms in the 1970s (also
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Mansfield 1980). He finds in his cross-sectional analysis that firms that invest a
larger fraction of their total R&D on basic research are more productive, hence
stressing the importance of this component. Recently, this finding has been comple-
mented by Czarnitzki et al. (2009) who show that research expenditures exhibit a
significant premium over development expenditures with regard to patent produc-
tivity in a panel of Belgian firms.
Moreover, economic theory suggests that the social rates of return are larger than
the private rates of return from research activities because of the incompleteness of
appropriability of the knowledge that is being created by investment (Arrow 1962,
Usher 1964).1
When Arrow (1962) wrote about economic welfare and the allocation of resources
for invention, he was in particular referring to private research activities - or gen-
erally speaking the production of new knowledge - that may suffer from financing
constraints due to market failure: ”Thus basic research, the output of which is only
used as an informational input into other inventive activities, is especially unlikely
to be rewarded”. Moreover he concludes that ”[] underinvestment will be greater
for more basic research.”
Hence, he was mainly referring to the ’R’ component of R&D. Thus, especially
for basic research, which is used as an informational input into subsequent inven-
tive activities, firms may face particular difficulties to attract external investors or
receive bank loans for financing these activities. Firms with limited internal liq-
uidity may therefore have to constrain their research to currently available funds
and postpone or abandon projects that they would conduct if additional financ-
ing was available. This reduces incentives to invest in long term research projects
and may bring overall industrial research in the economy way below optimal lev-
els. Hence, underinvestment in ’R’ due to financing constraints may therefore result
1Empirically, numerous studies have confirmed positive spillover effects from industrial R&D.
See Griliches (1992) for a survey. However, to date there is no study on social returns that explicitly
disentangles ’R’ and ’D’ investments with regard to spillover effects.
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in noticeable slowdown in productivity growth and consequently have particularly
detrimental effects on technological progress and economic development.
Previous literature has provided vast evidence for the conjecture that capital market
imperfections, in particular information asymmetries, influence lending and invest-
ment decisions of firms. Moreover, information asymmetries may be particularly
severe in the case of research and development (R&D) activities. As will also be
discussed in section 4.1, information asymmetries may be particularly severe in the
case of research and development (R&D) activities. Complexity, specificity and
outcome uncertainty of such investment projects may make it particularly difficult
for outsiders to judge the expected return. Additionally, firms may be reluctant to
reveal details of the projects to potential investors. Besides information asymme-
tries, the intangibility of the asset that is being created by the investment and the
uncertainty of returns may make raising funds externally more costly for R&D than
for other types of investments (e.g. Mansfield 1977, Berger and Udell 1998, Harhoff
1998). Financing R&D externally may thus be more costly compared to financing of
other types of investment (e.g. Meyer and Kuh 1957, Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, Myers
and Majluf 1984, Anton and Yao 2002). This may indicate that the Pecking Order
Theory of capital structure developed by Myers and Majluf (1984) is of particular
relevance for financing decisions for R&D.
Yet, most articles, surveys, evaluations and reports concerning allocation of re-
sources to R&D do not explicitly distinguish between the different components of
R&D.2 Previous studies on financing constraints for knowledge creating activities
usually analyzed industrial R&D in aggregate form. However, several authors have
already stressed that research activities are not only often separated from develop-
ment activities organizationally in industrial practice (Karlsson 2004, Mansfield et
2Link (1981) is one of the few studies that analyze determinants of inter-firm differences in the
composition of R&D expenditures. Also Mansfield (1981) studies the effects of firm size on the
composition of R&D investments and finds that increases in size of firm - measured in firms’ sales -
are associated with more than proportional increases in the amount spent on basic research. This
may already hint to financing constraints for firms with lower levels of internally available funds.
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al. 1971, Seiler 1965), but also important factors like time, originality, organization,
and knowledge depth differ substantially between ’R’ and ’D’ projects (Karlsson
2004). Moreover, characteristics usually attributed to R&D activities in general,
such as intangibility and outcome uncertainty are very likely to be more applicable
for ’R’ compared to ’D’. While not empirically discussed, Kamien and Schwartz
(1978) developed a theoretical model to show that firms conducting fundamental or
radical R&D projects are more likely to encounter financial constraints than firms
performing predominantly routine R&D. Although the authors do not explicitly dif-
ferentiate between ’R’ versus ’D’, their concept of radical versus routine R&D may
also apply to distinction between ’R’ and ’D’, since fundamental innovations usually
involve basic research, require significantly more resources and are much riskier in
terms of default and expected returns.
This article aims to complement previous studies by explicitly taking the heterogene-
ity of the two components of R&D into account. By compartmentalizing industrial
R&D activity into its components, it is argued in the following that financing de-
velopment ’D’ externally should be less critical than it is for industrial research
’R’. This empirical study, indeed, reveals that ’R’ investment is more sensitive to
the firms’ operating liquidity than ’D’ indicating that firms have to rely even more
on internal funds for financing their research compared to development activities.
Looking at aggregated R&D expenditures of the firm would not have revealed this
effect.
Moreover, it is found that (basic) research subsidy recipients invest more into ’R’
than other firms, and that their investment is also less sensitive to internal liquidity.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.1 outlines the motivation for this re-
search as well as the conceptual framework of the analysis and section 4.2 describes
the data. The econometric set-up and the model specifications are described in
section 4.3 Section 4.4 presents the results before a concluding discussion follows in
section 4.5.
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4.1 Conceptual framework
Although the presence of financing constraints for R&D has been shown in numerous
empirical studies3, R&D has usually been analyzed in aggregate form. If external fi-
nancing for R&D is constrained, firms engaging in R&D may have to rely to a larger
extent on internal financial resources than firms that mainly invest in capital goods
(e.g. Carpenter and Petersen 2002, Chiao 2002, David et al. 2008). Theoretical and
empirical literature has illustrated that firms foremost use internal funds to finance
innovation projects as compared to debt indicating such a gap in the cost of capital
(Leland and Pyle 1977, Bhattacharya and Ritter 1983, Hall 1990, 1992, Himmelberg
and Peterson 1994, Harhoff 1998, Bougheas et al. 2003, Czarnitzki and Hottenrott
2009). However, research activities that usually precede development activities may
show fundamentally different characteristics. Attributes typically related to R&D
activities in general, such as intangibility and uncertainty are very likely to be more
applicable for research ’R’ compared to development ’D’. Research projects are usu-
ally characterized by being ”far from the market” and may suffer from stronger
externalities decreasing the expected profitability. In many cases, results obtained
from research activities are not even planned to reach the market at all, but are
rather used to build up individual or group knowledge which might be beneficial for
future research (Mansfield et al. 1971). By contrast, development projects aim at
commercializing products to fit customer demands. Research can be labeled as a
more discontinuous process which may result in solutions displaying the possibilities
in a technology area whereas development is a more continuous solution of existing
ideas (Karlsson et al. 2004).
To illustrate this, think of, for instance, the recently emerging technology named
DNA computing. This technology uses genetic material to create nano-computers,
i.e. DNA-based microprocessors, that compared to traditional silicon-based com-
puters is capable of storing billions more information on an even smaller surface.
3See Hubbard (1998) and Hall (2008) for extensive surveys of the literature.
82
CHAPTER 4. INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH VERSUS DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENT: THE
IMPLICATIONS OF FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS
Moreover, it promises to allow solving complex ’fuzzy logic’ problem that could not
be solved with the technologies already in place. Suppose a semiconductor chip
producing company such as Intel works on this new technology. Projects that have
to objective to increase Intel’s knowledge on molecular computing in general would
be a clear case for what we would call ’R’- projects. This may involve basic research
on thinking whether molecular computing is possible at all. If so, applied research
will address the challenge of potential implementation of this new technology. In
contrast, current development activities of Intel would clearly revolve around intro-
ducing a new generation or improved version of a silicon-based chip on the market.
Of course, if research ever leads to an feasible implementation of DNA-computing,
the prototyping of such chips would then become a development project in the (dis-
tant) future.
Accordingly, development takes place at a later stage of the R&D process building
on previously generated knowledge4, which may be tangible to a certain extent, for
example in the form of patents or other intellectual property rights. Thus, the gap
in financing costs may be larger in the case of research activities as this is the part
of the R&D process that is even more prone to information asymmetries.
Consequently, firms may be limited in the financing of their R&D by the funds that
are internally available. At the same time, internal financial resources are affected
by the firms’ debt payment obligations. The higher the obligations relative to the
internal funds of the firm, the less liquidity remains for activities that have to be
financed internally such as R&D. Thus, increases in firms’ levels of debt may put
pressure on the firm to use its cash flow to service interest and repayment at the ex-
pense of long-term investments such as R&D (Hall 1990, 1992, Long and Ravenscraft
1993, Bhagat and Welch 1995, Ogawa 2007). Moreover, high leverage may reduce
4Although ’D’ projects usually follow some form of ’R’ project, not every ’R’ project is followed
by a corresponding ’D’ project as not every ’R’ project may deliver results that can immediately
serve as input for the development phase. Hence, ’R’ and ’D’ projects can be both entirely inde-
pendent from each other or of course results from ’R’ may enter ’D’ projects.
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access to further credit due to increasing default risk. Accordingly, higher debt pay-
ment obligations may also have stronger effects on ’R’ than on ’D’ investments as
firms have to rely even more on their internal funds for the former component of
R&D. In this chapter it is therefore argued that effects for investment in ’R’ should
be particularly more sensitive to debt compared to investments in ’D’ as the latter
occurs later in the R&D process and is closer to yielding returns. That is, firms will
be more likely to cut ’R’ than to reduce ’D’ if they have to allocate internal funds
for serving debt.
This chapter therefore explicitly aims at disentangling the effects of liquidity and
debt on R&D using firm-level panel data. In the following separate equations for
investment in ’R’ and investment in ’D’ are going to be estimated to identify dif-
ferences in the reliance of firms on internal funds for both components of R&D
reflecting constraints in the access to external financing.
A positive relationship between firms’ liquidity and the firms’ expenditures in R&D
is expected. For ’R’, however, the effect is expected to be stronger due to the nature
of ’R’ activities versus ’D’ activities. The former is likely to be more prone to infor-
mation asymmetries, secrecy issues as well uncertainty of outcomes. These factors
may make it more costly to finance externally if not impossible at all. Thus, a firm
has to rely more on internal funds for ’R’ than for ’D’ and may therefore show a
larger sensitivity to the availability of internal funds.
While the differences in funding gaps for ’R’ versus ’D’ have not yet been uncovered
explicitly in an empirical study on financial constraints at the firm-level, this phe-
nomenon has long been understood by technology policy. In Flanders, for instance,
different subsidy schemes exist. Firms can submit project proposals for subsidy re-
quests, and possible grants are based on a percentage of the eligible costs that consist
of project-related payroll costs, direct costs (operating costs and depreciation of the
equipment) and to a limited extent indirect (general) costs. The percentage to which
total project cost can be subsidized depends on the type of research project: indus-
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trial ”basic and strategic” research may receive up to 50% of the accepted total
costs, ”experimental development and prototyping” up to 25% of the accepted total
costs and ”mixed research projects” up to 38% of the accepted total costs.
Consequently, the initial analysis is supplemented with a policy variable. It is inves-
tigated whether firms that received grants for ”basic and strategic” research projects
are less constrained in their investment into ’R’. For ’D’ no such impact of public
basic research funding on the level of constriction is expected.
4.2 Data
The data for the analysis stems from the Belgian part of the OECD R&D survey.
The survey is harmonized across OECD countries and is conducted every second
year in order to compose the OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators with
the collected data. This R&D survey is a permanent inventory of all R&D-active
companies in Flanders. The analysis is based on six consecutive waves of the R&D
survey data covering the period from 1999 until 2007. Each wave provides informa-
tion on firm level data for two consecutive years.
The definition of research and development used in most economic research encom-
passes several kinds of activities. According to the definition of the OECD Frascati
Manual (1993, 2002) which frames the methodology for collecting and using statis-
tics about R&D in OECD countries, the term R&D covers three activities: basic
research, applied research and experimental development.5 The first two can be sum-
marized to be the ’R’ of R&D, while the latter one constitutes the ’D’ component
of R&D. According to the international definition is basic research ’experimental or
5According to this international definition is basic research ’experimental or theoretical work
undertaken primarily to acquire new knowledge of the underlying foundation of phenomena and
observable facts, without any particular application or use in view’. Whereas applied research also
is original investigation undertaken in order to acquire new knowledge, it is, however, directed
towards a specific practical outcome. Development activities are rather ’systematic work, drawing
from existing knowledge gained from research and/or practical experience, which is directed to
producing new materials, products or devices [. . .]’ (OECD, 2002, p.30).
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theoretical work undertaken primarily to acquire new knowledge of the underlying
foundation of phenomena and observable facts, without any particular application
or use in view’. Whereas applied research also is original investigation undertaken in
order to acquire new knowledge, it is, however, directed towards a specific practical
outcome. Development activities are rather ’systematic work, drawing from exist-
ing knowledge gained from research and/or practical experience, which is directed
to producing new materials, products or devices []’ (OECD, 2002, p.30).
In order to construct the financial indicators the data is supplemented with infor-
mation on the firms’ financial background with accounting and balance sheet data
from the BELFIRST database. For the policy analysis, the panel data is enriched
with public R&D project funding information that has been provided by the IWT
Flanders, which is the innovation and technology policy agency of the Flemish gov-
ernment administering innovation subsidies.
The sample comprises firms that at least once invested in R&D and are observed at
least twice in the reference period as panel data models are going to be estimated
that allow controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. On average, each firm is ob-
served about 4 times in the panel. After eliminating data with missing values in
the variables of interest, the final sample consists of 3,686 firm-year observations
referring to 952 different firms.6
Variables
Firms’ R&D expenditures serve as dependent variable for the analysis. The pecu-
liarity of the survey, however, provides information not only about aggregate R&D
spending, but also about ’R’ and ’D’ separately. Thus it is possible to disentangle
a firm’s R&D expenditures (R&D) into its components research (RESEARCH) ex-
penditures on the one hand and development (DEVELOPMENT) expenditures on
the other hand.
6Table A.13 in the appendix provides details on the distribution of firms across industries.
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Indicators for the capital structure of the firms in the sample are derived from bal-
ance sheet information accounted according to local Belgian GAAP on an annual
basis. The firms’ stock of working capital is employed as a measure of operating
liquidity to overcome limitations of cash flow as indicator for firms’ liquidity as
suggested by Hall and Kruiniker (1995). The appropriateness of cash flow as an
indicator for the availability of internal funds and the interpretation of sensitivity
of R&D investment to changes in cash flow has been seriously questioned in the
literature (Hao and Jaffe 1993, Fazzari and Petersen 1993, Hall and Kruiniker 1995,
Kaplan and Zingales 1997, 2000). Especially in the case of large firms, free cash flow
levels may be determined by accounting as well as dividend policies aimed at mit-
igating moral hazard problems (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Jensen 1986, Dhanani
2005). Additionally, a positive relationship between investment and cash flow may
simply reflect that both of them correlate with promising market demand. Firms use
working capital for day-to-day financial operations and it is therefore an important
indicator of the liquidity of the firm. By retaining cash inflows, firms accumulate
the financial funds needed for investment as reflected in the stock of working capital.
The advantage of working capital over cash flow is therefore that it is an accumula-
tion rather than a flow parameter. Although working capital is affected by cash flow
working capital is a more precise liquidity indicator when it comes to investment
decisions as it also includes not only cash but also values that can relatively easily
be converted into cash.
Working capital (WCAP) is the net amount of short term assets, i.e. the difference
between current assets minus current liabilities of a firm. The higher the working
capital the more secured is a firm’s liquidity and accordingly its financial flexibility.
This variable can take positive or negative values. A positive working capital means
that short term liabilities are covered by current assets (cash, accounts receivable
and inventory) whereas a negative working capital indicates that a firm’s current
assets are not sufficient to cover its current liabilities. Hence, it serves as indicator
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for a firm’s short-term liquidity.
In addition, firm’s debt is used as further variable controlling for credit market ac-
cess. The overall liabilities of the firm (DEBT) consist of current liabilities payable
within one year and non-current liabilities payable later than one year. The overall
debt-to-equity ratio (leverage) of the firms in the sample is about 60%. However,
debt-to-tangible assets-ratios are employed rather than debt-to-equity as the former
type is more meaningful in terms of reflecting the firms’ liabilities relative to the
firms’ collateral value.
As common in the financial constraints literature, the dependent variables are scaled
as well as WCAP and DEBT by firms’ assets (see e.g. Fazzari et al. 1988, Fazzari
and Petersen 1993, Harhoff, 1998, and others). Lagged tangible assets (K) calcu-
lated as the value of a firm’s total fixed assets minus current assets and financial
assets (as already captured by WCAP), goodwill and other intangible assets is used.
As common in firm level studies, it is controled for firm size. Larger firms may
be able to realize economies of scope while conducting research and development
activities. Therefore the log of the firms’ tangible assets ln(K) as well as its squared
value [ln(K)]2 is included. The dummy variable GROUP taking the value 1 if a
firm belongs to a group (0, otherwise) controls for different governance structures.
Group members may conduct more R&D activities since firms associated with a
group can make use of intra-firm spillovers, internalise externalities as well as fund
R&D from intra-group sources. To control for age-related effects, since younger and
newly established firms may invest relatively more into research and development
than older firms, the log of age, ln(AGE), is used. For a non-(log)-linear relationship
is allowed for by including [ln(AGE)2].
For the supplemental regression including the policy variable, create a dummy vari-
able is created indicating that the firm received government funding for basic or
strategic research (SUBR). This variable will be interacted with WCAP to evalu-
ate whether possible financial constraints are alleviated by basic research funding.
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Furthermore, a set of time dummies is included to take business cycle effects into
account. Finally, 16 sector dummies on basis on the European standard industry
classification NACE are included to capture different technological opportunities.
All variables in monetary units are measured in million Euros in prices of the year
2000. The GDP deflator is used for price adjustment. To avoid a simultaneity
bias which can arise if there are feedback effects from the dependent variable to
current explanatory variables, lagged values of all time variant exogenous variables
(except AGE) are used. For the variable DEBT, a two period lag is build as debt is
measured at the end of the year t-2, so that its signal to lenders is effective in t-1.
This 2-period lag then indicated credit market access in t-1 when also the available
working capital is measured.
Table 4.1 shows the descriptive statistics for all variables. Average R&D expendi-
tures are around 3 million Euros for each firm per year where roughly two thirds
are spent for development and one third for research. On average, liabilities amount
to about 77 million Euros. The median, however, is much lower (about 5 million
). Firms in the sample have about 270 employees on average. However, the size
distribution of firms is skewed and at the median the number of employees is only
54. The sample comprises very young firms of 2 years as well as established firms of
up to 125 years of business activity. The average firm age is about 26 years. Further,
60% of the firms in the sample are part of a group.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics (3,686 obs.)
Variable Unit Median Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
dependent variables:
R&Di,t in million e 0.16 2.86 18.36 0 471.35
RESEARCHi,t in million e 0.04 1.07 7.33 0 217.58
DEV ELOPMENTi,t in million e 0.07 1.79 13.39 0 424.21
regressors:
DEBTi,t−2 in million e 5.33 76.94 386.6 0.01 7,764.43
WCAPi,t−1 in million e 2.00 12.54 42.65 -155.02 634.90
Ki,t−1 in million e 1.39 15.94 85.69 0 1,805.05
EMPi,t−1 headcount 54 271.34 745.79 1 11,575
AGEi,t years 19 25.75 19.25 2 125
GROUPi dummy 1 0.58 0.49 0 1
RSUBi,t dummy 0 0.07 0.25 0 1
Notes: time and industry dummies omitted.
4.3 Econometric models
Censored panel regression models are going to be estimated as not all of the firms
in the sample perform R&D in each period. Especially small firms may conduct
R&D only on an irregular basis. In particular, random effects models are going to
be estimated that can be written as
Ii,t = max(0, x
′
i,tβ + ci + ui,t), i = 1, 2, ..., N t = 1, 2, ..., T (4.1)
ui,t | xi, ci ∼ N(0, σ2u) (4.2)
where y denotes the dependent variable, x the set of regressors, c a firm-specific
time-constant effect, and u the usual random error term. The parameters to be
estimated are denoted by the vector β. First the model is estimated as random
effects Tobit that requires the assumption of no correlation between c and x (see
Wooldridge, 2002: 540-541, for further technical details).7 In addition, Wooldridge
(2002) is followed that allows relaxing the assumption of uncorrelatedness between
7Note that it is not useful to estimate a fixed effects Tobit model, as the maximum likelihood
estimator is not consistent (see e.g. Cameron and Trivedi 2005).
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x and c by modifying the model. Let ci = ψ + x¯iξ + ai. Then one can write
yi,t = max(0, ψ + x¯iξ + ai + ui,t) (4.3)
with
ui,t | xi, ai ∼ N(0, σ2u). (4.4)
The appropriateness of the Wooldridge model, i.e. that the assumption of uncor-
relatedness between the firm-specific effect and the regressors is not valid, will be
tested by the joint significance of the x-variables’ ”within” means. Separate models
are estimated for the three dependent variables of interest. The basic model for
R&D investment is specified as8:
R&Di,t
Ki,t
∗
= β0 + β1
DEBTi,t−2
Ki,t−1
+ β2
WCAPi,t−1
Ki,t−1
+ β3lnKi,t−1 + β4(lnKi,t−1)2 + β5lnAGEi,t + β6(lnAGEi,t)2 + β7GROUPi
+
23∑
k=8
βkINDi,k +
32∑
s=24
βsts + ci + ui,t (4.5)
R&Di,t
Ki,t
=

R&Di,t
Ki,t
∗
if xi,tβ + ci + ui,t > 0
0 otherwise.
(4.6)
The equations for the two components of internal R&D, i.e. RESEARCH and
DEVELOPMENT are specified analogously.
8Although the model contains a time-invariant firm-specific effect the time-invariant regressors
GROUP and the industry dummies are included, as the firm-specific effect is treated as a random
component in the estimation. Time invariant regressors are used to decrease the error term variance
(see Wooldridge, 2002: 541).
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4.4 Estimation results
The results of the random effects panel and its modification by Wooldridge are pre-
sented in Table 4.2. The first column presents the results for total in-house R&D
investment, columns 2 and 3 present the results for Research and Development in-
vestments separately.
For the total R&D investment, the expected results are found: the working capital
variable is positively significant and debt is negatively significant. Thus, firms are
financial constrained by their internal resources. In addition, with higher values
of debt, investment is even reduced further. This is interpreted as indication that
the higher the default risk, the less likely potential investors are to provide further
capital for R&D investment.
If R and D is split into its two components, interesting differences between R and D
can be seen. Debt is only negatively significant for R but not D. Thus, the negative
coefficient for DEBT means that higher level of debt coincide with lower levels of
R&D, and ’R’, but not of ’R’. The negative sign is interpreted as the reflection of
basically two facts. First, that particularly ’R’-projects compete with the payment
of debt obligations and second that firms with higher debt levels find it harder to
raise additional financing for new or larger ’R’- projects. Furthermore, the positive,
significant coefficient of WCAP/K is larger in the R equation than in the D equa-
tion. Thus, the results from the disaggregated models for R and D reveal that these
liquidity effects constraining R&D stem to a large extent from research activities
only. In order to evaluate the magnitude of the impact of WCAP on investment,
marginal effects are calculated. It is of interest to study how E(y|x) changes if x
changes, i.e. the censoring is taken into account.9 The marginal effects are calcu-
lated under the assumption that ci = 0 at the mean of the covariates, and obtain
standard errors using the delta method (cf. e.g. Greene, 2000, for technical details).
The marginal effect of WCAP amounts to 0.064 (SE = 0.014) in the R equation
9Note that the coefficients in a Tobit model indicate ∂E(y∗ | x)/∂x.
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and to 0.024 (SE = 0.011) in the D equation, which yields a significant difference
between the two effect at the 5% level. Thus one can conclude that the firms have
to rely even more on internal resources for financing R within their R&D project, or
in other words suffer more from financial constraints for R than for D. This may be
due to the fact that ’D’ occurs later in the R&D process and is closer to the market,
i.e. closer to yielding returns. Hence, firms may cut ’R’, before they reduce ’D’ if
they are constrained by the credit market and have to rely on scarce internal funds.
With respect to the control variables a non-linear relationship between the depen-
dent variables and firm size as measured by lnK is found. The minimum value of this
U-shaped curve is around the 75% percentile of the lnK distribution for all models.
Thus, smaller firms in terms and larger firms in terms of lnK invest relatively more
into R&D, R and D than medium-sized firms. As expected, it can also be seen that
firms associated with a group invest more than stand-alone companies. The age
variables are insignificant in all models.
When it comes to the Wooldridge models, very similar results are obtained as in
the random effects models. Therefore, these are only discussed briefly. First, the
tests that x and c are uncorrelated are rejected in the R&D and R equation, but
not in the D equation (tests on joint significance on within means in Table 4.2).
Although the random effects model is rejected in two cases, the results on WCAP
and DEBT remain basically the same, except that debt becomes insignificant in the
R&D equation. This may be caused by relatively high correlations between the time
varying xi,t and the within firm means that are employed to relax the assumption
that x and c are not correlated. Table 4.3, presents the regressions on R and D in-
vestment again, but there the regression is augmented with the SUBR dummy, i.e.
the indicator for the receipt of public subsidies for ”basic and strategic” research,
and its interaction with WCAP. If one compares the results on the main regressors
of interest with Table 4.2, it shows that the magnitude of the coefficients is quite
stable, and thus the earlier results persist. The coefficient of SUBR is positively
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significant in the R equation. Thus recipients of such subsidies are able to invest
significantly more into R due to the subsidy itself. Even more interesting, however,
is that the interaction of SUBR with WCAP is negatively significant. That is, the
subsidy receipt offsets the slope of WCAP basically. Testing whether the coeffi-
cients of WCAP and WCAP*SUBR are significantly different from each other in
absolute values (note the opposite signs), H0 (= stating that they are equal) cannot
be rejected. Thus in general, firms depend highly on their internal resources, but
for subsidy recipients this effect is offset. On the one hand, this may indicate that
the grants are typically large enough to conduct the desired research project at full
scale. On the other hand, it may also hint at the so-called certification effect of
subsidies. Lerner (1999) argued that U.S. SBIR10 awardees achieve better access to
external capital due to the fact that they received an SBIR award, as it involves
a thorough peer-evaluation procedure of the submitted research proposal. For in-
stance, venture capitalists and banks may use that as positive signal on the quality
of the investment project.
10The Small Business Innovation and Research program is the largest policy scheme for support-
ing commercial research and innovation in U.S. history, and is in place since 1982.
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Table 4.3: Estimation results from Tobit regressions (3,686 obs. of 952 firms) on
R&D expenditures per unit tangible assets (K) with SUBR
Random-Effects Panel
Model
Wooldridge Estimator
Variable Research Development Research Development
DEBTi,t−2/Ki,t−1 -0.003 *** -0.002 -0.004 *** -0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
WCAPi,t−1/Ki,t−1 0.103 *** 0.053 ** 0.123 *** 0.033
(0.014) (0.025) (0.021) (0.036)
SUBRi,t−1 0.819 *** 0.120 0.270 -0.047
(0.292) (0.525) (0.312) (0.564)
SUBRi,t−1 ×
(WCAPi,t−1/Ki,t−1)
-0.084 ** 0.004 -0.086 ** 0.004
(0.036) (0.062) (0.035) (0.062)
lnKi,t−1 -1.475 *** -2.625 *** -1.307 *** -2.401 ***
(0.226) (0.419) (0.342) (0.620)
(Ki,t−1)2 0.091 *** 0.147 *** 0.067 *** 0.123 ***
(0.015) (0.028) (0.022) (0.041)
AGEi,t−1 -0.086 0.145 8.543 *** -3.261
(0.819) (1.491) (1.944) (3.477)
(AGEi,t−1)2 -0.054 -0.021 -1.704 *** 1.181
(0.139) (0.253) (0.489) (0.885)
GROUPi,t 0.324 1.341 *** 0.346 * 1.298 ***
(0.205) (0.376) (0.208) (0.386)
Joint sign. ind. dummies χ2(15) 16.21 39.55∗∗∗ 16.25 37.28∗∗
Joint sign. time dummies χ2(8) 14.90∗ 34.61∗∗∗ 10.72 25.42∗∗∗
Joint sign. within means χ2(7) - - 71.59∗∗∗ 5.11
Log-likelihood -7,633.656 -9,843.119 -7,598.082 -9,840.563
ρ 0.399 0.458 0.392 0.458
# censored obs. 1,085 839 1,085 839
∗ Notes: All models include an intercept and industry dummies (not presented). Standard errors in
parentheses. *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5, 10%). ρ indicates the share of the total
variance which is due to the cross-sectional variation. Coefficients of variables’ within means in Wooldridge
model are omitted from the table.
It is noteworthy that the findings on the subsidy dummy should be interpreted
with some care. It is known that firms may self-select themselves into subsidy
schemes (see e.g. the survey by David et al., 2000) and thus the effect of SUBR
may be overestimated. Although the panel regressions control for unobserved het-
erogeneity among firms and that should take care of the potential selection bias
to a certain extent, correcting for selection properly would require instrumenting
the SUBR variable. Unfortunately, there is currently no econometric panel Tobit
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model available that would allow for this. It was also experimented with pooled
cross-sectional regressions, but it turned out that it is important to control for firm-
specific effects in this study (see the high share of total variance explained by mere
cross-sectional variation).
4.5 Conclusion and discussion
Previous literature provided vast evidence for liquidity constraints of industrial R&D
investments due information asymmetries. Complexity, specificity and uncertainty
of returns may make it particularly difficult for outsiders to judge the potential value
and firms may be reluctant to reveal details of the projects to potential investors.
Furthermore, the intangibility of the asset that is being created (knowledge) may
limit firms’ access to external funds for R&D. Hence, firms have to rely on internal
liquidity to fund their R&D activities.
Although the presence of financing constraints for R&D has been shown in numerous
empirical studies, R&D has usually been viewed as an inseparable process (possi-
bly due to limited data availability). However, characteristics usually attributed to
R&D activities in general, such as intangibility and uncertainty are very likely to be
more applicable to ’R’ than to ’D’. Research projects are usually characterized by
being ”far from the market” and may induce higher externalities decreasing the like-
lihood of profitability. Moreover, development takes place at a much later stage of
the R&D process building on previously generated knowledge. This chapter aimed
to complement previous studies by explicitly taking the heterogeneity of the two
components of R&D into account. By compartmentalizing industrial R&D activity
into its components, it was argued that financial constraints affect ’R’ more than
’D’.
The empirical study indeed reveals that ’R’ investment is more sensitive to the firms’
operating liquidity than ’D’ investments, indicating that firms have to rely even more
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on internal funds for financing their research compared to their development activi-
ties. Looking at aggregated R&D expenditures of the firm would not have revealed
this effect. Thus, estimating different investment equations for R&D and ’R’ and ’D’
separately illustrates that financing constraints may be more binding for ’R’ than
for ’D’. The implications are that firms willing to pursue ’R’- projects should be
given the opportunity to raise funds at alternative institutions or be supported in
collaborations for ’R’- projects (for example with universities) that reduce financial
resource intensity of such projects.
Governments, as for example in Flanders, are aware of the need for special support
of industrial research, and grant higher shares of total cost in terms of subsidies
to ’basic and strategic’ research than for experimental development or prototyping.
Here it is found that research subsidy recipients indeed invest more into ’R’ than
other firms, and that their investment is also less sensitive to internal liquidity.
This has interesting consequences for policy. While policy makers also seek to in-
crease the outcome of funded projects, it may happen that very challenging research
projects are not awarded a subsidy, as submitted project applications are often eval-
uated by peer-review according to criteria such as ’technological content’ and ’ex-
pected economic value’ or similar criteria. As highly basic research projects may
score low on the latter criterion, government agents may behave similar as private
lenders when it comes to project selection. Therefore, even funding for R&D may
still inhibit investment into R.
As one rough check, the submitted grant requests and the grant rate of those
projects submitted under the three different schemes present in Flanders are an-
alyzed: ’(strategic) basic research’ (= ’R’ in our terms), ’mixed projects’ and ’ex-
perimental development and prototyping’ (= ’D’ in our terms). As Table 4.4 shows
there is slight evidence that basic research projects are indeed rejected more fre-
quently. While the total grant rate amounts to 81%, ‘R’ projects are only granted
at a rate of 75%, but ‘D’ projects at a rate of 82%. However, this evidence is not
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clear cut as ’Mixed Projects’ are granted most frequently with 91%.
Table 4.4: Grant rate of submitted project proposal by type in Flanders
Total (Strategic) Ba-
sic Research
Mixed projects Experimental
Development
and Prototyping
Number of submitted
projects
3,506 1,389 829 1,288
Grant rate 81% 75% 91% 82%
Notes: Note: The data were kindly provided by IWT Flanders (own calculations). A ’grant’
may imply a, typically downward, adjustment of accepted total project cost by the agency
compared the originally submitted project budget.
It would be highly interesting to find comparable figures from other countries
to evaluate national policies across countries to learn more about policy practices,
and eventually learn more about the implications of this chapter’s findings for levels
of ’R’ and ’D’ in the European Union. This could be especially interesting on the
background of the EC Lisbon agenda (see e.g. European Commission, 2005) that,
among other issues, states to raise the R&D/GDP ratio to 3% in the European
Union. If many countries favor projects that are more of a ’D’ nature a shift to
funding a higher proportion of ’R’ projects may yield higher total R&D in Europe
as firms are more constrained in ’R’ according to the econometric results.
Chapter 5
Innovative Capability and
Financing Constraints for
Innovation
In the current financial and economic crisis both policy and industry fear the deterio-
ration of firms’ financing conditions for investments. This is particularly relevant for
innovation projects. Independently of any financial crisis, economic theory stresses
that financing constraints may occur due to imperfections on capital markets. Most
importantly, information asymmetries may affect investments in innovation projects
as these are typically characterized by a high degree of uncertainty, complexity and
specificity which make it difficult for outsiders to judge the projects’ potential value.
Moreover, firms may be reluctant to reveal details of innovation projects to poten-
tial investors. Therefore, financing innovation externally may be more costly com-
pared to external financing of other investment (Meyer and Kuh 1957, Stiglitz and
Weiss 1981, Anton and Yao 2002). Hence, internal sources of financing are crucial
for the implementation of innovation projects (Leland and Pyle 1977, Bhattacharya
and Ritter 1983, Hall 1990, 1992, Himmelberg and Petersen 1994). In turn, internal
funds are not inexhaustible either. Cash flow is naturally limited and raising new
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equity may be costly and often unwanted (Carpenter and Petersen 2002).
Financing constraints, however, may not affect all firms to the same extent. This
paper addresses the question of which firms face financing constraints. Such iden-
tification is particularly interesting for policy makers in order to design effective
policy schemes as financing constraints lead to a suboptimal level of investment in
innovation. In contrast to previous empirical studies which tested the presence of
financing constraints indirectly by the sensitivity of R&D investment to changes in
internal funds, a direct approach is taken. It is based on the idea of an ideal test
for identifying financial constraints on investment in innovation as proposed by Hall
(2008). She suggests that ’the ideal experiment for identifying the effects of liquidity
constraints on investment is to give firms additional cash exogenously, and observe
whether they pass it on to shareholders or use it for investment and/or R&D. [. . . ]
If they choose the second [alternative], then the firm must have had some unex-
ploited investment opportunities that were not profitable using more costly external
finance’. That is, these firms had been financially constrained.
This chapter contributes to the literature in three main aspects. First, a direct
indicator derived from survey information is employed. Firms were asked to imag-
ine that they receive additional cash exogenously and to indicate how they would
spend it. Thus, it is directly observed whether firms choose to invest either all or
part of the cash in innovation projects. Second, it is accounted for the firm’s choice
between alternative uses of the money in the econometric analysis. Such an ap-
proach is crucial as investing in innovation projects competes with other purposes of
firms’ available funds. Third, the concept of innovative capability and how it affects
financing constraints for innovation is introduced. This fundamental aspect of a
firm’s innovation process has attracted little attention in this strand of literature so
far.
The results from the econometric analysis in this chapter show that financial con-
straints do not depend on the availability of internal funds per se, but that they are
5.1. THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 101
driven by innovative capability through increasing resource requirements. That is,
firms with high innovative capability but low financial resources are most likely to be
constrained. Constraints are also observed for financially sound firms that may have
to put some of their ideas on the shelf. Firms with low innovative capability choose
other options. Taking account of all options for using additional money, the mul-
tidimensional analysis reveals some further interesting results. For example, firms
with a bad credit rating would primarily repay debt. This chapter reviews previous
literature in section 5.1. Sections 5.2 and 5.3 describe the theoretical framework
and the empirical implementation of the study and sets out the role of innovative
capability for financing constraints. Econometric model specifications as well the
results from the different models are presented in sections 5.4 and 5.5, respectively.
Section 5.6 presents some robustness checks and section 5.7 concludes.
5.1 Theoretical arguments and empirical evidence
In principle, there are two sources for financing innovation projects. External sources
include bank loans or other debt contracts whereas internal sources basically origi-
nate from retained profits or (new) equity. Firms decide upon their optimal levels of
investment while choosing their capital structure in such a way as to minimize long
run cost of capital. Only in a neo-classical world with frictionless markets sources
of financing would not matter. In their seminal article Modigliani and Miller (1958)
show that in markets characterized by no taxes, no bankruptcy costs and no asym-
metric information investment decisions are indifferent to capital structure.
However, starting with the work of Arrow (1962) and Nelson (1959) numerous arti-
cles have elaborated on reasons illustrating why the source of financing matters and
why it particularly matters for investments in the creation of knowledge. If capital
markets are imperfect and information asymmetries influence lending and invest-
ment decisions, the cost of different kinds of capital may vary by type of investment
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(Meyer and Kuh 1957, Leland and Pyle 1977, Myers and Majluf 1984). Investment in
innovation compared to other types of investments is characterized by a high degree
of asymmetric information between the parties involved. Complexity and specificity
of innovation projects make it difficult for outsiders to judge their potential value.
Moreover, firms may be reluctant to reveal details of the projects to potential in-
vestors for competition reasons (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, Greenwald, Stiglitz and
Weiss 1984, Bhattacharya and Ritter 1983, Anton and Yao 2002). Lenders or in-
vestors therefore demand a ’premium’ on their required rate of return in the sense of
Akerlof (1970). If no pursuant rate of return can be appropriated, investors ration
their investment or even refrain from investing at all (Stiglitz 1985). In addition,
moral hazard problems between firm management and outsiders, such as investors or
lenders, as well as information asymmetries between management and owners may
impact financing conditions and, hence, investment in innovation projects (Jensen
and Meckling 1976, Grossman and Hart 1982, Czarnitzki and Kraft 2004b).
Besides information asymmetries, the intangible nature of the asset that is being cre-
ated by innovation usually makes external fund raising more costly for such projects
than for other types of investment. A large fraction of innovation investment, par-
ticularly R&D, is sunk and cannot be redeployed (Alderson and Betker 1996). Debt
holders such as banks prefer physical and redeployable assets as security for their
loans since they can be liquidated in case of project failure or bankruptcy. Moreover,
serving debt requires a stable cash flow which makes financing of innovation projects
by external sources more difficult, since most of these projects do not immediately
lead to success. In addition, serving debt reduces cash flow for future investments
(Hall 1990, 2002).
There is a whole branch of theoretical and empirical literature illustrating that
firms indeed first and foremost use internal funds to finance innovation projects (as
compared to debt) indicating a gap in the respective cost of capital (Leland and
Pyle 1977, Bhattacharya and Ritter 1983, Hall 1990, Hall 1992, Himmelberg and
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Peterson 1994, Bougheas, Go¨rg and Strobl 2003, Czarnitzki and Hottenrott 2009).
Internal funds, however, are naturally limited and raising new equity may be costly
and often unwanted. Consequently, the extent to which financial constraints are
binding depends on the firms’ ability to raise external or internal funds under the
conditions of imperfect capital markets.
Empirical evidence
Measuring and identifying financial constraints represents a main challenge in em-
pirical studies. Since the seminal work of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988)
econometric studies have tried to detect financial constraints by analyzing invest-
ments’ sensitivities to changes in available financial resources, most often cash-flow.
This methodology has subsequently been applied to investment in research and
development as it constitutes an important share of total innovation investments.
The conjecture for investment in R&D was derived accordingly: the more sensitive
firms’ R&D investment to cash flow the more binding are financial constraints. Ex-
cess sensitivities were regarded as indirectly reflecting firms’ lack of access to the
credit market.
The theoretical literature states that asymmetric information, moral hazard in
borrower-lender relationships, intra-firm organizational structures and other insti-
tutional factors may lead to financial constraints. This implies that financing con-
straints depend on certain project and firm characteristics. In order to observe
more than an average effect over the entire range of different firms when trying to
detect financing constraints, researchers thus usually split their sample or focus on
a particular group of firms a priori.1 Frequently investigated factors impacting fi-
nancial constraints for R&D are firm size in terms of number of employees or assets
1That is, firms are grouped into supposedly more and less constrained firms. The latter were
expected to be able to raise funds for any investment. Hence, investment spending should not turn
out to be sensitive to the availability of internal funds. The former group of potentially constrained
firms is expected to show a positive relationship between investment and the availability of financial
resources that reveals the existence of liquidity constraints.
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and firm age (Himmelberg and Peterson 1994, Petersen and Rajan 1995, Berger and
Udell 2002, Czarnitzki 2006, Czarnitzki and Hottenrott 2009), governance structures
(Chung and Wright 1998, Czarnitzki and Kraft 2004a), industry patterns (Hall 1992,
Bloch 2005) as well as financial market regimes (Bhagat and Welch 1995, Hall,
Mairesse, Branstetter and Crepon 1999, Mulkay, Hall and Mairesse 2001, Bond,
Harhoff and Van Reenen 2006, Baum, Schaefer and Talavera 2009). Empirical stud-
ies - primarily focusing on manufacturing industries - however, have not always pro-
vided unambiguous results. Hall (1992) and Himmelberg and Peterson (1994) find a
positive relationship between R&D activity and cash flow for US firms. Mulkay et al.
(2001) show that cash flow seems to be more important in the US than in France for
any type of investment. Bond et al. (2006) detect that cash flow determines whether
a UK firm does R&D, but not how much. This may indicate that R&D performing
firms are a self-selected group of firms that are not constrained. However, they do
not find such a relationship for Germany. In contrast, Harhoff (1998) confirms a
positive sensitivity to cash flow for German manufacturing firms. In a similar vein,
a negative association between debt and R&D activity was reported for US but not
for Japanese firms by Bhagat and Welch (1995). For US and UK firms they observe
a positive correlation between stock return and R&D activity two years later. Yet,
they do not observe any relationship between cash flow and R&D. Bougheas et al.
(2003) find similar results for Ireland.
Empirical evidence further shows that older and bigger companies are less restricted
than younger and smaller firms. This may reflect that established firms can inno-
vate by building on their previous innovations, e.g. by product differentiation or
improvement, while younger firms need to conduct more R&D which requires more
resources and is much more uncertain. Young firms may be furthermore restricted
in their R&D investment due to lower equity (Mu¨ller and Zimmermann 2006). Like-
wise, problems of asymmetric information may be less severe for older firms that
have established a long and stable relationship with their bank. Young firms, on the
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other hand, have not yet built such a relationship (Petersen and Rajan 1995, Berger
and Udell 2002). This may aggravate their financing constraints since they cannot
yet rely on internal funds resulting from cash inflow from former products either.
Finally, bank financing of innovation projects may be particularly limited for young
firms because of their overall higher default risk. Currently, this problem presumably
deteriorates as the financial crisis requires banks to conduct an even more detailed
risk assessment in the future.
Most existing empirical studies suffer from limitations in data availability. Many of
them look at either rather large firms listed at stock markets or at small firms only.
More severe limitations arise from the conceptual set-up. Kaplan and Zingales (1997,
2000) first questioned whether the relationship between cash flow and investment
is a sufficient indication of financial constraints (see also Cleary 1999, Fazzari et al.
2000 and Aydogan 2003). Especially in the case of large firms, free cash flow levels
may be determined by accounting as well as dividend policies aimed at mitigating
moral hazard problems (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Jensen 1986, Dhanani 2005).
Additionally, a positive relationship between investment and cash flow may simply
reflect that both of them correlate with promising market demand. Finally, firms
tend to smooth R&D spending over time (Hall, Griliches and Hausman 1986, Lach
and Schankerman 1988). This leads to difficulties in measuring the impact of changes
in cash in one period on subsequent investments.
As an alternative, recent studies investigate firms’ access to external funds more
directly through the analysis of standardized credit ratings (Czarnitzki 2006, Czar-
nitzki and Hottenrott 2009) or credit requests (Piga and Atzeni 2007). The main
concern using credit requests relates to a selectivity problem as those firms that are
constrained most may not expect to get external funding may therefore not ask for
it. Aghion, Askenazy, Berman, Cette and Eymard (2008) measure credit restric-
tions based on a direct indicator derived from repayments of trade credits. Using
French firm-level data they show that the share of R&D investment over total in-
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vestment is counter-cyclical without credit constraints, but is less counter-cyclical
as firms face tighter credit constraints. Moreover, the increased availability of rich
and comprehensive survey data on innovation activities at the firm level has enabled
researchers to adopt more direct approaches towards the identification of potentially
financially constrained firms (Canepa and Stoneman 2002, Savignac 2008, Tiwari,
Mohnen, Palm and Schim van der Loeff 2007).2 These studies define financially
constrained firms as those which innovation projects were hampered by the lack of
finance. Canepa and Stoneman (2002) compare inter-country differences in Europe
and find a higher perceived importance of financing constraints on innovation for
firms in high-tech sectors and for smaller firms in market-based systems. Savignac
(2008) corroborates that the probability of financing constraints decreases with firm
size and depends on the firms’ ex-ante financing structure. Tiwari et al. (2007) ana-
lyze both the impact of perceived financing restrictions and other constraints - such
as market uncertainty and regulation - on R&D investment. They confirm that
financially constrained firms spend less on R&D. Surprisingly, they find financial
constraints to be less binding if firms face other hampering factors as well.
Yet, survey-based studies that ask firms whether the lack of finance impedes their
innovation activities are not without limitations either. It can be argued that these
studies capture ’demand side effects’ as to face an obstacle there must have been a
demand before hand whereas credit rating indicators also capture those firms that
have not yet asked for a loan. Therefore, the letter might be viewed at as a financing
supply shifter.
Most of such survey-based studies also neglect that the option of investing in inno-
vation projects competes with alternative uses of available funds, as stressed in the
financial literature. That is, firms simultaneously determine their level of innova-
2The Oslo-Manual defines innovation indicators and sets outs guidelines for surveying them
(OECD and Eurostat 2005), first published in 1992. The collection of innovation survey data
in most OECD countries is guided by this manual. In Europe they are called the Community
Innovation Surveys (CIS).
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tion investment, capital investment, dividends, debt payments as well as retentions.3
Moreover, none of the empirical studies consider the role of innovative capability.
Financial constraints may not only depend on the availability of internal funds per
se, but may be driven by the firm’s ability to generate ideas for innovation projects
and to turn ideas into marketable products or new technologies and hence by its
resource requirements.
5.2 Theoretical framework and hypotheses
In order to establish a general understanding of financing constraints, the analy-
sis presented in this chapter draws from a simple model by Howe and McFetridge
(1976) and David, Hall and Toole (2000).4 It is employed to explore how innovative
capability affects financing constraints for innovation. In this setting, it is assumed
that in each planning period firm i has a certain set of ideas for innovation projects.5
This set of projects is determined by the firm’s innovative capability (ICi), that is,
its ability to generate and pursue new innovation project ideas. The firm ranks these
projects according to their expected rate of return in descending order. This results
in a downward sloping demand function (Di) for innovation financing that reflects
the marginal rate of return (MRRi) of firm i
6. The marginal rate of return depends
on the level of innovation expenditure (Ii), on the innovative capability (ICi) as well
as on other firm and industry characteristics (Xi):
MRRi = f(Ii, ICi, Xi). (5.1)
3Grabowski and Mueller (1972) and Gugler (2003) simultaneously investigate the determinants
of R&D, capital investment and dividends whereas Guerard, Bean and Andrews (1987) additionally
account for new debts issue. However, none of these studies explore the role of financial constraints.
4This supply and demand heuristic has also been used by Hubbard (1998) for investments and
by Fazzari et al. (1988) and Carpenter and Petersen (2002) to illustrate financing hierarchies for
R&D.
5For simplicity, the projects are assumed to be divisible.
6The expected rate of return is derived from the expected benefits less implementation costs.
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Profit-maximizing firm i invests in innovation up to the point where the marginal
rate of return equals the marginal cost of capital (MCCi). The marginal cost of
capital varies with the size of the investment and reflects the opportunity costs
of investing funds in innovation. This implies that MCCi also depends on the
expected returns of other uses of available funds such as investment in tangible or
financial assets (summarized in Re,oi ) as well as on the amount of firms’ internal
funds (IFi). In imperfect capital markets costs of external capital are assumed to
be higher than those of internal funds as lenders require a risk premium for instance
due to information asymmetries. Marginal capital costs are thus also affected by
firm characteristics such as creditworthiness (Wi) which depends on collateral as
well as capital structure. They increase with the total amount borrowed.7 Finally,
a pecking order is assumed, i.e. firms draw first on internal funds before recursing
to external financing.
MCCi = f(Ii, R
e,o
i , IFi,Wi). (5.2)
Figure 5.1 illustrates both the demand and the marginal cost function. Equating
MRRi and MCCi yields the reduced form for optimal investment (I
∗
i ) in innovation
(Grabowski and Mueller 1972):
I∗ = h(ICi, R
e,o
i , IFi, Xi,Wi). (5.3)
What happens if additional cash (not signalling any future demand increases) is
given exogenously to firms? Deciding upon investment, exogenous cash is not for
free due to opportunity costs. If a firm can already finance its optimal investment
level I∗ fully internally, additional cash has no effect on its innovation investment. A
finding that the firm does not increase its investment can either indicate that it has
faced the same capital costs for both funds before (as on perfect capital markets) or
7Marginal costs of new equity may be even above marginal costs of borrowing (Fazzari et al.
1988, Carpenter and Petersen 2002).
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that capital markets are imperfect but the firm does not have beneficial innovation
opportunities (at the given internal cost of capital). In any case, such a firm can be
defined as financially unconstrained as it pursues all privately profitable innovation
projects at cint (Figure 5.1a). Area A reflects privately non-profitable innovation
potential8. If innovation investment is stimulated by exogenous cash flow shocks,
one can reject the hypothesis that external and internal capital costs are the same.
A positive expansionary effect from additional cash on innovation investment can
thus be seen as a result from financing constraints that has curtailed firms’ innova-
tion investments at sub-optimal levels (Figure 5.1b). Area A′ reflects the innovation
potential that would have been invested at internal capital costs cint but that was
forgone due to financing constraints before.
This setting allows to derive hypotheses about the interplay of innovative capability,
financial resources and financing constraints for innovation. First, looking at inno-
vative capability two firms A and B are considered, B having a higher innovative
capability than A. B’s ability to generate projects with a higher rate of return or
to develop more ideas at any given rate of return leads to higher financing demand
(DB).
The higher B’s innovative capability the more likely it is that additional cash leads
to an expansionary effect (Figure 5.2a). If both firms cannot originally finance their
innovation from internal funds alone, additional cash increases the innovation invest-
ment of both (Figure 5.2b). The effect, however, is larger for the firm with higher
innovative capability if both receive the same amount ∆CASHA = ∆CASHB. This
holds as long as the slope of DB is flatter than the one of DA. Areas A and B
represent the firms’ stock of project ideas that render unprofitable given the rate
of borrowing cext. Additional cash reduces these costs and thus sets free additional
projects (Areas A′ and B′).
Second, Figure 5.3 (a) shows how different levels of available internal financing
8These projects may generate additional social returns that might render them profitable from
a welfare point of view.
110
CHAPTER 5. INNOVATIVE CAPABILITY AND
FINANCING CONSTRAINTS FOR INNOVATION
Innovation Investment, IF 
cint
I* IF
Δ cash
D(I, IC, X)
MCC (I, Re,o, IF, W)
MCC’ (I, Re,o, IF, W)
R
a t
e  
o f
 R
e t
u r
n
C
o s
t  o
f  C
a p
i t a
l
A
(a) unconstrained
cint
I
A
IF I*
R
a t
e  
o f
 R
e t
u r
n
C
o s
t  o
f  C
a p
i t a
l
Innovation Investment, IF 
D(I, IC, X)
Δ cash
MCC (I, Re,o, IF, W)
MCC’ (I, Re,o, IF, W)
A‘
(b) constrained
Figure 5.1: Unconstrained versus constrained firm (Hall 2002)
affect the likelihood of financing constraints given a certain innovative capability
(IFi). Firms A and B have the same innovative capability, but different levels of
internal funds, e.g. IFB > IFA. Due to the lower internal liquidity, firm A is as-
sumed to also face higher costs of external capital than B. This implies that the
expansionary effect is stronger for B even with ∆CASHA = ∆CASHB.
In addition to internal funds the slope of the marginal cost curve in the non-
horizontal part likewise depends on firm characteristics that affect the firm’s cred-
itworthiness (Wi), such as collateral values. For two firms with the same innovative
capability and internal funds, the expansionary effect is larger for the firm facing the
larger gap between cint and cext (Figure 5.3 (b)). Based on these theoretical consid-
erations the following hypotheses on financing constraints for innovation activities
are derived:
Hypothesis 1: Given the same level of internal funds, firms with higher innova-
tive capability should be more likely to be constrained than firms with lower
innovative capability.
Hypothesis 2: Given the same level of innovative capability, firms with lower fi-
nancial resources should be more likely to be constrained.
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Figure 5.2: Firms with heterogenous innovative capability (own representation)
Hypothesis 3: Firms that face a larger gap between cint and cext, should be more
likely to be financially constrained.
Whether the likelihood of being constrained is larger for firms with low IC and low
IF than for firms with high IC and high IF is not clear-cut. It depends on whether
lack of internal financing or innovative capability drives financial constraints.
Obviously, some of the assumptions of this basic setting are contestable. This par-
ticularly concerns the non-marginal nature of project costs and the information
necessary to rank innovation opportunities appropriately. Furthermore, it is as-
sumed that firms always draw upon internal funds first. However, firms may pay
out the additional cash to shareholders and raise external capital to leverage the
risk to lenders (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Easterbrook 1984, Jensen 1986).
5.3 Empirical implementation and data
The following analysis makes use of the 2007 wave of the Mannheim Innovation Panel
(MIP). The MIP started in 1993 with the aim to provide representative innovation
data for policy and research purposes. It is the German part of the European-wide
Community Innovation Surveys (CIS) and thus provides internationally comparable
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Figure 5.3: Homogenous innovative capability, but different access to funds
data. The target population covers all firms with at least 5 employees in the Ger-
man business sector.9 The present study focuses on information of 2,468 firms in
manufacturing industries.10 The sample distribution across industries is presented
in Table A.14 in the Appendix.
9The survey is conducted annually by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW),
infas Institut fuer Sozialforschung and ISI Fraunhofer Institute on behalf of the German Federal
Ministry of Education and Research. A detailed description of the survey data can be found in
Peters (2008)
10630 observations were deleted from the original data-set due to item non-response or outlier
correction.
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Measuring Financing Constraints
Following the idea of an ideal experiment suggested by Hall (2008), firms were asked
in the survey to imagine that they receive additional funds:
”Suppose your firm, unexpectedly, would have additional profit or equity amounting
to 10% of last year’s turnover at its disposal. Which of the following options would
you most likely chose for using this money?
 (additional) investment projects
 (additional) innovation projects
 retention / reserves
 payout to shareholders
 repayment of debt”
Firms were also given the possibility to indicate that they cannot judge. This infor-
mation serves as basis for the derivation of the constraints’ indicators.
A firm is considered to be financially constrained if it would invest additional funds
in innovation projects (CON = 1, otherwise CON = 0).
The conceptual set-up allows us to to estimate not only the likelihood of being
constrained, but also the degree to which these constraints affect the firms’ innova-
tion investments. Three different degrees of constraints are distinguished (TYPE).
TYPE = 0 if the firm indicated that it would not invest in additional innovation
projects. Further, TYPE = 1 if the firm would allocate the money to additional
innovation and to at least one of the other options. Finally, TYPE = 2 if it would
invest exclusively in additional innovation projects. Thus, (TYPE) is an ordinal
variable that increases the more binding the firm’s financial constraints for innova-
tion are.
The variables CON and TYPE represent the main dependent variables in the em-
pirical study. Taking into account that innovation competes with other usages, a
set of binary indicators for each of the alternative response options are defined and
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a simultaneous multivariate probit model is estimated additionally.
Innovative Capability and Lack of Financing
According to the hypotheses financing constraints are a function of firm liquidity
(M ∼ Money) and innovative capability (B ∼ Brain). It is distinguished between
6 types of firms that differ in terms of their innovative capability that can be high
(BH) or low (BL) and their financial resources that can be high (MH), medium
(MM) or low (ML).
A firm’s ability to generate ideas for innovation depends to a large extent on the
knowledge capital of its employees. A broad stream of literature deals with the
complementarity of skills to other factors in the innovation process (see for example
Mohnen and Rller 2001, 2005 and Leiponen 2005). Thus, employees’ skills (includ-
ing also experience, see for example Geroski et al. 1993) have been recognized as
important success factor for innovation projects. What has not been discussed in
previous analyzes is the role of such skills for financing need and also financing con-
straints. With respect to the role of employees skills in the innovation process and
how they related to financing constraints, there are in principle two distinct theo-
ries that can serve as basis for empirical investigation. First, one could expect that
particularly those firms with high skill levels (high innovative capabilities) would
NOT be subject to financial constraints as they can convince potential investors
with their high skill level and successful projects in the past. Secondly, it can be
hypothesized that investors - although they might be aware of the fact that skill
are an important success factor of R&D - do not value such skills. In terms of eco-
nomic theory this means that uncertainty about the outcome of innovation projects
outweighs the information on skills. That is banks and investors may still value
‘tangible collateral capital‘ more than something as intangible as skills. As intan-
gible investments like R&D and investment in human capital are not capitalized in
the firms’ balance sheets, financial statement-based estimations of firm value and
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creditworthiness (internal, but also external ratings) may penalize firms that invest
in R&D at least in the short-run. If the second theory applies in reality, innovative
capabilities measured in skills and experience, should drive demand for innovation
financing, because of the higher ability to develop innovative ideas and at the same
time make raising funds for these additional investments more critical.
Employees’ skills can be measured through formal qualification levels or through
knowledge acquired by training. Hence, in the following information on the firm’s
share of highly qualified personnel and its expenditure for training of their employ-
ees is used. A firm is considered to have a high innovative capability (BH) if either
the share of highly qualified personnel or the expenditure on training per employee
is larger than the 80th percentile (in 2006).11 Other studies measure innovative
capability also by the firm’s R&D expenditure or past innovation success. As this
study also involves firms that have not (yet) engaged in R&D and innovation, the
more general definition above is prefered. The robustness of the results is checked by
using pre-period innovation success and firms’ share of R&D personnel, see section
5.6.
The profit margin defined as earnings before taxation as a share of total sales (in
2006) is used to measure the availability of internal funds. Originally the profit
margin is an ordinal variable with eight categories that were grouped into three
dummy variables (see Table A.15 in the Appendix). Firms are assumed to have
a low financial endowment (ML) if the profit margin is smaller than zero. If the
ratio is larger than zero, but smaller than 7%, the firm exhibits a medium financial
background (MM). Finally, MH equals one if the firm’s ratio is at least 7%.
By interacting financial resources and innovative capability 6 groups of firms that
differ in their Resource Endowments are identified.
11The sensitivity of the results is tested by using alternative cut-of-points. Results of this sensi-
tivity analysis are presented in Table A.17 the Appendix.
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Figure 5.4: Innovative capability and financial resources
Control Variables
In the estimations a set of control variables is used. First, it is accounted for the
amount of additional funds that firms would receive (CASH). 12 According to prior
empirical evidence financial constraints for innovation depend on firm age and size.
Firm age (AGE) is measured in years since founding and firm size (SIZE) is mea-
sured by the number of employees. Since the distributions of SIZE and AGE are
highly skewed logs of both variables are taken. Two proxies for access to external
funds are used. First, capital intensity reflects firms with relatively high collateral
value which should suffer less from financing constraints. Capital intensity is mea-
sured by the value of firms’ assets per employee in 2006 (KAPINT). Second, the
survey data is complemented with the firms’ credit rating index that is assumed to
reflect cost of external capital (RATING). The credit rating is an index between
100 and 600, 100 representing the best rating. The credit rating indicator is a stan-
dardized measure provided by Creditreform, Germany’s largest credit rating agency.
As intra-group financing flows represent an alternative financing channel, it is also
control whether a firm is part of a company group (GROUP).
Being a family-owned company (FAMCOM), that is the majority of stakes belongs
to members of one family, may also have effects on financing conditions. On the one
hand, family owned firms may have an advantage in external capital cost since they
more often have a close and long-established relationship with their house bank. On
the other hand, recent empirical evidence has shown that family-owned firms tend
12Please note that - unlike common liquidity indicators - CASH is not correlated with future
demand as it is based on past turnover. Hence, there is no need to instrument CASH.
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to avoid dependency on external lenders (Peters and Westerheide 2009).
Moreover, the firms’ product life cycle patterns (PLC) are taken into as a shorter
product life cycle may increase the pressure to develop new products and hence may
increase the need for resources. A shorter product life cycle may also imply shorter
periods for generating returns from prior product innovations. Further a dummy
variable that indicates whether the firm is located in East Germany (EAST ) is
included to control for regional differences. Due to extensive R&D subsidy pro-
grams targeting East German firms, these firms were found to face less financing
constraints in the 1990s and early 2000s (Czarnitzki 2006). To take into account
differences in the competitive environment of the firm a Herfindahl-index (HHI ) of
industry sales concentration is included. The data are taken from the annual reports
of the German Monopolies Commission.
Finally, it cannot be ruled out that the job function of the respondent may effect
the response. Hence, a set of 5 dummy variables reflecting the respondent’s function
within the firm is generated. Respondents from the general management (CEO),
R&D (R&D DEP ), financial (FIN DEP ), sales (SALES DEP ) and other de-
partments (OTHER DEP ) are distinguished13.
Descriptive Statistics
About 36% of the firms in the sample are financially constrained as can be gath-
ered from the summary statistics in Table 5.1. Only 5%, however, would invest the
full amount of additional cash in innovation while the large majority would only
partially invest in innovation. 68% of the firms would allocate at least part of the
money to general investments, 44% would pay out the money to shareholders, 21%
would retain the cash and 44% would rather serve debt. When looking at the main
covariates of interest, on can see that most firms (43%) were classified as having a
rather low innovative capability while being in a solid financial situation (BLMM).
13See Tables A.19 to A.21 in the Appendix for correlations of job functions and answering
patterns
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18% of firms with low innovative capability are in good financial situation (BLMH).
33% of all firms were defined as having a high innovative capability. 4% of those
firms have a negative profit-turnover-ratio (BHML). 18% exhibit a solid financial
background (BHMM) and 11% are financially well endowed (BHMH).
When looking at the firm characteristics of constrained (CON = 1) and uncon-
strained (CON = 0) firms, interesting differences can be inferred from the test in
differences in means. As expected, constrained firms are less capital-intensive, face
shorter product life cycles and are less frequently located in East Germany. At first
glance it is surprising that they are significantly larger in terms of employees, do not
differ in terms of age and have a better credit rating. Moreover, it is observe that
in the group of constrained firms, the share of firms with high innovative capability
is larger. This is valid independent of their financial background.14 The average
amount of CASH that firms receive is 10 million e. This appears quite high, but
as can be seen from the median that is about 600,000 e, the distribution is highly
skewed. Moreover, the size of the hypothetical additional cash affects the answering
pattern of firms if the log of CASH is taken15.
14See Table A.16 in the Appendix for cross-correlations between the variables.
15See Table A.22 in the Appendix for correlations between CASH and answering patterns.
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5.4 Econometric models
As section 5.2 has shown, the degree of financing constraints y∗ depends on financial
resources M , innovative capability B, other observable firms characteristics Z as well
as non-observable factors ε16:
y∗ = β0 + β1BHML + β2BHMM + β3BHMH + β4BLML+
β5BLMM + β6BLMH +
∑
k
βkZk + ε. (5.4)
Z includes the control variables defined in section 5.3 and a set of 14 industry
dummies. Since the degree of constraint is not observed directly, first the likelihood
of being financially constrained is estimated by using a probit model. This can be
written as
P (CON = 1|X = x) = Φ(x′β), (5.5)
with X comprising the interaction terms and Z.
According to Hypothesis 1 formulated in section 5.2, it is expected that β1 > β4,
β2 > β5 and β3 > β0. Furthermore, it is expected for firms exhibiting the same inno-
vative capability, like BH , that β1 > β2 > β3 (Hypothesis 2). Finally, Hypothesis 3
suggests a positive coefficient of the variable capturing creditworthiness as RATING
ranges from 1 to 6 with 6 being the worst rating. Contrarily, capital intensity and
group membership should negatively impact the likelihood of being constrained.
Next, the degree of constraints is proxied by the categorial variable (TYPE) and es-
timate ordered Probit models (Greene 2003, 737-738). Finally, it is accounted for the
firm’s choice between alternatives of use for the money. Simultaneous multi-equation
Probit models are estimated by the method of simulated maximum likelihood to in-
crease efficiency in the estimation by taking into account the correlation between
the different answering options of the responding firm (Greene 2003, 710-715).
16For simplicity, firm subscripts i are suppressed.
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In order to account for heterogeneity and correlation among firms, estimated stan-
dard errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent and clustered by industries and region
(Eastern vs Western Germany).
5.5 Estimation results
Probit and ordered Probit Models
Table 5.2 provides the estimation results of 4 different specifications of the probit
model on the likelihood of facing financial constraints. Model 1 presents the base
specification including all variables except those reflecting access to external finance
and the amount of additional cash. RATING, KAPINT and GROUP are added
in model 2, CASH in model 3 and classes for CASH (based on percentiles of the
distribution) in model 4. The latter turns out to be the preferred specification in
terms of goodness-of-fit.
The results show that the marginal effects of the interaction terms for firms with
a high innovative capability (BHML, BHMM , BHMH) are all significantly posi-
tive, while no significant effects for firms with low innovative capability (BLML and
BLMM , with BLMH being the reference category) can be observed. Hence, Hy-
pothesis 1 is confirmed: firms with a high innovative capability are generally more
likely to be constrained than firms with low innovative capability. As the most strik-
ing result, it turns out that firms with low financial resources and low innovative
capability (BLML) are not more likely to be constrained than firms having a rich
financial endowment and low innovative capability. Altogether, this implies that
innovative capability and not solely financial resources drives financing constraints
for innovation.
Among firms with high innovative capability, those having low financial resources
(BHML) are more likely to be constrained than firms that have a solid financial
background(BHMM , BHMH). Tests confirm that the marginal effect is indeed sig-
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nificantly larger for firms with BHML. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is confirmed. However, as
expected no monotonic relationship can be observed. That is, there is no significant
difference between firms with BHMM and BHMH . These results are robust across
all 4 specifications. However, for these firms one cannot state that they are signifi-
cantly less likely to be constrained than firms with slighter lower financial resources.
This effect might be due to the phenomenon that these firms generate more ideas
than they can finance or want finance at each point in time. Thus, these firms may
use the additional money that comes free of cost and invest in innovation projects
that they would not conduct if this money was not available either because other
investments appeared more beneficial or because a certain cash thresh-hold for the
innovation project was not reached yet.
Accounting for access to external finance, surprisingly no significant impact of
RATING is found. The multivariate probit model will shed some light on this
variable in the firms decision-making process. The control variables KAPINT and
GROUP show the expected signs. A higher capital intensity significantly reduces
the likelihood of facing binding constraints. Being part of a group also exerts a neg-
ative, yet insignificant, effect. The amount of exogenously given CASH turns out
to significantly influence firms’ likelihood of investing additional cash in innovation
projects. To check for any non-linear effects of additional cash, five categories for
CASH are constructed additionally on the basis of the 20, 40, 60 and 80th percentile
of the distribution. In other words, this is done to check whether there is a minimum
amount, that is a threshold for additional innovation projects, is required17 As can
be seen in specification 4, the positive effect is increasing with the size of the hypo-
thetical payment. The effect of CASH doubles from class 3 to class 4 indicating a
17The average amount of CASH in class 1 is about 58,000 e, in class 2 about 206,600 e, in class
3 about 645,000 e, in class 4 about 2.1 million e and 47 million e in class 5. The lowest category
serves as reference category (see Table A.23 for correlations of the different classes of CASH with
all options of use.). The maximum hypothetical payment of 4.4 billion e (see descriptive statistics)
is no data error but refers to a large company in the energy sector. All models were run with this
company excluded from the data which did not significantly alter the results.
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critical size of the payment of about roughly 1 million e that significantly increases
the likelihood of new innovation projects. After controlling for CASH firm size
turns out to be insignificant.
Interestingly, family-owned firms seem to be more willing to spend this additional
cash on innovation than non-family-owned firms. For the duration of the product
life cycle and firms’ age, no effects are found.18 Moreover, it is noteworthy that no
significant differences between the response patterns of R&D-managers and CEOs
can be found. Therefore, no bias towards new innovation projects resulting from
R&D-managers answering the questionnaire is expected. Only if the survey has been
answered by the financial department a lower likelihood of spending additional cash
in new innovation projects is observed. Finally it should be noted that it was test for
heteroscedasticity and normality of the explanatory variables (Verbeek 2000, p.168).
The test statistics show that homoscedasticity and normality cannot be rejected in
any of the models.
Table 5.3 shows the results of the ordered probit model.19 The first and second col-
umn present the coefficients and standard errors of the model and columns three to
eight show the marginal effects and standard errors of the likelihood of the different
outcomes of TY PE. Outcome 2 indicates the most constrained firms as they would
invest the full amount solely in innovation. Outcome 1 reflects that firms would
partly invest in innovation. Outcome 0 means that firms indicated that they would
not conduct any additional innovation projects.
The ordered model by and large confirms the previous results. Regarding the degree
of constraints, firms with a high innovative capability but low financial resources ex-
hibit a likelihood of being constrained in terms of outcome 1 that is 19 percentage
18Different forms of AGE, such as non-logged or age classes were tested as well. Further,
non-linear specifications have been tried. AGE did not turn out to be significant in any of these
alternative specifications. However, the survey is representative for firms with at least 5 employees.
This implies that a large proportion of very young firms does not belong to the target population.
19It should be noted that the condition µ2 > µ1 > 0 necessary for all probabilities to be positive
is fulfilled.
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points higher than for the reference group. For outcome 2 the effect of 3 percentage
points for BHML may appear small at first glance. However, given that only 5% of
the firms in the sample would invest the full amount in additional innovation, the
effect is comparatively high.
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Multivariate Probit Model
To account for the rivalry in the usage of additional cash, a multivariate probit
model is estimated in the next step. This involves simultaneous estimation of five
equations for the decision to invest in physical capital, in innovation, to build re-
serves, to payout to shareholder or to repay debts. Table A.16 in the Appendix
presents the correlation coefficients between the five equations.20 The table reveals
significant correlation between most of the error terms indicating that the equations
should be indeed estimated simultaneously. Table 5.4 presents the results from the
multi-equation probit model. The specification is enriched by including firms’ le-
gal form (PUBLIC and LIMITED, PIV ATE serves as references category) as
it may affect payouts to shareholders, for example. The results show that the legal
form indeed impacts the choice of choosing additional investments. PUBLIC and
LIMITED firms are less likely to do additional investments than PIV ATE firms
with the cash. Additional innovation projects are more likely for LIMITED firms
than for PIV ATE firms. For both, building reserves and payout to shareholders it
can be seen that the likelihood is higher for PUBLIC and LIMITED firms than
for PIV ATE firms, and LIMITED firms are likely to pay back debt. The last
results is plausible as for LIMITED firms the liability is indeed limited in case
of bankruptcy. Hence, using additional liquidity to reduce debt may not be the
first option. The interpretation of the effects observed for reserves and payout is
less straight forward. Because of the different tax treatment for retained earnings
and payouts that apply to PUBLIC and LIMITED firms in Germany, but not
to PIV ATE firms one would expect differences in the results. The expectation
that PUBLIC and LIMITED firms are more likely to chose one of these options
compared to private firms is met. However, because payouts, i.e. dividends are
not tax-advantaged, one would expect smaller effects smaller effects there. Yet, the
20The variance-covariance matrix of the cross-equation error terms has values of 1 on the leading
diagonal, and the off-diagonal elements are correlations to be estimated ρji = ρij , and ρii = 1, for
all i = 1, ...,M
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marginal effects are higher in the payout equation. This may hint to some weakness
of the model in that respect.
The results for investing in additional innovation projects remain nearly unchanged
due to this change in specification. Interestingly, the main variables of interest show
a fundamentally different pattern in the decision to invest in physical capital. Hav-
ing a low innovative capability leads to a higher likelihood of choosing additional
investments, the effect being highest for BLML. The differences that are found here
are in line with the finding from chapter 2. Besides the difference in B and M and
their interaction, it can be seen that for example RATING is negatively significant.
This hints to the fact that firms with bad ratings are less likely to do more invest-
ments in capital goods although CASH is provided. However money M plays a role
for capital investment as well. Firms with low or medium internal funds and low
innovation capacity are more likely to invest in capital good as their richer coun-
terparts. Firms with high innovative capability and low financial resources have a
lower likelihood of using the additional money for building reserves than other firms.
The results from equation 4 illustrate that all firms are less likely to distribute the
cash to their shareholders than the reference group of firms that have a low innova-
tive capability and rich financial resources. In contrast to the innovation decision,
the decision to serve debt is to a large extent driven by the financial background.
For both, high and low innovative capability, the likelihood of serving debt rises with
decreasing liquidity. That is, the largest effects are observed for BLML and BHML.
This is in line with the results found for RATING. Firms with a worse RATING
have a higher probability of serving debt. These firms seems to give priority to
consolidating their financial reputation before investing in new projects.
Interestingly, R&D managers turn out to be more willing to pay out the cash than
CEOs. Moreover, public and limited firms are more likely to distribute cash to their
shareholders. Estimates for firms belonging to a group suggest that they are gener-
ally less constrained: They are less likely to pursue additional investment projects
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and have a lower propensity to pay back debts.
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5.6 Alternative measures for innovative capabil-
ity / robustness checks
The previous sections pointed out the important role of innovative capability for fi-
nancing constraints. Admittedly, innovative capability cannot be observed directly.
To test the robustness of the results, alternative proxies for innovative capability
are employed. First, innovative capability is measured by the same variables, but
use different cut-off-points (mean, median and 90th percentile of both highly quali-
fied personnel and expenses for training of employees) or measure it relative to the
respective industry distribution. The results are robust within a broad range of
cut-off-definitions, as can be gathered from Table A.17 in the Appendix. Second,
three alternative variables are employed to define innovative capability. First, only
the share of highly qualified personnel (not accounting for training) is used. Next,
a stricter definition of innovation-related human capital is tested by using the share
of R&D employees. For these two checks the original 80% cut-off-point is applied.
Finally, innovative capability is defined based on successful innovation projects in
the past. More precisely, it is observed if the firm has introduced at least one new
product to the market in the pre-survey period. Table 5.5 summarizes the results
from this exercise. Hypothesis 1 is generally confirmed. The main difference with
respect to Hypothesis 2 is a significant non-linear effect of financial resources for
firms with high innovative capability.
A second concern which may arise is that the results of the quasi-experiment depend
on the fact whether a firm was already engaged in innovation activities. Hence, a
two-stage selection model is estimated for both CON and TY PE. The first stage
describes whether the firm has been innovative in the past two years (INNO).21 The
selection model hinges upon at least one valid exclusion restriction. The firms’ diver-
21INNO takes the value one if the firm either had a product or process innovation, or has
ongoing or abandoned innovation activities in the period 2004-2006 or has planned to start such
activities in the near future. The variable takes the value of zero if none of this was the case.
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sification of their product portfolio (DIV ERS) is expected to affect the likelihood
to innovate, while it should not impact the likelihood to face financial constraints.
Hence, this variables is used as exclusion restriction in the first stage.22 From Table
5.6 it can be seen that DIV ERS is indeed highly significant in Stage 1. Further-
more, firm size, group membership and seller concentration stimulates innovation,
whereas the effect of firms’ age is negative.
However, the likelihood-ratio-test does not reject the hypothesis of independence of
stage 1 and 2. Thus, selectivity does not seem to play a role here. Consequently,
the results do not change considerably compared to the models presented in section
5.5.
22Admittedly, the validity of the exclusion restrictions cannot tested, however, it turns out that
DIV ERS was not significant in any regression of financial constraints (CON or TY PE).
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5.7 Conclusion and discussion
In imperfect capital markets financing conditions for innovation activities may be
one reason for welfare reducing under-investment in innovation projects. Firms with
limited internal funds may have to leave some of their innovation projects on the
shelf due to restricted access to external financing. Such projects would be profitable
at the internal rate of return, but are not rewarding given the ’risk-premium’ on the
cost of external capital.
This chapter contributes to the literature on financing constraints for innovation
in three ways. First, a new approach of measuring financial constraints is intro-
duced. In a quasi-experiment firms were asked to indicate how they would spend
exogenously given cash. A positive expansionary effect from additional cash on in-
novation projects is interpreted as the result from financing constraints that curtail
these firms’ innovation investments at sub-optimal levels. The data allowed not only
to estimate the likelihood of being constrained but also the degree to which these
constraints affect the firms’ innovation investments. This distinction is derived from
the information whether firms would invest the full amount or only parts of it in
additional innovation projects. By using multivariate probit models, it is secondly
taken into account that the decision to engage in innovation projects is part of the
firms’ overall optimization process. Third, a framework that attributes financing
constraints not only to the lack of financial resources but also to the firms’ innova-
tive capability is derived.
The econometric analysis by and large supports the hypotheses that financial con-
straints hold back innovation activities. Firms with higher innovative capability are
more likely to have unexploited innovation projects, independent of their financial
background (Hypothesis 1). The results further show that firms with high innovative
capability and low levels of internal funds are more likely to be constrained in their
innovation activities than their more liquid counterparts (Hypothesis 2). On the
other hand, the main variables of interest show a fundamentally different pattern in
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the decision to invest in physical capital. Having a low innovative capability leads to
a higher likelihood of choosing additional investments. To sum up, firms with high
innovative capability but low financial resources are most likely to be constrained.
Constraints are also observed for financially sound firms that may have to put some
of their ideas on the shelf. In a nutshell, financial constraints do not depend on the
availability of internal funds per se, but are driven by innovative capability through
increasing resource requirements.
Firms that face a larger gap between internal and external cost of capital, for ex-
ample due to lower overall collateral values, should be more likely to be financially
constrained. This is supported by the significant effect of a low capital intensity on
the likelihood and the degree of being constrained (Hypothesis 3). The multidimen-
sional analysis reveals that in contrast to the innovation decision, the decision to
serve debt is to a large extent driven by the financial background. Firms with low
internal funds or a bad credit rating would primarily repay debt instead of investing
additional cash in additional innovation projects.
Interestingly, it can be seen that family-owned businesses are more likely to invest
additional cash in innovation projects than firms with other ownership structures.
This may, however, indicate that these firms have a general preference for internal
financing. Future analysis will be directed to these issues. In particular, one can
expect that family-run firms would answer differently, if not cash, but loans at a
comparatively low interest rate would have been offered. Hence, further analysis
will address the fact how much the results generally depend on the fact that the
question offers cash only.
From a policy point of view, it can be concluded that a significant portion of firms
is financially constrained, particularly firms with high innovation capability. Hence,
policy should stimulate the provision of risk-taking external capital and provide pub-
lic funding. If innovative capability is the driving force behind financing constraints,
policy should regard innovative capability as an important criterion for supporting
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private investment in innovation. Either project selection or granting tax credits
should account for such factors as they reflect the firms’ ability to set free unex-
ploited innovation potential and turn ideas into innovative products or processes.
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Chapter 6
Concluding Discussion
Measuring financial constraints and identifying firms that face such constraints rep-
resents a challenge in empirical research. This dissertation contributes to previous
empirical research on financing constraints for investment in industrial R&D. Re-
strictions on the access to financing are regarded as key source of a funding gap
for innovation. Previous empirical evidence for incentive and financing problems for
private sector investment in innovation projects provided ground for governmental
interventions to prevent welfare reducing under-investment in innovation. Such pol-
icy actions include the protection of intellectual property, direct financial support
and tax incentives for R&D as well as the encouragement of R&D collaboration
and partnerships between firms and between science and industry. However, it is
also evident that designing efficient policy schemes is not straightforward. As gov-
ernment funds are limited support should effectively address firms which are really
constrained in their access to funding.
This dissertation thus aims at contributing to the identification of firms that are
potentially not able to pursue all their R&D projects. R&D in the economy may
hence also be below the socially desired level. The identification of potentially con-
strained firms is crucial for the design of efficient innovation policy schemes.
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As shown in chapter 2, R&D investment differs from capital investment with re-
spect to the importance of internal and external financial resources. More precisely,
internal funds turn out to be the most crucial source of financing for innovation
projects. The availability of internal funds has been shown to be more decisive for
R&D investments than it is for capital investment. That is, an increase in the avail-
ability of internal funds, measured by increases in the firms’ price-cost-margin, has
a stronger impact on R&D investment than it has on capital investment.
This insight may be interpreted as an indication of a gap in the cost of capital be-
tween internal and external sources of funds for firms engaging in R&D. In other
words, access to external sources for funding of R&D activities may be restricted
due to uncertainty of returns of such projects and asymmetric information between
firms and investors. The extent of the gap and hence the importance of internal
funds has been found to depend on firm characteristics. Firms that do not yet have
accumulated sufficient internal funds or have reached their limits through ongoing
projects may thus have to rely on more expensive external funds. Given the cost pre-
mium on external funds potential innovation projects may be rendered unprofitable.
Hence, if external funds are either not available or too expensive and internal funds
for financing of R&D projects are exhausted, firms cannot pursue as much R&D
as they would otherwise like to. In the long run this may lead to welfare reducing
under-investment in innovation projects.
The analysis presented in chapter 2 also illustrates that the extent of the gap de-
pends on the overall collateral value that firms can offer to banks and potential
investors. In particular, it is shown that smaller firms in terms of fixed assets suf-
fer more from external constraints for R&D investment than larger firms. That is,
smaller firms’ levels of R&D investment increase as conditions for access to exter-
nal funds improve, while larger firms’ R&D investment is not as sensitive. Thus,
financial constraints are more binding for smaller firms and the level of constriction
decreases monotonically with firm size. The larger the firms, the fewer R&D invest-
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ment projects are discarded. Thus, larger firms may either be able to fund most of
their projects internally at full scale or may face a lower gap between internal and
external cost of capital. The latter argument is supported by the fact that larger
firms are in the position to offer sufficient collateral for external financing due to
their overall asset value.
These results suggest innovation policies that directly address the improvement of
access to financing for R&D of small businesses. If particularly small and young
firms are concerned with the most severe constraints, technological progress has to
rely mainly on large and established firms. This may aggravate barriers for mar-
ket entry in both technology and product markets for new firms and may thereby
strengthen market power of established firms. Although growing attention of policy
makers has generated numerous initiatives to improve financing conditions for small
firms already, it seems worthwhile to assess the effectiveness of these schemes in
terms of addressing the intended targeted group and the firms’ cost of participating
in such schemes.
Moreover, this thesis contributes to previous research by taking into account the
role of the heterogeneity of R&D investments for financing constraints. This aspect
received little attention in the economic literature so far. While it had been quite
established that financing constraints depend on firm characteristics, the relevance
of the type of R&D and even project characteristics had not been studied in detail.
The analyzes presented in chapters 3 and 4 consider the heterogeneity of R&D activ-
ity as being decisive for the occurrence of financing constraints. Chapter 3 suggested
that R&D of a more risky nature will be difficult to finance by external resources
whereas less risky R&D may not be subject to binding financial constraints. This
was implemented empirically by grouping the sample into firms with a routine versus
a cutting-edge R&D strategy. The results showed that firms pursuing cutting-edge
R&D strategies are indeed subject to financial constraints in the credit market. A
bad credit rating index turned out to curtail R&D spending for cutting-edge R&D
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while it did not for routine R&D investment. Thus, even if firms were able to
credibly convey all information about their business to banks, the risky nature of
cutting-edge R&D may still have prevented these firms from raising sufficient capi-
tal. When kept in mind that cutting-edge innovations are one of the driving forces
of technological progress and yield higher social returns than routine R&D projects,
this finding has important implications for innovation policy as well. These results
call for policy measures particularly addressing cutting-edge R&D performing firms.
While chapter 3 explored the heterogeneity of R&D activity from the ’R&D-Strategy’
perspective, Chapter 4 focused on the characteristics of the R&D activity itself. In
this chapter industrial R&D activity had been compartmentalized into its compo-
nents ’R’ and ’D’. Characteristics usually attributed to R&D activities in general,
such as intangibility and uncertainty, are very likely to be more applicable to ’R’
than to ’D’. The empirical analysis revealed that ’R’ investment is indeed more sensi-
tive to the firms’ financial liquidity than ’D’ investments. This result illustrates that
firms have to rely even more on internal funds for financing their research compared
to their development activities. Thus, estimating different investment equations for
R&D and ’R’ and ’D’ separately shows that financing constraints appear to be more
binding for ’R’ than for ’D’. Looking at aggregated R&D expenditures of the firm
would not have revealed this effect.
Chapter 5 contributes to the literature on financing constraints for innovation in
three ways. First, a new approach of measuring of financial constraints is intro-
duced. That is, in a quasi-experimental setting, firms were asked to indicate how
they would spend additional cash that was given exogenously. A positive expansion-
ary effect on innovation projects from the additional cash is interpreted as resulting
from financing constraints that curtailed these firms’ innovation investments at sub-
optimal levels. Second, a framework is derived that attributes financing constraints
not only to the lack of financial resources, but also to the firm’s innovation capabil-
ity. Further, it was accounted for the firm’s choice between alternative uses of the
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additional money. Such an approach is crucial as investing in innovation projects
competes with other purposes of firms’ available funds. The results show that firms
with higher innovation capability are more likely to have unexploited innovation
projects, independent of their financial background. Yet, firms with high innovation
capability and low levels of internal funds were found to be more likely to be con-
strained in their innovation activities than their more liquid counterparts. These
effects can be found for innovation projects, but not for capital investment.
Is this result surprising as innovation capabilities are necessary to do innovation?
There are two possible theories on how innovative capabilities affect financing con-
straints. First, as innovation capabilities are necessary to do innovation, firms with
high capabilities should be able to attract funds easier because of the higher ex-
pected success of their projects. On the other hand, it can be argued that investors
- although they might be aware of the fact that skill is an important success factor
of R&D - do not value such skills. In terms of economic theory this means that
uncertainty about the outcome of innovation projects outweighs the information on
skills. The analysis in chapter 5 of this thesis suggests the second alternative. Al-
though one could expect firms with high innovative capacity to be less constrained
as they should be able to better convince banks and investors because of all the
evidence that skill increase success of innovation projects, they are actually more
likely to be constrained. This may be due to the increased demand for financing
on the one hand, but also due to the fact that banks and investors may still value
tangible collateral capital more than something intangible as innovation capabili-
ties. Hence, firms investing in intangible assets such as human capital and R&D
may be at a disadvantage in raising funds due to their ’relative collateral value’. In
a nutshell, financial constraints for innovation do not depend on the availability of
internal funds per se, but are driven by innovation capability.
Such empirical findings suggest an innovation policy that focuses on those factors
that form the innovation capability of firms such as the accumulation of human
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capital. The consistency of this novel constraint measure had been tested within
the methodological framework presented in chapter 3.
Besides these policy related insights, this thesis also adds to previous work in
terms of methodology. Chapters 2 and 3 improve on previous approaches by employ-
ing a credit rating index as direct measure of external constraints. This indicator
had been implemented in addition to a measure for internal liquidity. This helps
to overcome limitations related to the interpretation of the cash-flow-sensitivity
approach. Chapter 5, on the other hand, took a generally different approach by
deriving a constraint measure from survey evidence. Moreover, panel data models
were estimated in chapters 2, 3 and 4 to account for firm specific effects and changes
over time. Beyond that, while most previous studies focused on R&D performers
only and thus neglected the fact that a large share of smaller firms do not conduct
any R&D activities or not every year, the presented analyzes accounted for such
a potential bias. In particular, non-R&D performing firms and the endogeneity of
firms’ decisions to invest in R&D with respect to the availability of financing were
explicitly taken into account. Furthermore, most previous studies analyzed samples
of rather large, often stock market listed firms because of the accessability of data
for such firms. However, the results obtained cannot be generalized smaller or to
non-listed firms. The analysis in this book avoids a bias towards large firms by using
a sample of firms that is more representative of the economy.
Despite all efforts, this work is not without limitations. The first limitation con-
cerns the panel structure of the innovation survey data. The design of these surveys
is such that responding to the survey is not compulsory for firms. This resulted in
highly unbalanced panels that are not rich enough to estimate investment models
such as Euler equations, accelerator models or error-correction models which are
theoretically founded models of investment behavior that revolve around the firms’
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challenge to achieve an ’optimal’ capital stock through their investment. Although
long time-series data was available for some firms, it was not possible to calculate
an R&D stock. This would have been necessary to estimate Euler equations or error
correction models that map the inter-temporal optimization problem between the
size of investments and the level of R&D stocks. It would have been desirable to
extend the common investment models to direct measures for external constraints.
Moreover, there are some limitations due to the special characteristics of the Com-
munity Innovation Survey data that directly affect the results particularly those of
chapter 2. The CIS is designed such that it is representative of the population of
firms with five or more employees. That implies that young start-up firms may be
underrepresented due to this criterion. Moreover, independent of the size of the
firm, it may take a couple of years until young firms make it into the repertory
from which the sample is drawn as this repertory is not refreshed each year. Thus,
the inconclusive results for AGE in chapter 2 should not be over-interpreted. It is
certainly not valid to conclude that constraints are size related only. With respect
to the results of chapter 2, there may actually two issues play a role. First, start-up
firms and firms in their first couple of years of business activity may just not be in
the final sample. This may not only be caused by the sampling, but also by panel
structure of the data since the final data only includes firms that were observed at
least twice during the panel period. This means that they must have existed for
a couple of years. A second issue is that SIZE and AGE are to a certain extent
correlated. That implies that some age related effects may be captured by SIZE.
Thus, what can actually be concluded is that for firms that have reached a certain
AGE-threshold SIZE matters. However, based on the analyzes presented in this
thesis, I cannot derive a conclusion for start-up or very young firms as this would
have required different data sources.
Furthermore, although chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis made an effort to estab-
lish a causal link between the credit rating and R&D investment, the instrumental
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variables - despite passing common relevance and validity tests - cannot rule out
some remaining concerns about endogeneity, for instance, cross-industry endogene-
ity. This is also the case with the measures of firms’ liquidity used in chapter 2 to 4.
Longer time series data and a more balanced panel would possibly allow exploiting
some specific shocks, e.g. policy changes or technological shocks.
Regarding the unit of analysis it would have been desirable to have information
at the individual project level. The data at hand informs only about aggregated
’R’ and ’D’ expenditures that cannot be broken down into projects. Firms’ R&D
projects may however differ substantially in terms of size, content, duration and
other important aspects. The presented analysis should thus be interpreted with
this limitation in mind.
The conclusions that can be drawn from this dissertation have important im-
plications for innovation policy particularly for economies in which bank financing
plays such a crucial role as it does for example in Belgium and Germany. Firms
in Anglo-Saxon ’market-based’ economies with developed and liquid stock markets
generally rely to a lower extent on bank financing compared to firms in ’banking-
dominated’ financial systems that can be found in continental Europe. Given that
even independently of any financial crisis, economic theory and empirical evidence
stress the relevance of financing constraints, the problem presumably deteriorates
as the current financial crisis will require banks to conduct an even more detailed
risk assessment in the future. Systematic risk assessment techniques as within the
implementation of the New Basel Capital Accord affect financing of innovation, in
particular the screening of innovative firms. As intangible investments like R&D are
not reflected in the firms’ balance sheets, financial statement-based estimations of
firm value and creditworthiness (internal, but also external ratings) penalize firms
that invest in R&D at least in the short-run. A starting point for future research
is thus for example how investments in intangible assets such as the outcome from
R&D projects, affect banks’ risk evaluation and the decision to provide credit. In
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addition, the rigorous evaluation of existing policy schemes addressing financial con-
straints appears to be a desirable task for (European) innovation policy.
In Germany there have been so-called ’thematic R&D programs’ in place since the
early 1980’s that aim at supporting radical R&D in new technologies that can still
be far from marketable applications. However, public R&D support for the indus-
trial sector has been declining in the period from the mid-80s until the year 2003.
In 1997 governmental R&D subsidies for such programs were at an all time low
accounting to 0.74 billion Euro representing only 27% of all public R&D spending
in the private sector (Rammer and Binz 2006). Even if financial support has been
declining for all types of R&D, the decline in the ’thematic R&D programs’ may
have most severe long-run detrimental effects as particularly cutting-edge R&D and
research-oriented projects have been found to be most likely to be constrained. At
European Union level so-called Young Innovative Companies (YICs) have recently
attracted policy initiatives’ attention. These firms, even if they are small in number,
contribute to a large share of radical innovations, create new markets and stimulate
follow-on innovations by other companies. However, YICs are also characterized by
a high innovation capability and a rather weak financial background which positions
them as ’most likely constrained’ as shown in chapter 5.
Despite the suggested need for government intervention to support financially con-
strained firms, it should be noted that also governments are not immune against
information asymmetry problems either. With respect to project selection within
support programmes, it may be that selection committees do not pick those pro-
posals that promise highes social returns or those that are least likely to attract
financing at private sector sources, but those that seem the most feasible or most
likely to yield successful outcomes in the not too distant future. As highly basic
research projects may score low on selection criteria like ’feasibility’ or ’expected
economic value’, government agents may behave similar as private lenders when it
comes to project selection. Hence, it may happen that very challenging research
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projects are not awarded a subsidy. As briefly outlined at the end of chapter 4 for
the pattern of innovation project grants by the Flemish government, there is slight
evidence that basic research projects are indeed rejected more frequently.
Due to this hazard of governmental failure to efficiently support financially con-
strained firms, Venture Capital (VC) is often regarded as market solution to the
financing gap (see e.g Chan 1983, Lerner 1994, 1995, 1999, Hellmann 1998, Cornelli
and Yosha 2003, Kaplan and Stroemberg 2003 and Hall and Lerner 2010 for a recent
survey). Yet, continental European economies have not seen a remarkable growth
in the provision of VC. VC financing in most continental European countries, is still
rare and much focused on some few (high-tech) industries, e.g. bio-tech. A recent
study by Breuer et al. (2007) find substantial differences between the German and
the U.S. VC markets. They suggest legal differences as well as cultural differences
may cause the comparative underdevelopment of the German VC industry and the
difference in the importance of debt financing (see also Mayer 1988, Bebenroth et al.
2009, Deutsche Bundesbank 2000). However, the VC solution to the problem of a
financing gap for innovation is not only limited geographically, but also intrinsically.
First, VC firms focus only on a few sectors at a time and often are not interested in
investments of less than a certain size that is hardly ever reached many start-ups.
Second, for the VC solution to work VC firms must be given the opportunity to exit
the investment at a certain point. Only if VC firms can divest from the start-up
after it has the potential to finance new R&D from internal resources, funds can be
set free to be used in new VC investment in other firms. This, however, requires
well developed and liquid stock markets (see e.g. Bottazzi and Da Rin 2002 and
Hall and Lerner 2010). European policy makers, thus, attribute the relative gap in
R&D spending compared to the US to the lower number of small, young, highly
innovative firms in Europe. One crucial difference between the US and continental
Europe is the access to financing for such firms. Countries with well developed mar-
kets for VC and equity are thus likely to achieve a comparative advantage in R&D
149
for high-tech or other knowledge intensive goods and services (Chiao 2002, Carpen-
ter and Petersen 2002). For future European innovation policy, it will therefore
remain a challenge to find an optimal policy path that balances targeted subsidy
and incentive programmes as well as initiatives that pave the way for market based
solutions. The latter may even involve the implementation of fundamental ideas
such as legal reforms with respect to accounting policies to better position R&D
investments vis-a`-vis traditional capital investments.
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A.1 Appendix to chapter 2
Table A.1: Industry classifications and distribution of firms over industries
# NACE
Code
Description Frequency %
1 15, 16 Food & Tobacco 220 4.40
2 17, 18, 19 Textiles, Clothing & Leather 295 5.90
3 20, 21, 22 Wood, Paper & Printing 444 8.87
4 23, 24 Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals & Refineries 432 8.63
5 25 Rubber and Plastics 469 9.37
6 26, 36 Non-Metallic Mineral Products & Furniture 446 8.91
7 27, 28 Metal and Metal Products 715 14.29
8 29, 31 Machinery & Equipment (incl. Electric.) 912 18.23
9 30, 32 ICT Hardware 435 8.69
10 33 Instruments 373 7.46
11 34, 35 Vehicles 262 5.24
Total 5,003 100.00
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A.2 Appendix to chapter 3
Table A.5: Industry classifications and distribution of firms over industries
NACE Description Frequency %
routine cutting edge routine cutting edge
15, 16 Food & Tobacco 141 12 5.49 0.97
17, 18, 19 Textiles, Clothing &
Leather
115 53 4.48 4.28
20, 21, 22 Wood, Paper & Printing 242 43 9.42 3.47
23, 24 Chemicals,
Pharmaceuticals &
Refineries
268 88 10.44 7.11
25 Rubber and Plastics 255 95 9.93 7.67
26, 36 Non-Metallic Mineral
Products & Furniture
211 107 8.22 8.64
27, 28 Metal and Metal
Products
401 93 15.62 7.51
29, 31 Machinery & Equipment
(incl. Electric.)
481 317 18.73 25.61
30, 32 ICT Hardware 211 145 8.22 11.71
33 Instruments 145 197 5.65 15.91
34, 35 Vehicles 98 88 3.82 7.11
Total 2,568 1,238 100.00 100.00
Table A.6: Distribution of NOVEL
Share of sales with
market novelties
Relative Frequency
(in %)
Cumulative relative
frequency (in %)
0 38.71 38.71
(0 - 2.5%] 14.46 53.17
(2.5% - 5%] 13.90 67.07
(5% - 7.5%] 6.62 73.69
(7.5% - 10%] 6.06 79.76
(10% - 15%] 6.81 86.57
more than 15% 13.43 100.00
The regressions discussed in the text of the paper define the upper 33% of the distri-
bution (cut-off at 5%) as cutting-edge R&D performers. As robustness checks, we defined
the cut-off at (about) the median of the distribution with NOVEL at 2.5% (see Tables
A.7 and A.8) and at (about) the upper quartile (cut-off at 7.5%) of NOVEL (see Tables
A.9 and A.10) as cutting-edge R&D performers, respectively. As can be seen from Table
170
A5, does the distribution of firms over industries vary between the two groups of R&D
performers. To test the sensitivity of our results to this distributional property, an alter-
native grouping that defines cutting-edge and routine R&D relative to the firm’s industry
is tested. We calculate the average sales of market novelties across all time periods at
the firm level, but now divide this number by the average sales of market novelties at the
industry level. A cutting-edge R&D performer is now defined as a firm that is located
in the upper third of the sales distribution with market novelties relative to its industry.
Thus, cutting-edge performers are defined relative to their ’peer companies’ (see Tables
A.11 and A.12). All results discussed with the other specification remain robust for these
alternative definitions of R&D types.
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Table A.8: Tobit regressions on ln(1+R&D), for ’routine R&D’ (2,040 obs.) and
’cutting edge R&D’ (1,766 obs.) with RATING classes and NOVEL-split at 2.5%
Pooled Cross Section
Model
Random-Effects Panel
Model
Variable routine
cutting
edge
routine
cutting
edge
ln(EMPi,t−1) -0.394 *** -0.656 *** -0.221 ** -0.601 ***
(0.118) (0.096) (0.100) (0.082)
ln(EMPi,t−1)2 0.093 *** 0.116 *** 0.072 *** 0.107 ***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007)
ln(AGE)i,t 0.029 -0.042 0.051 -0.013
(0.045) (0.032) (0.040) (0.032)
KAPINTi,t−1 0.596 0.205 0.721 *** 0.222
(0.403) (0.304) (0.269) (0.245)
PCMi,t−1 0.515 ** 0.740 *** 0.108 0.487 ***
(0.211) (0.170) (0.164) (0.118)
ln(HHIi,t−1) 0.041 0.009 0.063 * 0.015
(0.040) (0.030) (0.033) (0.025)
RATINGi,t−1/100B 0.106 -0.062 0.161 -0.049
(0.105) (0.075) (0.072) (0.054)
RATINGi,t−1/100C 0.066 -0.130 * 0.110 -0.081
(0.115) (0.075) (0.082) (0.062)
RATINGi,t−1/100D 0.012 -0.223 *** 0.051 -0.191 ***
(0.105) (0.078) (0.077) (0.059)
Joint sign. ind. dummies
χ2(10)
98.45∗∗∗ 115.73∗∗∗ 99.45∗∗∗ 127.27∗∗
Joint sign. time dummies
χ2(9)
33.72∗∗∗ 57.89∗∗∗ 39.41∗∗∗ 54.17∗∗∗
Joint sign. RATING
χ2(3)
1.41 9.20∗∗ 5.48 11.59∗∗∗
Log-likelihood -1,811.783 -1,878.892 -1,587.726 -1,673.366
ρ - - 0.543 0.500
∗ Notes: All models include an intercept and industry dummies (not presented). Standard
errors in parentheses (clustered in pooled cross-sectional models). *** (**, *) indicate a
significance level of 1% (5, 10%). ρ indicates the share of the total variance which is due to
the cross-sectional variation.
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Table A.10: Tobit regressions on ln(1+R&D), for ’routine R&D’ (2,833 obs.) and
’cutting edge R&D’ (973 obs.) with RATING classes and NOVEL-split at 7.5%
Pooled Cross Section
Model
Random-Effects Panel
Model
Variable routine
cutting
edge
routine
cutting
edge
ln(EMPi,t−1) -0.374 *** -0.723 *** -0.217 *** -0.708 ***
(0.097) (0.110) (0.082) (0.096)
ln(EMPi,t−1)2 0.089 *** 0.124 *** 0.070 *** 0.119 ***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008)
ln(AGE)i,t 0.005 -0.001 0.027 0.022
(0.035) (0.042) (0.031) (0.040)
KAPINTi,t−1 0.423 0.048 0.595 *** 0.083
(0.333) (0.327) (0.218) (0.310)
PCMi,t−1 0.692 *** 0.759 *** 0.264 ** 0.471 ***
(0.167) (0.216) (0.127) (0.141)
ln(HHIi,t−1) 0.044 -0.017 0.061 ** 0.008
(0.032) (0.036) (0.026) (0.031)
RATINGi,t−1/100B 0.028 -0.029 0.052 0.019
(0.078) (0.096) (0.055) (0.069)
RATINGi,t−1/100C 0.003 -0.135 0.019 -0.041
(0.085) (0.104) (0.062) (0.080)
RATINGi,t−1/100D -0.093 -0.238 *** -0.062 -0.152 **
(0.080) (0.099) (0.059) (0.075)
Joint sign. ind. dummies
χ2(10)
125.40∗∗∗ 103.88∗∗∗ 151.38∗∗∗ 96.13∗∗
Joint sign. time dummies
χ2(9)
62.31∗∗∗ 20.88∗∗∗ 66.06∗∗∗ 23.40∗∗∗
Joint sign. RATING
χ2(3)
3.27 7.96∗∗ 4.22 6.93∗
Log-likelihood -2,724.879 -1,008.945 -2,387.381 -886.161
ρ - - 0.538 0.510
∗ Notes: All models include an intercept and industry dummies (not presented). Standard
errors in parentheses (clustered in pooled cross-sectional models). *** (**, *) indicate a
significance level of 1% (5, 10%). ρ indicates the share of the total variance which is due to
the cross-sectional variation.
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Table A.12: Tobit regressions on ln(1+R&D), for ’routine R&D’ (2,500 obs.) and
’cutting edge R&D’ (1,300 obs.) with RATING classes with alternative grouping
Pooled Cross Section
Model
Random-Effects Panel
Model
Variable routine
cutting
edge
routine
cutting
edge
ln(EMPi,t−1) -0.367 *** -0.691 *** -0.222 ** -0.627 ***
(0.106) (0.103) (0.088) (0.088)
ln(EMPi,t−1)2 0.091 *** 0.118 *** 0.073 *** 0.109 ***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
ln(AGE)i,t 0.008 -0.018 0.034 -0.001
(0.037) (0.037) (0.033) (0.037)
KAPINTi,t−1 0.665 * -0.221 0.802 *** -0.206
(0.364) (0.289) (0.235) (0.275)
PCMi,t−1 0.683 *** 0.606 *** 0.290 ** 0.375 ***
(0.181) (0.193) (0.137) (0.133)
ln(HHIi,t−1) 0.060 * -0.015 0.069 ** 0.001
(0.034) (0.034) (0.028) (0.029)
RATINGi,t−1/100B 0.128 -0.150 * 0.145 * -0.117
(0.090) (0.082) (0.060) (0.074)
RATINGi,t−1/100C 0.079 -0.172 ** 0.100 -0.114 *
(0.092) (0.089) (0.067) (0.062)
RATINGi,t−1/100D 0.009 -0.277 *** 0.026 -0.249 ***
(0.088) (0.090) (0.064) (0.069)
Joint sign. ind. dummies
χ2(10)
155.94∗∗∗ 128.45∗∗∗ 167.78∗∗∗ 140.98∗∗∗
Joint sign. time dummies
χ2(9)
54.25∗∗∗ 31.68∗∗∗ 59.18∗∗∗ 34.07∗∗∗
Joint sign. RATING
χ2(3)
2.94 9.53∗∗ 7.10∗ 13.69∗∗∗
Log-likelihood -2,321.561 -1,382.164 -2,042.324 -1,230.071
ρ - - 0.539 0.500
∗ Notes: All models include an intercept and industry dummies (not presented). Standard
errors in parentheses (clustered in pooled cross-sectional models). *** (**, *) indicate a
significance level of 1% (5, 10%). ρ indicates the share of the total variance which is due to
the cross-sectional variation. The alternative grouping does not use an absolute threshold
of new product sales. Here it is defined relative to the industry average, i.e. average sales of
new products at the firm level divided by average sales at the industry level.
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A.3 Appendix to chapter 4
Table A.13: Industry classifications and distribution of firms over industries
# NACE
Code
Description Frequency %
1 10, 11, 12 Food & Tobacco 273 7.41
2 13, 14, 15 Textiles, Clothing & Leather 224 6.08
3 16, 31 Wood and Furniture 111 3.01
4 17, 18 Paper 99 2.69
5 19, 20 Chemicals 292 7.92
6 21 Pharmaceuticals 76 2.06
7 22 Rubber and Plastic 148 4.02
8 24, 25, 33 Metal 309 8.38
9 27, 28 Machines and Equipment 464 12.59
10 26 ICT 269 7.30
11 29 Transport 127 3.45
12 41 Building and Construction 108 2.93
13 1, 5, 23,
37, 35, 32
Miscellaneous Industries 237 6.43
14 45, 46,
47, 49,
55, 58
Commerce and Transport 257 6.97
15 59, 64,
68, 69, 71
- 79
Other Services 452 12.26
16 61, 62 Software Development and Communication 240 6.51
Total 3,686 100.00
178
A
.4
A
p
p
e
n
d
ix
to
ch
a
p
te
r
5
T
ab
le
A
.1
4:
In
d
u
st
ri
es
an
d
C
O
N
b
y
in
d
u
st
ri
es
(2
,4
68
ob
s.
)
In
d
u
st
ry
∗
F
re
q
u
en
cy
%
M
ea
n
C
O
N
M
ea
n
T
Y
P
E
T
Y
P
E
(0
)
T
Y
P
E
(1
)
T
Y
P
E
(2
)
1
m
in
in
g
78
3.
16
0.
15
4
84
.6
2
15
.3
8
0.
00
2
fo
od
/t
ob
ac
co
17
2
6.
97
0.
28
5
71
.5
1
27
.3
3
1.
16
3
te
xt
ile
s
11
3
4.
58
0.
33
6
66
.3
7
32
.7
4
0.
88
4
pa
pe
r/
w
oo
d/
pr
in
t
25
0
10
.1
3
0.
28
4
71
.6
0
27
.6
0
0.
80
5
ch
em
ic
al
16
2
6.
56
0.
43
2
56
.7
9
38
.8
9
4.
32
6
pl
as
ti
cs
/r
ub
be
r
14
3
5.
97
0.
36
4
63
.6
4
34
.2
7
2.
10
7
gl
as
/c
er
am
ic
s
11
8
4.
78
0.
39
8
60
.1
7
39
.8
3
0.
00
8
m
et
al
31
2
12
.6
4
0.
36
9
63
.1
4
36
.2
2
0.
64
9
m
ac
hi
ne
ry
26
5
10
.7
4
0.
42
6
57
.3
6
39
.2
5
3.
40
10
el
ec
tr
.
en
g.
18
6
7.
54
0.
50
5
49
.4
6
46
.7
7
3.
76
11
m
ed
ic
in
e/
op
ti
c
19
3
8.
82
0.
52
3
47
.6
7
48
.7
0
3.
63
12
ve
hi
cl
es
10
0
4.
05
0.
46
0
54
.0
0
44
.0
0
2.
00
13
fu
rn
it
ur
e
12
1
4.
90
0.
33
9
66
.1
2
32
.2
3
1.
65
14
en
er
gy
/w
at
er
14
2
4.
75
0.
14
8
85
.2
1
14
.0
8
0.
70
15
co
ns
tr
uc
ti
on
11
3
4.
58
0.
15
0
84
.9
6
15
.0
4
0.
00
T
ot
al
2,
46
8
10
0.
00
0.
35
9
64
.0
6
34
.1
2
1.
82
∗ I
nd
us
tr
y
de
fin
it
io
n
ac
co
rd
in
g
to
N
A
C
E
se
ct
or
s
A.4. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 5 179
Table A.15: Profit-Margin Categories (2,468 obs.)
Profit-margin Frequency % Cum. Category
1 < 0% 272 11.02 11.02 ML
2 0%− < 2% 419 16.98 28.00 MM
3 2%− < 4% 467 18.92 46.92 MM
4 4%− < 7% 604 24.47 71.39 MM
5 7%− < 10% 348 14.10 85.49 MH
6 10%− < 15% 209 8.47 93.96 MH
7 ≥ 15% 149 6.04 100.00 MH
Total 2,468 100.00
Table A.16: Correlation (rho) between equations in MV-probit (2,468 obs.)
equ1 equ2 equ3 equ4
equ2 0.567 (0.029)
equ3 -0.165 (0.033) -0.115 (0.034)
equ4 -0.310 (0.036) -0.243 (0.038) 0.117 (0.037)
equ5 -0.236 (0.033) -0.100 (0.034) 0.020 (0.033) 0.033 (0.038)
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Table A.19: Correlations between job types and options of cash use
Options CEO FIN DEP R&D DEP SALES DEP OTHER DEP
Investment -0.0035 -0.0150 0.0116 -0.0110 0.0245
Innovation -0.0016 -0.0490 0.0861* 0.0084 0.0032
Reserves -0.0031 -0.0020 -0.0108 0.0114 -0.0439
Payout -0.1200* 0.0843* 0.0571* 0.0424 0.0185
Serv. Debt 0.0060 0.0162 -0.0437 -0.0324 0.0073
Table A.20: Frequencies of options of cash use by job type
Job Type # Investment Innovation Reserves Payout Serv. Debt
CEO (1,538) 67.91 35.88 43.52 17.75 44.35
FIN DEP (387) 66.41 30.49 43.41 29.46 45.99
R&D DEP (154) 70.13 51.95 41.56 30.52 35.71
SALES DEP (188) 67.02 34.04 53.72 26.06 44.15
OTHER DEP (156) 72.44 36.54 35.26 24.36 45.51
Table A.21: Correlations between options of cash use
Options Investment Innovation Reserves Payout Serv. Debt
Investment 1.0000
Innovation 0.2998* 1.0000
Reserves -0.0993* -0.0597* 1.0000
Payout -0.2051* -0.1114* 0.0541* 1.0000
Serv. Debt -0.1152* -0.0857* 0.0062 -0.0267 1.0000
Table A.19 shows the correlations between the different job types and the answering
patterns. Table A.20 displays the frequencies (in percent) of answering options by the
different job types. I can be seen that in most cases the questionnaire has been answered
by CEO (or a CEO-owner). The percentages indicate the share of representatives per job
type who chose the respective option of cash-use. For the option to invest in ’additional
innovation projects’, R&D managers show the largest percentage for choosing this option
51.95%. However, R&D managers have high values for picking the option ’additional
investments’ or ’pay out’ as well. In the multivariate analysis presented in section 5.5 it
can be seen, however, that there is no significant difference between R&D managers and
CEOs regarding the answering pattern with respect to innovation projects. That is, the
pair-wise correlation presented in Table A.19. that was significant at the 1% level, is not
sustained in the multivariate case. Table A.21 shows the correlations between options of
cash use. It can be seen that there is a significant positive correlation between ’investments’
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and ’innovation’. This can be - at least in part - by complementary capital investments
to innovation projects.
Table A.22: Correlations between ln(CASH) and options of cash use
Options ln(CASH) Investment Innovation Reserves Payout Serv. Debt
ln(CASH) 1.0000
Investment 0.0227 1.0000
Innovation 0.1366* 0.2998* 1.0000
Reserves 0.0144 -0.0993* -0.0597* 1.0000
Payout 0.1585* -0.2051* -0.1114* 0.0541* 1.0000
Serv. Debt -0.0900* -0.1152* -0.0857* 0.0062 -0.0267 1.0000
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A.5 Supplemental material
A.5.1 Consistency check I
Chapter 5 of this thesis made use of a direct indicator of financial constraints. To test
whether this indicator really captures what was expected, an admittedly rough test of
the validity of the survey-based constraint indicator (CON) is conducted in the following.
For this purpose the sensitivity of firms’ R&D investments to the availability of internal
funds and to the access to external funds is estimated for both the group of potentially
constrained (CON = 1) and unconstrained firms (CON = 0). A higher sensitivity for
firms in the group of firms that were categorized as constrained (CON = 1) is expected.
A comparable specification to Czarnitzki and Hottenrott (2009, 2010) who use the same
data-set (MIP) is used. They find higher sensitivities for firms with cutting-edge R&D
and for smaller firms, respectively. While the latter studies employ panel data techniques,
this test is restricted to the 2007 cross-section that provides our constraint measure CON .
That is, Tobit models on the following R&D equation are estimated
ln(R&D) = β0 + β1ASSETS + β2ASSETS2 + β3AGE + β4COMP + β5PCM+
10∑
k=6
βkRATINGc +
24∑
l=11
βlIND. (1)
For comparability reasons, internal liquidity is also measured by the empirical price-cost-
margin PCM .1 Access to external funds is again measured by the credit rating index
(RATING). 5 rating classes are distinguished based on the distribution of RATING,
each class covering 20 percent of the distribution. It is controled for firms’ size measured
by fixed assets (ASSETS), age of the firm (AGE), market (seller) concentration (COMP)
1The MIP data does not provide any information on cashflow. Hence, the authors calculate
an approximation for the availability of internal funds (PCM) as PCM = (Sales - Staff Cost -
Material Cost + δR&D)/Sales. This approach has been widely used in the literature (see Collins
and Preston 1969, Ravenscraft 1983 for the seminal papers). Since R&D is an expense, the decision
to invest in R&D will decrease PCM in the corresponding period. As internally available funds
during the year should be measure irrespective of the actual investment decision, it is common to
add the R&D expenses back into PCM (cf. Harhoff 1998). As PCM does not account for capital
cost, the staff and material cost shares of R&D are added back. These amount to 93% (δ = 0.93)
according to the official German R&D statistic.
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and industry. To avoid direct simultaneity, lagged values for all time-variant explanatory
variables are used.
As the survey question on which the constraint measure refers to the term ’innovation
projects’ rather than R&D projects, the robustness of the findings is tested using innova-
tion expenditure (INNOINV ) as dependent variable as well. In addition to R&D outlays,
innovation expenditure comprises acquisition of new (lab) equipment that is linked to an
innovation project, the purchase of other intellectual property (e.g. patents or licenses),
expenditure which become necessary for training employees when implementing new tech-
nologies, marketing costs for a new product, as well as design, prototyping and related
activities.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table A.24 present the results in terms of marginal effects for the
R&D equation and columns 3 and 4 for the innovation equation, respectively. In the R&D
equation, internal liquidity is significant for the firms classified as constrained (CON = 1),
but not for the firms with CON = 0. Innovation expenditure increases significantly with
an increase in internal liquidity in both groups, but the effect is significantly larger in the
group CON = 1. Further it can be seen that firms that have a worse credit rating than
the firms in the top 20th percentile (which serves as reference group) spend less on R&D
and innovation. The negative sign for the second worst and third worst rating classes is
observed for both CON = 0 and CON = 1. However, the marginal effect is larger for the
latter group2.
The results of this rough check can be interpreted as confirming that the survey-based
measure of financing restrictions derived for innovation (as used in chapter 5) indeed cap-
tures liquidity constraints.
2Concerns regarding the potential endogeneity of the credit rating have been discussed in detail
in section 3.4.
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Table A.25: Correlations between different constraint indicators
Options CON RATINGt−1 PCMt−1
CON 1.0000
RATINGt−1 0.0480* 1.0000
PCMt−1 -0.0497* -0.0359 1.0000
As can be gathered from Table A.25 there is a significant positive relationship between
lagged RATING and CON. Note that the index ranges between 1 and 6 with 6 being the
worst rating. On the other hand, with respect to lagged PCM a negative relationship can
be seen.
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Table A.26: Estimation results : probit models on the likelihood of being constrained
(CON) (2,314 obs.) without R&D-managers
Model
Variable dF/dx (Std.Err.∗)
BHML 0.236 (0.084)∗∗∗
BHMM 0.097 (0.037)∗∗∗
BHMH 0.174 (0.053)∗∗∗
BLML 0.027 (0.045)
BLMM -0.017 (0.021)
ln(SIZE) 0.008 (0.020)
ln(AGE) 0.005 (0.014)
FAMCOM 0.043 (0.019)∗∗
ln(PLC) -0.014 (0.013)
EAST -0.030 (0.019)
FIN DEP -0.118 (0.026)∗∗∗
R&D DEP -0.083 (0.038)
SALES DEP -0.047 (0.039)
OTHER DEP -0.001 (0.001)
GROUP -0.015 (0.033)
KAPINT -0.125 (0.059)∗∗
RATING -0.001 (0.014)
ln(CASH) 0.039 (0.015)∗∗∗
Log-likelihood -1,387.851
McFadden’s R2 / Count R2 0.073/0.664
McKelvey & Zavoina’s R2 0.159
AIC / BIC 1.228/-14,894.596
z-Test of BHML ≤ BHMM 2.94**
z-Test of BHML ≤ BHMH 0.84
z-Test of BHMM ≤ BHMH 2.00
Joint significance of
industry dummies 723.86***
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
The models contain a constant and industry dummies.
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Table A.27 presents the results of two additional models. The models presented here
have an alternative depended variable (LOAN ). LOAN is also derived from the CIS 2007.
The question introduced in section 5.3 originally included a section part. In this second
part the firms which said that they would do additional innovation projects with the cash
were asked whether they would investment in additional investment or innovation if the
money was not provided as cash, but as bank loan with a ’relatively low’ interest rate.
The results of this alternative model are in principle in line with the models presented
in chapter 5. It turns out that also those firms with little or medium financial resources
and high innovative capabilities are the ones that would indeed also take the money for
additional innovation projects even though it is provided by an external bank (that would
probably request some information and documentation) and even though an interest rate
would have to be paid. Interestingly, those firms with rich financial background that
would have taken the money as cash, do not turn out to be willing to accept a loan. This
supports the view mentioned in the interpretation of the results that the higher likelihood
of to be constrained for BHMH should not be over-stressed. For those firms it may be
that costs of project ideas exceed internally available funds, but their expected return is
below the cost of external capital even if the interest rate was relatively low. Excluding
the R&D-managers from the sample does not considerably change the results. However,
the results of the LOAN -models cannot be compared directly to those of the CON-models
for reason related to the design of the survey question. The difficulties with this part of
the question are twofold. First, the question addresses only those firms that were classified
as constrained in the first part of the question. Second, firms that did not answer to the
first part in way that would identify them as constrained answered as well. This makes
the interpretation of these results rather difficult. They are therefore positioned in this
supplemental material only.
Table A.28 shows the correlation of the constrained indicator CON and the responses
to the survey question on hampering factors to innovation projects that was also asked
the 2007 wave of the MIP. Such survey measures were frequently used in the literature as
a direct measure of financial constraints (see section 5.1). In particular it was asked in
survey which factors among which were ’lack of internal funds’ (IF) and ’lack of external
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Table A.27: Estimation results : probit models on the likelihood of being constrained
with loan-based measure (LOAN)
Model 1 (2,129 obs.) Model 2 (1,994 obs.)
Variable dF/dx (Std.Err.∗) dF/dx (Std.Err.∗)
BHML 0.123 (0.068)∗∗ 0.134 (0.065)∗∗
BHMM 0.073 (0.042)∗ 0.071 (0.045)∗
BHMH 0.054 (0.053) 0.036 (0.057)
BLML 0.078 (0.049)∗ 0.064 (0.048)
BLMM 0.020 (0.026) 0.027 (0.023)
ln(SIZE) 0.008 (0.011) 0.010 (0.017)
ln(AGE) 0.012 (0.015) -0.014 (0.014)
FAMCOM -0.014 (0.013)∗∗ 0.045 (0.019)∗∗
ln(PLC) 0.042 (0.018) -0.020 (0.013)
EAST -0.018 (0.011)∗∗∗ -0.047 (0.014)∗∗∗
FIN DEP -0.046 (0.014) -0.034 (0.022)
R&D DEP -0.035 (0.022) -0.046 (0.034)
SALES DEP -0.029 (0.042) -0.053 (0.037)
OTHER DEP -0.047 (0.035) -0.001 (0.001)
GROUP -0.054 (0.037) -0.022 (0.025)
KAPINT -0.023 (0.022) -0.079 (0.056)
RATING -0.078 (0.057) 0.012 (0.010)
ln(CASH) 0.010 (0.009) 0.010 (0.013)
Log-likelihood -1,028.717 -956.390
McFadden’s R2 / Count R2 0.035/0.799 0.036/0.801
McKelvey & Zavoina’s R2 0.078 0.083
AIC / BIC 0.998/-13,997.405 0.992/-12,986.698
z-Test of BHML ≤ BHMM 0.52 0.76
z-Test of BHML ≤ BHMH 0.84 1.74*
z-Test of BHMM ≤ BHMH 0.07 0.22
Joint significance of
industry dummies 71.90 *** 118.86***
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
The models contain a constant and industry dummies.
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funds’ (EF) impacted innovation projects in three ways. First, did lack of IF or EF lead to
a delay in the innovation project? Second, were there projects that had been started, but
had to be canceled due to lack of IF or EF? And finally was lack of IF or EF a hampering
factor to the start of an innovation project. The third question type comes closest to the
CON measure used in chapter 5 in terms of formulation of the question. Indeed, Table
A.28 shows the highest correlation between CON and ’lack of IF did hamper project
start’. This conforms in way the validity of the CON -measure. However, the correlation
of only 15% also indicates that there is indeed a difference between innovation obstacles
that are more ’demand-side-measure’ oriented and our ’supply-side-measure’ CON .
Table A.28: Correlations between CON and obstacles to innovation
delayed canceled not started
Options CON lack of IF lack of EF lack of IF lack of EF lack of IF lack of EF
CON 1.0000
lack of IF 0.0607* 1.0000
lack of EF 0.0622* 0.5700* 1.0000
lack of IF 0.1420* 0.0885* 0.0853* 1.0000
lack of EF 0.1146* 0.0937* 0.1044* 0.5172* 1.0000
lack of IF 0.1511* 0.1039* 0.1006* 0.0027 0.0359 1.0000
lack of EF 0.1087* 0.1181* 0.0600* 0.0832* 0.0375 0.6957* 1.0000
A.5.2 Consistency check II
In order to test the validity of the novelty index used in chapter 3, patent information of
the firms in the sample is used in the following. However, this check can only be done for
a sub-sample as the availability of comprehensive patent data is limited. German patent
data is used as it includes patent filed with the European Patent office where protection
is requested for Germany. This database was available until the year 2001, but it turned
out that only the data until 1997 could be used due to the application-to-grant lag. After
1997 this data became too incomplete.
Furthermore, no citation data is available which would be required for the calculation of
basicness and generality. (The citation data is only available for the EPO patents, but
this is a small fraction of all patents.) However, I believe that looking at patent appli-
cations and granted patents is a useful exercise already. Unlike in the U.S., the German
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patent office follows a thorough examination procedure with the results that only about
40% of the patent applications in the sample were eventually granted. In general, routine
R&D should rarely lead to patents, as an invention should pass, among other criteria,
the ’novelty’ and ’non-obviousness’ requirements (see e.g. Scotchmer, 2004: 66). The
cutting-edge R&D, in contrast, should coincide with a higher likelihood of a patent grant.
Consequently, the survey measure of cutting-edge R&D performers can be validated in
regressions of patent measures on the group definition and some controls.
It is tested whether the number of granted patents per 1,000 employees (PATENT) is
higher for cutting-edge R&D performers compared to routine R&D performers. More-
over, it is tested whether the number of granted patents relative to the number of patent
applications is higher for the cutting-edge group indicating that these firms produce more
radical innovations, that is, their inventions have a higher rate of patentability due to
novelty and non-obviousness. It is controled for size, age and R&D as well as the firms’
patent application stock and the technology intensity of the industry (low-tech, medium-
tech, high-tech). The variable (NOVEL ¿ 5%) takes the value 1 if the firm is a cutting-edge
R&D performer and it takes the value 0 for routine R&D performers. Tobit models are
applied as only a fraction of firms filed patents, that is, our dependent variable is censored
at zero. The results show that firms that were classified as cutting-edge R&D performers
produce a significantly larger number of patents that are granted compared to the routine
R&D group (2nd column of the Table A.29 below). To test whether not only the number
of granted patents is significantly higher for cutting-edge performers, a Tobit model on the
share of granted patents over applied patents is estimated next. If the innovation is more
radical, the likelihood of the patent to be granted should be higher compared to routine
R&D.
The results show that NOVEL is highly positive significant in both specifications. This
basically supports the validity of the distinction between routine and cutting-edge R&D
based on the survey instrument. These results are robust to the definition of cutting-edge
vs routine such as the ’relative to industry’ measure.
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Table A.29: Tobit regressions on granted patents per 1,000 employees and share of
granted patents per patent application (1,946 obs.)
Variable # granted patents % granted patents
NOV EL > 5% 9.750*** 0.197**
(2.920) (0.085)
ln(R&Di,t−1) 17.814*** 0.443***
(3.255) (0.094)
ln(R&Di,t−1)2 -3.364*** -0.088***
(0.671) (0.020)
Patentstocki,t−1 179.754*** 4.761***
(19.781) (0.612)
ln(EMPi,t−1) 5.731 0.773***
(6.088) (0.218)
ln(EMPi,t−1)2 0.092 -0.038**
(0.546) (0.019)
ln(AGEi,t) -1.109 -0.033
(1.504) (0.044)
Log-likelihood -1,930.974 -839.585
Joint significance of
time dummies F(3, 1,934) 5.89*** 9.16***
Joint significance of
industry dummies F(2, 1,934) 6.58*** 8.42***
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
All models include an intercept and industry dummies (not presented).
,Doctoral dissertations from the Faculty of Business and Economics, see
http://www.kuleuven.ac.be/doctoraatsverdediging/archief.htm
